Abstract
In a world where Artificial Intelligence (AI) is pervasive, humans may feel threatened or at risk by giving up control to machines. In this context, ethicality becomes a major concern to prevent AI systems from being biased, making mistakes, or going rogue. Requirements Engineering (RE) is the research area that can exert a great impact in the development of ethical systems by design. However, proposing concepts, tools and techniques that support the incorporation of ethicality into the software development processes as explicit requirements remains a great challenge in the RE field. In this paper, we rely on Ontology-based Requirements Engineering (ObRE) as a method to elicit and analyze ethicality requirements (‘Ethicality requirements’ is adopted as a name for the class of requirements studied in this paper by analogy to other quality requirements studied in software engineering, such as usability, reliability, and portability, etc. The use of this term (as opposed to ‘ethical requirements’) highlights that they represent requirements for ethical systems, analogous to how ‘trustworthiness requirements’ represent requirements for trustworthy systems. To put simply: the predicates ‘ethical’ or ‘trustworthy’ are not meant to be predicated over the requirements themselves). ObRE applies ontological analysis to ontologically unpack terms and notions that are referred to in requirements elicitation. Moreover, this method instantiates the adopted ontology and uses it to guide the requirements analysis activity. In a previous paper, we presented a solution concerning two ethical principles, namely Beneficence and Non-maleficence. The present paper extends the previous work by targeting two other important ethicality principles, those of Explicability and Autonomy. For each of these new principles, we do ontological unpacking of the relevant concepts, and we present requirements elicitation and analysis guidelines, as well as examples in the context of a driverless car case. Furthermore, we validate our approach by analysing the requirements elicitation made for the driverless car case in contrast with a similar case, and by assessing our method’s coverage w.r.t European Union guidelines for Trustworthy AI.
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1 Introduction
In a world where Artificial Intelligence (AI) is pervasive, controlling more services and systems everyday, humans may feel threatened or at risk by giving up control to machines. In this context, many of the potential issues are related to safety and ethics. For example, AI systems may be biased towards one group of people in detriment of others, resulting in job loss and wealth inequality; they may also make mistakes and even go rogue, by acting against the interests of stakeholders [54].
According to the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, ethics refers to standards of behavior that tell us ‘how we ought to act’ while playing different roles, e.g. worker, driver, parent, citizen, engineer, medical doctor, etc. For each role, there are ethical codes of conduct that capture such standards of behaviour [1]. Ethicists and AI researchers have been studying the interplay of ethics and AI systems where the subjects of ethical codes are systems that play such roles, e.g., worker, driver. Floridi et al. [22] proposes five general principles that underlie ethical codes and are role-independent. These have been adopted by the European Commission in a document concerning trustworthy AI [41]. The principles are: Autonomy (respect human dignity), Beneficence (do good to others), Non-maleficence (do no harm to others), Justice (treat others fairly), and Explicability (explainability, transparently). But besides being recognized and well-defined, these principles need to be embedded into software engineering practices, in a way that they may effectively guide the design of ethical systems.
Requirements Engineering (RE) is the research area that can exert a great impact in the development of ethical systems by design. RE is not only responsible for eliciting requirements that will guide the design of a system-to-be, but also for ensuring that such requirements have been properly met, and also for monitoring that these requirements remain valid throughout the life cycle of the system. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no current Requirements Engineering method to support the development of ethical systems.
The proposed solution to the problem-at-hand involves a deep understanding of what the proposed ethical principles mean and how they can be converted into concrete system requirements that can guide system design and run-time monitoring. For that, we rely on the Ontology-based Requirements Engineering (ObRE) method. ObRE consists of three activities: (1) Adopt or develop an ontology to conceptually clarify the meaning of requirements (in this paper, ethicality requirements); (2) Instantiate the ontology for a system-to-be, resulting in a domain model; and (3) Use the domain model to guide analysis, resulting in requirements models, such as goal models, requirements tables, user stories etc. ObRE has been previously proposed in [7], where it has also been illustrated for the elicitation and analysis of trustworthiness requirements.
In this paper, we use ObRE to propose a method for eliciting and analyzing ethicality requirements.Footnote 1 We can categorize ethicality requirements for a system-to-be as types of Ecological Requirements [40], in that they are derived from the ecosystem within which the system-to-be is embedded. After all, it is that ecosystem that determines values and risks that can lead to ethical behaviours by the system ([40], p. 253). In fact, as mentioned in Sect. 1, the focus on ethics is motivated by the emerging feeling of risk brought by the use of recent technologies. And these risks must be accounted for and analyzed in contrast with the values delivered by systems and services applying such technologies.
