Abstract
Theories of multinational enterprises emphasize that foreign direct investment (FDI) is undertaken in different industries for different reasons, yet studies of the effects of democracy on FDI most commonly use aggregate-level FDI data. This paper evaluates US FDI outflows to 15 industries (eight manufacturing, seven nonmanufacturing) in 54 countries in a linear dynamic panel-data gravity FDI model using a “system” generalized method of moments estimator and three widely used democracy indicators. At the aggregate-level, we estimate a positive effect of democracy on FDI, consistent with most prior studies. At the industry level, we estimate larger positive effects of democracy on FDI for service than manufacturing industries, particularly for finance and insurance and information, and negative effects for mining and oil and gas extraction.
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Notes
Supporting this view, Blanton and Blanton (2012) show that there is a somewhat stronger positive correlation between education and democracy than between education and human rights, based on the measures they use in their study.
In contrast, what Bayulgen describes as “hybrid” countries, like Russia, are unable to effectively provide either.
Cf. Bollen (1993), Poe and Tate (1994) and Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for valuable assessments of a range of democracy indexes. Of the FH political rights index, Poe and Tate write, “In sum, we believe that the Freedom House index is a useful measure of democracy” (Poe and Tate 1994, p. 857). Munck and Verkuilen argue that all democracy indexes, including the Freedom House and Polity IV indexes, suffer notable weaknesses. The authors note the high degree of correlation between the various indexes, but argue that this illustrates their reliability rather than their validity.
We use the Polity2 index rather than the democracy and autocracy indexes separately, which seems consistent with the literature on the hypothesized effects of democracy on FDI and, as the Polity IV users’ manual states, “provides a convenient avenue for examining general regime effects” ((Marshall et al. 2011, p. 17). The Polity2 index is also consistent with the construction of the Freedom House political rights index, which addresses aspects of both democracy and autocracy.
We do not use earlier years because of a break in the series, a result of which data from 1994 on are not directly comparable with data from earlier years, as described by Bach (1998).
Note that other industries includes a very large and diverse set of activities: agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; construction; utilities; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; real estate rental and leasing; administration, support, waste management and remediation services; health care and social assistance; accommodation and food services; and miscellaneous services.
That is, other manufacturing (not elsewhere classified) includes: tobacco products; textile products and apparel; lumber, wood furniture and fixtures; paper and allied products; printing and publishing; rubber products; miscellaneous plastic products; glass products; and stone, clay and non-metallic mineral products.
We chose chemicals and allied products because it is the sole industry with perfect definitional consistency over the period from 1994 to 2010.
See Kennedy (1998, pp. 225–226) for a fuller explanation of such use of dummy variables.
Regional dummy variables are based on the nine regions described in the appendix, with the dummy variable for developed countries excluded. Note that dropping developed countries from the sample results in high p-values for the Hansen J test, about which Roodman cautions (2006).
The coefficient estimates and associated standard errors (in parentheses) for the FH civil liberties, FH political rights and Polity IV indexes are respectively, 0.798 (0.311), 0.302 (0.265), and 0.587 (0.257), with the first and last coefficient estimates statistically significant at the level of 5 %. We also tried using the “collapse” option in the xtabond2 program, which reduces the number of instruments by collapsing the matrix of GMM-type instruments into a column. But for the full sample of countries and the sample without developed countries, this results in unrealistically high p-values for the Hansen J test (greater than 0.9).
The coefficient estimates and associated standard errors (in parentheses) for the FH civil liberties, FH political rights and Polity IV indexes are respectively, 0.839 (0.768), 0.509 (0.559), and 2.647 (0.824), with the last coefficient estimate statistically significant at the level of 1 %. The associated null hypotheses for the corresponding Hansen J and Arellano–Bond tests are accepted.
These are Chile, Nigeria, Peru, the Russian Federation and Venezuela.
At the same time, even if such countries are only interested in the narrow pursuit of economic outcomes, attracting FDI is just one among such outcomes. For example, stronger democracies may also affect growth performance (see Gerring et al. 2005 for an overview).
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee as well as the organizers and participants of the 3rd Regulating for Decent Work Conference, held in Geneva on 3–5 July 2013, where this paper was presented. We are particularly grateful to Sangheon Lee for his interest in and support of this work.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Data sources
Freedom House civil liberties and political rights indexes are available online from Freedom House at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/.
The Polity IV Polity2 index is available online from the Polity IV Project at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
US FDI data are available online from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis at: http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm.
Crosswalk tables between SICS and NAICS are available online from the NAICS Association at: http://www.naics.com/.
Data on English as an official language and distances between capital cities are available online from CEPII at: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
World Development Indicators are available online from the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
However, we downloaded the World Development Indicators in Stata format from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies website at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/md4stata/datasets/wdi.html.
All websites for data were accessed in May 2012.
1.2 Technical notes
For US FDI data, the SIC (1987) industry classification was used from 1994 to 1998 and the NAICS (1997/2002) industry classification from 1999 to 2010. For most of our 15 industries, we use data from 1999 to 2010, as we were unable to adequately match SIC with NAICS. But for six industries, we matched SIC and NAICS as follows, using crosswalk tables provided by the NAICS Association. For chemicals and allied products, SIC 28 was matched with NAICS 325, with no difference between the two. For food and kindred products, SIC 20 is matched with NAICS 311, with beverages included in the SIC period but combined with other manufacturing thereafter. For primary and fabricated metals, SIC 33 and 34 are matched with NAICS 331 and 332, for which 93 of 106 NAICS 331 and 332 products correspond. For industrial machinery and equipment, SIC 35 is matched with NAICS 333, for which 58 of 82 NAICS 333 products correspond. For transportation equipment, SIC 37 is matched with NAICS 336, for which 31 of 41 NAICS 336 products correspond. For wholesale trade, SIC 50 and 51 are matched with NAICS 421 and 422, for which 73 of 95 NAICS 421 and 422 products correspond.
Regarding the specification of the FDI model, several additional host-country variables commonly used in FDI models were tested and not found to be statistically significant. These include the number of phone lines per 100 inhabitants (as natural logarithms, where 1 is added to values to retain observations with zero values—a measure of infrastructure), the change in the consumer price index (as percentage change—a measure of inflation), GDP growth (as percentage change based on valuation in constant 2,000 US dollars—a measure of market dynamics) and total FDI stock from all countries (as natural logarithms based on valuation in constant 2,000 US dollars—a measure of agglomeration effects and treated endogenously in the system GMM context). While data for the first three variables come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the last comes from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and is available online at: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en.
Following Busse et al. (2011), we set negative FDI values to zero and then added 1 to all FDI values, which the authors refer to as their “preferred FDI variable” (Busse et al. 2011, p. 150). But for regressions using this variable construction, we reject the null hypothesis for the Hansen J test that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. Following Asiedu and Lien (2011), we used measures of total trade relative to GDP and gross fixed capital formation relative to GDP constructed as percentages, but we also used these constructed as natural logarithms, and this did not substantively change results.
1.3 Countries in the sample (grouped according to World Bank geographical classification)
East Asia and Pacific (7): China, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.
Europe and Central Asia (5): the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, Turkey (data for the first four countries are only available from 1999 to 2010).
Developed (21): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom.
Latin American and Caribbean (13): Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela.
Offshore (1): Bermuda.
Middle East and North Africa (4): Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
South Asia (1): India.
Sub-Saharan Africa (2): Nigeria, South Africa.
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Kucera, D.C., Principi, M. Democracy and foreign direct investment at the industry level: evidence for US multinationals. Rev World Econ 150, 595–617 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-013-0183-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-013-0183-0