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Southeast Asian water conflicts—from a political geography perspective

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Abstract

This article analyzes water-related conflicts in Southeast Asia and draws the attention to controversial dam—and hydropower—schemes. It focuses on three dam projects in Thailand, Laos and Burma that are all interwoven by different characteristics of development assistance. But they also slightly differ in terms of the implementation stage, the geopolitical setting, the socio-economical frameworks and the actors involved. Against this analytical background, the approach unveils the complexity of internationalising conflicts that are created under the influence of the ongoing globalisation and by multiple actors involved, their networks, strategies and power relations. “Scarcity of resources—securing energy by development assistance” provides a brief introduction by drawing the main global configurations. “Energy supply and poverty alleviation—new dams in Southeast Asia” zooms in on the specific stage by mirroring dam disputes in Southeast Asia (SEA). Based on these fundamentals, in “Different dams—diverse actors and conflict potentials” the case studies are reconstructed to highlight the multiplicity of dam-projects and inherent controversies. “Conclusion—new conflict frameworks require new instruments of dispute resolution” offers an outlook on conceptual ideas on how to deal with future dam disputes under the auspices of development assistance.

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Notes

  1. As the term ‘developing countries’ is linked with a negative connotation, the United Nations introduced the phrase ‘less/least developed countries’ (LDCs) that is used in the following (Nohlen 2000, p. 23).

  2. Without doubt, China currently is the most influential agency (cf. “Different dams—diverse actors and conflict potentials”). For further information see e.g. Beattie and Yeh (2007) and Lawrence and Middleton (2007).

  3. The actors that play a crucial role in the controversies have become internationalised accordingly. Hence these two important conflict-constituents build the focal point of the analysis (cf. “Different dams—diverse actors and conflict potentials” and “Conclusion—new conflict frameworks require new instruments of dispute resolution”).

  4. To meet the need for a credible and effective river basin management organisation, the ‘Mekong River Commission’ (MRC) was established. But as it is only obliged to provide the member-states with legally non-binding recommendations and guidelines, the MRC faces a crisis of legitimacy and relevancy (Miller 2003).

  5. Due to predicted population growth and climatic change, experts estimate that this conflict potential will worsen in the future (Elhance 1999; Pearce 2006; Shiva 2002).

  6. See also Dore (2001), Lang et al. (2000) and Usher (1997).

  7. The WCD was an interdisciplinary panel of dam opponents and supporters. Co-financed by the World Bank, it conducted a worldwide study on consequences of dams (Bosshard 2005). The WCD concluded that in (too) many cases there has been paid an unacceptable and often unnecessary price to secure mainly economic benefits of dams, “especially in social and environmental terms, by people displaced, by communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment.” (WCD 2000, p. XXVIII).

  8. Sometimes these competing actors even conduct joint ventures such as the Nam Theun 2 in Laos (see below). At the (media) forefront of pushing dams are the international development banks like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB). They are strongly backed by the dam building industries, consultants, governments of the LDCs—and increasingly by the private sector (cf. “Different dams—diverse actors and conflict potentials”).

  9. Although energy experts are accusing the government and the power industry of constantly over-predicting the energy requirement on purpose (Greacen and Footner 2006).

  10. Furthermore it is backed by eager plans of Asian governments to establish a ‘Mekong Power Grid’ that is currently pushed forward. If realized, the grid would interconnect the power-lines of riparian Mekong countries—thus, transforming Thailand into the ‘power hub and energy broker of SEA’ (Osborne 2007; Ryder 2003).

  11. Due to space limitations of this article, the complex dam-biographies are only presented in a nutshell here.

  12. The APMDM merged in the nationwide ‘Assembly of the Poor’ (AOP) which even received international attention as it conducted longsome protest camps—well-known as ‘Villages of the Poor’—in front of Bangkok’s’ government house (Missingham 2003).

  13. Besides compensation issues and exploding costs, particularly the serious problems with declining fisheries was the main point of concern, as the local majority was dependent upon this (Blake 2006). Hence, the lion’s share of the workforce was obliged to become migrant labourers – in consequence leading to a worsening social disruption of the local society-structure (Foran 2006).

  14. The scientific recommendation was to constantly open the gates, as “even without the Pak Mun Dam there would be no problem in terms of the power generation and power security. And we have proved that the local income would increase quite a lot with the opening.” (Interview rS14).

  15. One striking lesson was the consonantly agreement for a necessarily more transparent process including participation of the (affected) population as well as to perform detailed studies upon expectable environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Subsequently, quite a number of those lessons were taken into consideration in planning following dam projects. For detailed lessons learned see Blake (2006), Foran (2006), Kanokrat (2003).

  16. The World Bank plays a crucial role for the go-ahead as international private investors made their involvement dependent on a risk guarantee from the bank. Accordingly, the model is a public–private Joint Venture which the World Bank hopes to deploy for other dams, too (World Bank 2005).