In a previous paper, we presented a solution concerning two of the ethical principles defined by Floridi et al. [22], namely Beneficence and Non-maleficence [36]. The present paper significantly extends the previous work by targeting two other important ethicality principles, those of Explicability and Autonomy. For each of these new principles, we do semantic unpacking of the relevant concepts, and we present requirements elicitation and analysis guidelines, as well as examples in the context of a driverless car case. Moreover, we present a validation of our approach, by verifying it against a checklist of goals established by the EU initiative towards the development of ethical systems by design [21]. We are able to show that the proposed method guides the requirements engineer in capturing requirements associated to most of the goals present in this checklist.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of ontological analysis, and explains the existing ontologies reused in this work; Sect. 3 describes the ObRE method; Sect. 4 applies ontological analysis and instantiation for ethicality requirements; Sect. 5 presents requirements elicitation and analysis for a driverless car case; Sect. 6 validates the proposed ObRE-based method for eliciting and analyzing ethicality requirements. Section 7 discusses related works; and finally, Sect. 8 concludes and sketches future work.
2 Research baseline
2.1 Ontological analysis
The notions of ontology and ontological analysis adopted here are akin to their interpretations in philosophy [11]. In this view, ontological analysis: (i) characterizes what kinds of entities are assumed to exist in a given domain; (ii) offers a metaphysical account of the nature of these kinds of entities. An ontology, in turn, is a system of concepts and their relationships that result from (i) and (ii).
As such, an ontology is neither merely a logical specification nor it is mainly concerned with making terminological and taxonomic distinctions. For example, in addressing the domains of risk, one is less concerned with what specific subtypes of risk exist (e.g., physical, biological, financial, electronic), but instead with what exactly is risk? What kind of entity is it? What is its nature? Is it an object? an event? a relationship? a complex property? If the latter, is a categorical or dispositional property? what is the bearer of such a property?, and so on.
Given the nature of this method of analysis, it must be supported by a domain-independent system comprising the most general categories, hence, crosscutting several domains (e.g., objects, events, relationships, dispositions, etc.), i.e., what is termed a foundational ontology (aka top-level or upper-level ontology). In this article, we adopt the Unified Foundational Ontology (UFO). Moreover, in order to develop and represent our models, we use the UFO-based ontology representation language OntoUML. OntoUML contains modeling primitives that represent the ontological distinctions put forth by UFO, and its grammar semantically-motivated syntactical constraints that reflect the axiomatization of UFO [28].
The choice of UFO and OntoUML are justified in a number of grounds:
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both UFO and OntoUML have a successful track record in supporting ontological analysis of complex related notions such as value, risk, service, trust and trustworthiness, legal relations, money, decisions, economic preferences, among many others [6, 34, 37, 49];
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empirical evidence shows that the use of OntoUML significantly contributes to improving the quality of domain representations without requiring an additional effort to produce them [58]. As demonstrated in [10], in contrast to traditional conceptual modeling languages, the process of ontological analysis supported by OntoUML is actually a process of explanation, which reveals the truthmakers of the propositional content present in the model. The resulting models are much more explicit regarding their ontological commitments when compared to traditional models, thus, facilitating domain comprehension and interoperability [29];
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as shown by [57], UFO is the second-most used foundational ontology in conceptual modeling and the one with the fastest adoption rate. The authors also show that OntoUML is among the most used ontology-driven conceptual modeling languages in the literature. The diffusion of UFO and OntoUML in the field facilitates the accessibility of our results;
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although there are a few alternative foundational ontologies (see [12]), UFO is the only one among these that is accompanied by a full-blown modeling language (OntoUML) with its tool ecosystem. The former enables the representation of our models in a conceptual modeling diagrammatic language, thus, facilitating their accessibility by requirements engineers, and the latter allows one to potentially leverage this tool ecosystem for model verification, validation, verbalization and code generation [25, 27]. In particular, it allows for the generation of logical specifications in OWL/SWRL for the models proposed here, thus, enabling automated reasoning over these models;
However, the main reason for adopting UFO (and OntoUML) here is the following: as it will become evident in the models that follow, an analysis of the different dimensions of this domain requires the ontological support of: a mature theory of relations and relational aspects (relational modes and relators) [24, 26]; a theory of events [13] and how they can be represented in structural conceptual models [4, 33]; and a theory of types [31] including higher-order types [23]. UFO is currently the only foundational ontology that satisfy all these theoretical requirements. To briefly contrast it with a few alternatives: DOLCE does not include a theory of types and it does not countenance relational aspects; BFO does not include a full-blown theory of material relations, events or types, and does not countenance the notion of higher-order types. Likewise, BWW rejects the very idea of higher-order types, as shown later in the paper, abound in this domain.
