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Foreign-owned plants and job security

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Abstract

We investigate the hypothesis that workers in foreign-owned plants face greater job insecurity than those in domestic-owned plants. Using linked employer-employee data from Germany, we examine whether foreign-owned plants are more likely to close down, and whether workers in foreign-owned plants face higher separation rates. Our results show that, in Germany, foreign-owned plants per se are not associated with greater job insecurity, either through plant exit or worker separation. However, small, non-exporting and privately owned foreign-owned plants do face a higher risk of closure than equivalent domestic plants.

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Notes

  1. The estimated coefficient reported by Görg and Strobl (2003, Table 2) is 0.231 with a standard error of 0.059. However, the ownership variable is also interacted with a number of other characteristics, and some of these interactions are highly significant. The average effect of foreign ownership on the hazard rate may therefore be much smaller than 0.231.

  2. The authors compute hazard ratios of 2.56 for the electronics sector and 10 for the food sector. These estimates are an order of magnitude greater than estimates from cross-sectional comparisons.

  3. A detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel can be found in Fischer et al. (2009).

  4. The relevant question is: “Is the establishment mainly or solely in: (a) Western German ownership (b) Eastern German ownership (c) Foreign ownership (d) Public ownership (e) No single owner which holds majority?” Our analysis considers only plants under (a)–(c).

  5. For example, there are only 36 plants who were domestic-owned in 2000 and foreign-owned in 2004.

  6. The interview outcome essentially takes three values: (1) “Same plant as last year” (2) “Plant still exists but has left panel” (3) “Plant has closed”.

  7. The age of a plant is calculated by finding the year in which the plant first appears in the Beschäftigtenstatistik. However, the earliest year in the Beschäftigtenstatistik is 1975, and so the age of some plants is right censored.

  8. It is left truncation rather than left censoring because we observe the age of plants as they enter the sample (Wooldridge 2002, Section 20.3.3).

  9. This is closely linked to their larger size: see Addison et al. (2001) for a description and analysis of German works councils.

  10. See Schank et al. (2007) for a discussion of exporting and size amongst German establishments.

  11. The profitability variable comes from the question “How was the profit situation in the last business year?”.

  12. Andrews et al. (2010) analyse the wage effects of foreign ownership using these data.

  13. This is 1,394 closures divided by 31,790 plant-years at risk. See Table 1. Throughout, all plant level analyses are based on 31,790 plant-years and 8,943 plants.

  14. This difference in log-hazard rates between domestic-owned and foreign-owned plants can be interpreted as an approximate percentage difference in the usual way, measured in log-points. The exact percentage difference is given by \(100 (\exp(\beta)-1)\).

  15. Note that even in this case we should not control for any genuine additional productivity which arises from the acquisition.

  16. See Addison et al. (2004) for evidence that works councils and plant closure are positively associated.

  17. 100(e −1.192 − 1) =  −70%; 100(e −2.304 − 1) =  −90%.

  18. It is interesting to note that some 34% of foreign plants report that they are not part of a larger organisation (Table 2), which suggests that they may not in fact be part of a multinational. This is another reason for restricting the sample.

  19. Helpman et al. (2004) construct a model in which, amongst firms which serve foreign markets, only the most productive engage in foreign direct investment. This is confirmed empirically for the United States. Wagner (2006) also confirms this empirically using a sample of German firms.

  20. In fact, the much greater number of observations at the worker level implies that we do not have to group the hazard as we did for the plant closure hazards. We have done this purely for comparability.

  21. Estimated coefficient is 0.039 with a standard error of 0.066.

  22. We experimented with different definitions of a ‘contracting’ plant, ranging from 0 to 10%; 5% is where the foreign ownership effect is the biggest. We also checked whether expand/contract dummies affects other controls and have interacted it with plant-size.

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank the Economic and Social Research Council (under grant number RES-000-22-1034) and the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy (under grant number F/00 114/AM) for financialsop assistance. We are grateful for the comments of an anonymous referee, and we also thank the participants of the “Labour Markets, Trade and FDI” workshop at Istanbul Technical University (2009), the Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Micro Data (CAED) conference in Budapest (2008), a workshop on Foreign Trade and Globalisation sponsored by the German Council for Social and Economic Data (RatSWD), and the 2008 WPEG conference in Sheffield for their comments. Stephen Jenkins also helped with clarifying conversations concerning unobserved heterogeneity and left truncated discrete duration models. The data used in this paper are confidential but not exclusive. They are available for non-commercial research by visiting the research data centre of the German Federal Employment Agency at the IAB in Nürnberg, Germany. See http://www.fdz.iab.de for more information. Researchers interested in replications or extensions of our work may contact richard.upward@nottingham.ac.uk.

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Andrews, M., Bellmann, L., Schank, T. et al. Foreign-owned plants and job security. Rev World Econ 148, 89–117 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-011-0110-1

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