  17. Furthermore, several controversies over the projects’ design accounted for the setback. These struggles occurred between NT2 proponents and opponents—mainly international NGOs like ‘International Rivers Network’ (IRN) and ‘Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance’ (TERRA). Finally the disputes ended in unaccountable numbers of studies as “the bank, together with [...] developers of the NT2 project, undertook years of studies assessing alternatives and best options [...]. It is also why NT2, has had the most extensive consultations process in the history of the country.” (Porter 2005).

  18. From their view, the recently increasing Chinese DA—engagement in Asia and Africa demonstrates that these concerns seem justifiable. The growing Chinese influence is unveiled for instance by the fact that the ‘China Development Bank’ covers a loan budget bigger than the World Banks’ and ADBs’ combined accounts (Beattie and Yeh 2007). Hence, NT2-proponents legitimize their involvement by stating that “if the ADB and World Bank would not build dams like NT2, these dams would be constructed by Chinese banks and companies anyway.” (Interview iF32).

  19. Besides the political structure and economic surroundings, the site-specific geographical premises are unique. “There is a 350m high plateau—the Nakai Plateau—which can supply the main head, meaning you can go for a relatively small dam and get huge output of energy down the plateau.[...] God has done half of the work for us. Therefore we do not have to build a 350 meters bigger and higher dam.” (Interview iE62).

  20. The project’s socio-ecological blueprint appears indeed promising (Shivakumar 2007; Tribollet 2006). But the relocation performance of roughly 6,200 people and the realisation of environmental safeguards are watched critically (Schuettler 2008). Furthermore, the dam’s anticipated negative impacts upon ecology and approximately 100,000 affected people living downstream along the Xe Bang Fai River was taken into account only marginally until recently (Bechstedt 2006).

  21. Main reasons are the internally rising discontent regarding the socio-ecological performance as well as the behaviour of specific protagonists—predominantly GoL and poorly skilled NTPC-staff (Shivakumar 2007).

  22. Thus, preparatory building measures are already underway. Besides these projects, China also plans to construct up to 13 dams on their Salween part—but faces rising environmental resistances (Nguyen and Amin 2007).

  23. So far, hydropower accounts for about one-third of Burma’s mere 1,500 MW electricity production. The Salween-dams would add up to 16,000 MW of capacity (Bartle 2005).

  24. Just the ADB forms an exception through indirectly supporting the Tasang dam, as this is (as well as the NT2) part of the planned Mekong Power Grid—which is an ADB promoted program. “They funded the feasibility study for the design of the dam as it would fit perfectly into the idea of ‘Regional Economic Cooperation for Power Development’.” (Interview iN44; cf. “The dam constellation of Thailand and its neighbours”).

  25. The NGOs are mainly TERRA and ‘Southeast Asia Rivers Network’ (SEARIN) from Thailand, as well as the American-based ‘EarthRights International’ (ERI).

  26. On international scale they try to raise awareness upon the dams’ negative aspects e.g. by publishing books, maintaining a website and initiating ‘Salween Action Days’. On national Thai-scale in turn, the priority is to cooperate with the media, in order to question Thai energy demands and to ‘frighten’ the population by giving warnings of a rising Burmese refugee wave to Thailand because of the dams (Pianporn 2007).

  27. Another setback was the assassination of one of the Karens’ outstanding leaders in Thailand, as he strongly defeated the dams (Tada 2008).

  28. For instance, the locally affected people, activists, peoples’ organizations and NGOs seeing themselves as the ‘good ones’ and the governments, development banks, consultants, dam builders, financiers and other DA-agents as the ‘bad guys’—and vice versa.

Abbreviations

ADB:

Asian Development Bank

APMDM:

Anti-Pak Mun Dam Movement

AOP:

Assembly of the Poor

DA:

Development Assistance

Egat:

Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

ERI:

EarthRights International

GoL:

Government of Laos

IRN:

International Rivers Network

LDC:

Less/ Least Developed Country

MRC:

Mekong River Commission

MW:

Megawatt(s)

NGO(s):

Non Governmental Organisation(s)

NT2:

Nam Theun 2 Dam

NTPC:

Nam Theun 2 Power Company Ltd.

SEA:

Southeast Asia

SEARIN:

Southeast Asia Rivers Network

SWC:

Salween Watch Coalition

TERRA:

Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance

WCD:

World Commission on Dams

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  1. Department of Political and Social Geography, Prof. Reuber, University of Münster, Robert-Koch-Straße 26, 48149, Münster, Germany

    Yvonne Klöpper

  2. Friedelstraße 24, 12047, Berlin, Germany

    Yvonne Klöpper

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Klöpper, Y. Southeast Asian water conflicts—from a political geography perspective. Asia Europe J 6, 325–343 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-008-0187-x

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