2.2 An ontology for requirements (NFRO)
The Non-Functional Requirements Ontology (NFRO) is defined as an extension of UFO. As such, it adopts the UFO notion of Agent, an entity having mental states such as belief, desire and intention and means to act accordingly.Footnote 2 Also, the notion of Intention that refers to a situation (state-of-affairs) that the Agent commits to bring about by pursuing goals and executing actions. It is also important to state that according to UFO, Agent can be categorized into Human (i.e. a person), Artificial (i.e. artificial systems, such as information systems, cyber-physical systems, etc.) and Institutional (i.e. organization). A Stakeholder may be a Human or an Institutional agent, while the system-to-be is an Artificial one. Given the focus of this article, we do not include a figure showing this Agent categorization, but we refer the reader to [35] (chap.3), for details.
Requirements can be functional and non-functional, while the latter has special relevance to ethicality requirements, so we focus on them by adopting NFRO [39]. In NFRO, a requirement is a goal. Requirements are specialized into NFRs (aka quality goals) and functional requirements (FRs). FRs refer to a function (a capability, capacity) that a system can manifest in particular situations. NFRs refer to desired qualities taking quality values in particular quality spaces. For example, a software system is considered to have good usability if the value associated to its “usability” quality maps to the “good” quality region in the “usability” quality space. In other words, functional requirements prescribe what should be done by the system (i.e., what kind of behavior it should exhibit). In NFRO, this means that the system should be endowed with functions whose manifestations will satisfy certain goals. In contrast, NFRs refer to how these manifestations occur. For example, transporting a passenger from A to B is a functional requirement that can be satisfied by the manifestation of a complex transportation function, thus, satisfying a crisp goal. Now, transporting that passenger e.g., in a calm (as opposed to aggressive) driving style, as quick as possible, in an ecologically-friendly manner refer to ways in which that transportation event unfolds, i.e., a to particular quality of that event. Notice that this quality emerges from the interplay between other functions (dispositions) and qualities of the system and its environment. This point is further discussed in Sect. 2.4. So, although both functions and qualities play a role in designing systems that satisfy ethical requirements, the latter (as we elaborated in Sect. 2.1 are formulated in terms of qualities characterizing the actions brought about by the system.
UFO makes an important distinction among types of moments (existentially dependent entities). In particular, among types of intrinsic moments (those moments that are existentially dependent on a single individual). This is the distinction between qualities and modes. Qualities (e.g., color, height, weight, duration) represent objectified intrinsic properties of an individual. The types instantiated by these qualities (i.e., Quality Universals) are directly associated to a Quality Spaces [28]. A quality is then constrained to vary its quality value within the points constituting that Quality Space. For example, the Quality Universals Color is associated with a particular tri-dimensional Quality Space (the Color Spindle) and, hence, the color of a particular object (i.e., a Quality individual) can only vary its value within that space. In contrast with Qualities, Modes are existentially dependent entities that are not directly associated with quality spaces. Instead, modes can have parts and can have their own qualities and modes, which can change in independent ways. A particular type of mode is a disposition. Dispositions are modes that manifest in certain situations and always via the occurrence of events. Not only Functions but many of the key notions that appear later in this paper (e.g., capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, duties, powers, rights) are examples of dispositions.
A fragment of COVER depicting value and risk experiences [49]
This ontological account delineates different kinds of requirements, and clarifies the nature of NFRs as qualities that map a system artifact into a quality region [39]. Figure 1Footnote 3 depicts a selected subset of the NFRO that is relevant here. For an in-depth discussion and formal characterization of qualities, quality universals, dispositions, and quality spaces, we refer the reader to [28, 38].
2.3 The common ontology of value and risk (COVER)
The Common Ontology of Value and Risk (COVER) [49] breaks down Value Experiences into events, dubbed Value Events. These are classified into Impact Events and Trigger Events. The former directly impact a goal or bring about a situation that impacts a goal. while Trigger Events are simply parts of an experience identified as causing Impact Events, directly or indirectly. Within the category of Impact Events we can further distinguish into Gain Event and Loss Event. The difference between them rests on the nature of the impact on goals (positive for Gain Events and negative for Loss Events). To formalize goals, COVER reuses the concept of Intention from UFO [12].
Risk Experiences are unwanted events that have the potential of causing losses, and are composed by Risk Events, which can be of two types, namely threat and loss events. A Threat Event carries the potential of causing a loss, intended or unintended. A Threat Event might be the manifestation of: (i) a Vulnerability (a special type of disposition whose manifestation constitutes a loss or can potentially cause a loss); or (ii) a Threatening Capability (capabilities of a threat object that, hence, can dent the goals a Risk Subject). The second mandatory component of a Risk Experience is a Loss Event, which necessarily impacts intentions in a negative way. Figure 2 depicts a fragment of COVER, which captures part of the aforementioned ontological notions.
2.4 The decision making ontology (DMOnto)
Figure 3 shows an excerpt extending the Decision Making Ontology (DMOnto) [37], which defines Decision as a particular kind of Intention resulting from a Deliberation performed by the Agent.
DMOnto also goes deeper into the Deliberation process, analyzing it in terms of the concepts of Preference and Prospect Ascription.Footnote 4Prospect Ascription results from a process of assigning Value or Risk to Prospect Bearers (either a Prospect Object or a Prospect Experience). For instance, when one decides to take a particular route when traveling, one considers the values of taking that route (e.g. it is the shortest route w.r.t. the destination) as well as the risks (e.g. the risk of getting caught in a traffic jam). The concepts of Value and Risk have been already defined by the COVER ontology in the previous section.
When an Agent decides something (i.e., performs a Deliberation), she takes into consideration her own Preferences regarding two possible Prospect Bearers. A Preference is the truthmaker of the ternary has preference relation, the latter connecting a Preferred Bearer and the non-preferred bearer (termed Deprecated Bearer). Preference is thus a complex mode, which aggregates two Prospect Ascriptions, each one associated to one of the Prospect Bearers. According to [46], this binary case may be extrapolated to include other Prospect Bearers, each one associated to its own value.
Each Prospect Ascription is composed of several smaller “comparisons” (or “judgements”), named Prospect Ascription Components, which aggregate an Intention and Intrinsic Moments that are taken into consideration by the Agent when ascribing Value or Risk to a Prospect Bearer. In the aforementioned route example, there are two Prospect Ascription Components: one related to the Quality of the route of being the shortest one w.r.t. the destination and an Intention of "getting to the destination as fast as possible"; and another related to the Quality of how busy the route is and the same Intention of "getting to the destination as fast as possible".
In establishing preference, the deciding agent considers intrinsic moments (modes and qualities) associated with the prospect bearer (e.g., length and topology of the road), with entities in the environment (value and risk enablers in COVER) (e.g., average speed of a collective of cars on that road in that period), the capacities of the agent themselves (e.g., competence of the driver in driving in certain conditions), as well as (see discussion in 4.2) the social positions inhering in these agents. The types instantiated by these intrinsic moments that ground preference and, hence, deliberation are termed decision Criteria. In other words a Criterion may be a Quality Type, e.g. length (of the route), or a Mode Type, e.g., the existence of the functionality provided by an automatic gearbox, in case you are buying a car.
A decision is a type of intention (and, hence, a type of disposition) created by a deliberation event. A decision-resulting action is an event that manifests that intention in particular situations.
3 The ObRE method
Figure 4 illustrates the process of the ObRE method, showing the three activities mentioned in Sect. 1.
The process starts with (1) Domain Ontology Development, requirements analysts and ontology engineers perform ontological analysis for a class of requirements. We emphasize that ObRE does not prescribe that the requirements engineer is versed in the use of ontological analysis concepts. For that, ObRE assumes the presence of an ontology engineer, and the requirements engineer plays a role of a domain expert in the ontology development process. The outcome of activity (1), is an ontology modelled in OntoUML. This activity is performed once for each class of requirements and doesn’t need to be repeated for each new system development project. For example, in [5], we conducted ontological analysis about the notions of trust and trustworthiness in order to unpack the meaning of trustworthiness requirements. According to the results of our analysis, a system is trustworthy if it is believed to have the capability to perform its required functions (Capability belief) and its vulnerabilities will not prevent it from doing so (Vulnerability belief). Moreover, we define trustworthiness as a composition of three other qualities, namely reliability in performing its functions, truthfulness in presenting its credentials and transparency in its operations. To judge how reliable a system is, we must understand how much of the Stakeholder’s Capability Belief is actually met by the system’s operations. Note that reliability could have been defined in multiple other ways, for instance, it could have been related to accessibility, i.e., how often will the system be responsive to stakeholder needs; or inferred by the system possessing a specific reliability certificate. The trustworthiness ontology has been recently used in a real case study, reported in [6], showing promising results in defining and monitoring trustworthiness requirements for a particular system. In case a new trustworthy system needs to be developed, the same ontology can be fully reused, and instantiated for the new system-to-be.
Having the requirements explicitly defined and understood, the analyst may perform (2) Domain Ontology Instantiation. Here, the analysts focus on a particular system and instantiate elements of the ontology. For a security ontology, this step would identify stakeholders, vulnerabilities, attack types, etc. for a particular system. This is intended to serve as domain model for conducting requirements analysis. We highlight the importance of this step, since the same class of requirements may lead to distinct concrete requirements for each system. Thus, instantiating the ontology created in (1) helps identify these particular requirements and opens the way for the system-to-be requirements analysis.
In activity (3) Requirements Analysis Method Execution, analysts use the domain model to define and analyze system requirements. For instance, she may simply define a requirements table, listing the requirements instantiated with the help of the ontology. Or if she prefers a more sophisticated analysis methodology, she may use goal modeling, defining the contribution of different choices to accomplish a particular goal (i.e., requirement), and specifying how goals relate to each other, as well as to relevant stakeholders’ resources and tasks. Or yet, she may create user stories based on the identified ontological instances. From this point on, the requirements analysis may progress as the chosen method prescribes, however, with the benefit of having the ontology and ontological instances as guides.
As depicted in Fig. 4, steps (2) and (3) are intended to be carried out iteratively, as with most RE methods. This supports the analyst in revisiting the previous activities while maturing the requirements elicitation and analysis.
Table 1 summarizes some practical guidelines for the ontology-based requirements engineering process.
4 Domain ontology development and instantiation for ethicality requirements
In this section, we apply steps (1) and (2) of ObRE for ethical principles as qualities, and we model ethical requirements as NFR refined into sub-NFRs related to such qualities, following the definitions presented in Sect. 2.2. This is shown in Fig. 5.
4.1 Beneficence and Non-maleficence requirements
Let us interpret ethicality requirements in terms of value and risk. Value can be seen as a relational property, emerging from a set of relations between the intrinsic properties of a value object (or a value experience) and the goals of a Value Subject [49]. The value of an object (or experience) measures the degree to which the properties (affordances) of that object positively contribute (help, make) to the achievement of value subject goals. Mutatis Mutandis, risk is a relational property emerging from a set of relations between the intrinsic properties of an Object at Risk (vulnerabilities), as well as Threat Objects and Risk Enablers (capacities, intentions) and the goals of a Risk Subject [49]. The risk of an object at risk given threat objects and risk enablers amounts to the degree to which the properties of those entities can be enacted to negatively contribute to denting (hurt, break) the risk subject goals. Now, ontologically speaking, affordances, vulnerabilities, capacities, intentions are all types of dispositions, which are themselves ecological properties, i.e., properties that essentially depend on their environment for their manifestation [43]. Now let us analyze Beneficence and Non-maleficence requirements, allowing us to contrast these two related NFRs. Considering the definition of beneficence as “doing good to others” [22], we can say that Beneficence Requirements are related to “creating value” to stakeholders in the ecosystem in which the system is included. It means that Beneficence Requirements can be seen as goals related to an intention of positively impacting the goals of stakeholders in this ecosystem. Analogously, considering the definition of Non-maleficence as “doing no harm to others” [22], we can say that Non-maleficence Requirements are related to “preventing risks” to stakeholders. Consequently, Non-maleficence Requirements can be seen as goals related to an intention of preventing the occurrence of events that may negatively impact stakeholders’ goals.
Events that impact agents’ goals, either positively or negatively, are defined in COVER [49] as Gain Events and Loss Events, respectively. In this sense, Beneficence Requirements intend to create Gain Events, which positively impact stakeholders’ goals. Similarly, Non-maleficence Requirements intend to prevent the occurrence of Loss Events, which negatively impact stakeholders’ goals. Fig 6 represents the OntoUML modeling of Beneficence and Non-maleficence Requirements.
As presented in Fig. 5, Requirement is modeled as a Goal, which is the propositional content of an Intention of a stakeholder. We use the notion of agent defined in UFO to model stakeholders. In UFO, agents are individuals that can perform actions, perceive events and bear mental aspects. A relevant type of mental aspect for our proposal is that of an intention. Intentions are self-commitments to bring about certain state of affairs [14]. In the ontology, Intentions are represented as modes (an externally dependent entity, which can only exist by inhering in other individuals [28]) that inhere in Agents. Quality Requirement is a type of Requirement. Beneficence and Non-maleficence Requirements are types of Quality Requirements, which are related to a Beneficence Intention and a Non-maleficence Intention, respectively. Beneficence Intentions are externally dependent on Gain Events as their focus of interest is the creation of such events. As previously mentioned, Gain Events are a type of Impact Event (as defined in COVER [49]) that positively impact Agent’s goals. Non-maleficence Intentions, in turn, are externally dependent on Loss Events as their focus of interest is to prevent the occurrence of such events. As aforementioned, Loss Events are a type of Impact Event that negatively impact Agent’s goals.
In order to satisfy Beneficence Intentions, the designed system will be endowed with functions whose manifestations (together with other dispositions of its environment) are Gain Events. Furthermore, it shall be endowed with countermeasuring functions (i.e., functions of countermeasure mechanisms) whose manifestations prevent (block, and antidotes for) the occurrence of Loss Events. For an extensive discussion on countermeasure mechanisms and their relation to the topics of prevention (blocking, antidopes), we refer to [9].
In the sequel, in Fig. 7, we instantiate the ontology with two examples (a Beneficence and a Non-maleficence Requirement) in the context of driverless cars.
In the first example, the Passenger of a driverless car intends “not to be late”. In order to address this, we have the Beneficence Requirement that “the car should choose quicker rout towards destination” related to the Intention that the “driverless car arrives on time at destination”, which is a Beneficence Intention that aims at creating a Gain Event. The event “driverless car arrives on time at destination” is a Gain Event that positively impacts the Passenger’s goal of not being late.
In the second example, the Passenger intends to “feel safe”. In order to address this, we have the Non-maleficence Requirement that “the car should adopt a defensive driving behavior” related to the Intention of “preventing aggressive direction”, which is a Non-maleficence Intention that aims at preventing the occurrence of a Loss Event. The event “passenger feels nervous as the car drives aggressively” is a Loss Event that negatively impacts the Passenger’s goal of feeling safe.
4.2 Autonomy requirement
Another important ethicality requirement is the Autonomy Requirement, defined by Floridi et al. [22] as the ‘power to decide’. In this paper, the authors argue that when using AI, people voluntarily delegate some of their decisions to the system. Thus, dealing with system autonomy means defining the right balance between what is to be decided by the user and what can and should be delegated to the system.
The concept of Delegation has been targeted by the Unified Foundational Ontology since its early days. In a Delegation, two agents play the role of Delegator and Delegatee. To analyze autonomy, the Stakeholder assumes the role of Delegator while the System assumes the role of Delegatee.
To understand Autonomy Delegation, it is crucial to consider concepts borrowed from UFO-L, an ontology of legal relations. Considering well-known legal theories, UFO-L defines 8 legal relationships, which are grouped in four pairs of legal positions:
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Right and Duty. If subject \(S_1\) has the right to an action A or omission O against subject \(S_2\), then subject \(S_2\) has a duty to perform action A (or omitting O).
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Permission and No-Right. If subject \(S_1\) holds a permission towards subject \(S_2\) to an action A (or omission O), then subject \(S_2\) has no-right to demand that the permission holder \(S_1\) omits action A (or refrains from omitting O).
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Power and Liability. If subject \(S_1\) has legal power in face of subject \(S_2\) to create, change or extinguish a legal position (a right, duty, permission, etc.) X for subject \(S_2\), then subject \(S_2\) is liable towards subject \(S_1\) w.r.t this legal power.
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Disability and Immunity. If a subject \(S_1\) has, in face of subject \(S_2\), no power to create, change or extinguish a legal position X for subject \(S_2\), then subject \(S_2\) is immune to changes in the legal position that affect her.
We here generalize these notions from UFO-L to consider not only legal positions but also social positions, i.e., social rights duties, permissions, powers, etc. Duties, rights, permissions and no-rights are either Action Type Referring Positions (e.g., the duty to perform actions of the Action Type T) or Omission Type Referring Positions (e.g., the permission to omit from performing actions of the Action Type T’). The actions types referred to by these autonomy social positions include Deliberation Types (e.g., the permission to deliberation over certain situations, i.e., to make decisions of a given type). As shown in Fig. 8, an Autonomy Delegation is a bundle of these social positions. These complex bundles instantiate an Autonomy Delegation Type. A particular predefined type of autonomy delegation, i.e., a type of bundle of autonomy social positions is called a Level of Autonomy.
Levels of Autonomy are provided by the Stakeholder to an Artificial System, and it modulates the strength of this delegation relation, i.e. how much is in fact delegated to the system. In some systems, this autonomy level may be configurable. For example, in the context of the driverless car example, in general, the passenger may delegate the choice of the route to the car. However, in some circumstances, based on the passenger’s preference, she may take over such decision, for example, if she wants to follow the route by the sea to appreciate the view. Autonomy requirements refer to Autonomy Delegation Types, i.e., which Level of Autonomy is to be delegated to a Artificial System.
As previously mentioned, we adopt here the approach of the Intentional Stance Theory, in which artificial systems are thought of as being able to bear mental moments and, hence, being able to participate in social (albeit not legal) delegations. Artificial Agents’ intentions are adopted intentions, which are adopted from those of human and organizational stakeholders, often as a result of these delegations. An Artificial Agent (including an Ethically-Design System) can then form preferences that based on these adopted intentions, and its beliefs about properties of entities in its ecosystem (and how they affect those intentions). These preferences will then ground that agent’s deliberations, the deliberations it has a duty (permission) to perform.
One of the most important parts of dealing with ethical requirements is handling ethical conflicts. In other words, what happens when two stakeholders have conflicting requirements or when the system needs to make a choice between favoring one stakeholder than another, in face of the same requirement. This is one of the contexts in which it is useful to analyze autonomy requirements.
Let us consider a possible conflicting situation in the context of the driverless car example. It is intuitive that all stakeholders (e.g. passengers and pedestrians) have the same requirement of "being safe". Suppose that in some point in the car’s route, there is a tree that must be avoided. But not hitting the tree, while saving the passenger means running over some close-by pedestrians. This case illustrates the well-known Trolley Problem in philosophy. And Fig. 9 illustrates one possible choice to handle such conflict.
As can be seen in Fig. 9, Dodging the tree is a Risk Experience that has participations from the Driverless car, the Passenger and the Pedestrians. This is a point of attention for the requirements analyst, whenever two (or more) stakeholders participate in the same risk experience, it is possible that such experience results in a gain event for one stakeholder and a loss event for the other. That is exactly what happens here. The Driverless Car needs to make a choice between hitting the tree and putting the Passenger in danger or avoiding it and harming the Pedestrians. And in this case, it decides to dodge the tree, leading to the Driverless Car Keeps passenger Safe gain event and the Driverless Car Runs Over Pedestrians loss event. Ultimately, the car fulfills the Keep Passenger Safe ethicality requirement, failing to fulfill the same requirement w.r.t. the Pedestrians.
Please note that ObRE does not take any particular ethical stance, but merely provides the right concepts to deal with ethical conflicts. As clear in the analyzed example, these concepts are: risk experience, gain and loss event and stakeholder’s intentions, which will ultimately lead to one of multiple conflicting ethicality requirement to be fulfilled.
Note that in the illustrated case, we assumed that the Driverless Car had the Permission to perform that action (the gain event) on behalf of the Passenger in face of this particular risk experience, but also that it has the power to overrule its duty to omit from performing an action that harms the pedestrian (a loss event). An Autonomy Requirement referring to an Autonomy Delegation Type for this particular case has been decided a priori. And the Autonomy Level was high, allowing the Driverless Car to fully make that decision. Notice that the human stakeholders that are the delegators of that autonomy level to the car be found to bear the corresponding social and legal responsibility for the artificial system’s actions and omissions.
4.3 Explicability requirement
Explicability has been in the center of discussion regarding AI systems [2, 18]. According to Floridi et al. [22], this requirements should be viewed in the sense of “intelligibility” (addressing the question “how does it work?”) and in the sense of “accountability” (addressing the question “who is responsible for the way it works?”).
Let us first address explicability as intelligibility. In the ontology depicted in figure 10, an explicability requirement refers to a number of action types (including types of deliberations and Decision Resulting actions) whose trail of provenance has to be made intelligible. In this context, this means reconstructing the chain from Decision-Resulting Actions to the decisions they manifest, from those to the Deliberations that create them, from the latter to the preferences relation on which they are grounded, from the latter to the criterion, i.e., qualities, dispositions, intentions, as well as social positions that constitute the prospect assessments that are the truthmakers of these preferences.
Now, turning to accountability, there are three aspects to consider. Let us first address the notion of moral responsibility. In disposition-based philosophical studies of moral responsibility [8], an agent A is taken to be morally responsible for action X if: (1) A has caused X; and did that (2) intentionally and (3) autonomously; and (4) there is a system of values (and norms) on which the appropriateness of A can be judged. Our models make explicit that there are here at least types of agents that can be considered the bearers of moral responsibility. First and foremost, these are the stakeholders who must form their intentions and preferences taking into considerations a wider backdrop of collective values, values of other stakeholders in the ecosystem at hand, and who delegate their goals to artificial agents including via the formulation of social positions in autonomy delegations. Secondly, the artificial agents (ethically-designed systems) to which these intentions and autonomy levels are delegated. In our analysis, we make clear that artificial systems are ethically designed when they have the capacity and (adopted) intentions (2) to perform actions (1) that bringing about value to the relevant stakeholders and mitigate their risks (4), when they honor their delegated autonomy agreements, i.e., they act at the appropriate level of autonomy (3) defined by the relevant stakeholders (the prospect beneficiaries).
By being able to intelligently recreate the chain of entities connecting actions performed by an autonomous system to the original stakeholders intentions and delegations, systems designed in conformance to our analysis would be able to explain also moral responsibility (accountability) for these two types of agents.
Let us think of an example in the context of the driverless car case, illustrated in Fig. 11. Suppose that the car is driving the Passenger through a highway in a lane of slow traffic speed, but fails to overtake the vehicles that are riding in front. When asked by the Passenger why it chooses not to overtake (Decision-Resulting Action), the driverless car responds that overtaking the car (Deprecated Bearer) would take them to a lane which is obstructed by an accident in 500 Km. Given the Passenger’s Intention of reaching the destination fast and safely, and the Quality of the lane of being obstructed, the driverless car decided to maintain the current lane, not overtaking the other vehicles. This example shows that the analyzed ontological concepts provide the means to trace the driverless car action to the decision that led to such action, along with the used criteria, making it clear for the stakeholder why that action was executed instead of an alternative one. From the accountability perspective, the driverless car may also point out that it has a high Autonomy Level w.r.t to overtaking, based on a specific contract made with the Passenger, who delegates the Decision to overtake or not to the driverless car. Such delegation is composed of a Permission to decide.
As demonstrated in [10, 30] but also in [32], the method of ontological unpacking employed here is a type of explanation similar to the notions of truthmaking explanation [51] and grounding [52] in the philosophical literature. Ontological unpacking explains notions such as the ethical dimensions analyzed here by revealing the underlying ontological entities on which they are grounded, i.e., the truthmakers of propositions involving these notions (e.g., acting with beneficence, non-maleficence, ethically, etc.). So, the ontological analysis proposed here provides explicability of the first of the moral agents aforementioned, namely, the stakeholders involved defining intentions and preferences taking into considerations a wider backdrop of collective values. As discussed in depth in [32], both the Explainable AI (XAI) notions of white-box explanation (i.e., explanation by generating a symbolic artifact replicating the behavior of the black-box) and black-box explanation (such counterfactual explanations) should be complemented by a process of ontological unpacking (grounding, truthmaking) as outlined here.
Moreover, if one takes explanation to also be “deduction in reverse” and, in particular, if what we are “reversing” is a type of causal chain (thus, enabling a type of causal explanation), we have that: by providing a representation structure that explicit models the chain connecting actions performed by an autonomous system to decisions and preferences and, ultimately, to the original stakeholders intentions and delegations, this approach also supports the design of systems that are able to intelligibly and unaccountably explain and justify their actions by explicitly traced causal processes.
Finally, the notion of Explicability Requirement put forth here can be seen as a special case of Why-Question or Requests for Explanation in the approach of Pragmatic Explanation [48, 55]. In particular, having Preferences modeled as a comparisons between alternative Prospect Ascriptions, allows for providing a contrast classFootnote 5 against which deliberations are made.
5 Requirements analysis method execution
In this section, we exemplify activity 3) of the ObRE process. Due to space limitations, we only present relevant fragments of the results. The complete case study is available at https://github.com/unibz-core/obre/blob/main/ethicality-requirements-case/.
Before presenting the requirements models we created, it is important to emphasize that a key concept to deriving ethical requirements is that of Runtime Stakeholders [40]. These include those stakeholders that are using, affected by, or influencing the outcomes of a system as it is operating. Traditional RE often limits runtime stakeholders to just users of the system-to-be. However, for AI systems this needs to be extended to other parties. For example, for a driverless car, runtime stakeholders include passengers - i.e., the users of the car - but also pedestrians, whose path may cross that of the car and shouldn’t be hit; bystanders, who shouldn’t be scared or splashed as the car drives by; nearby drivers, who as a courtesy, should be allowed to cut in front in the car’s lane; and fellow drivers in general, who might benefit from information about an accident that just happened in the vicinity of the car. This is illustrated in Fig. 12.
5.1 Beneficence and Non-maleficence requirements analysis
Now, we present a requirements table for the driverless car case. We start by presenting Table 2, showing how a requirements table may be enriched with the inclusion of columns representing some of the ontological concepts described in the previous subsections. This facilitates requirements elicitation, by using the right concepts for a particular kind of requirement as guides. In the case of ethical requirements, concepts such as impact event (both positive and negative) and ethical principles. All words highlighted in boldface in Table 2 refer to ontological concepts analyzed in Sect. 4, while the ontological instances are written as non-emphasized text.
Note that the ontological analysis of Sect. 4 makes very explicit all involved ontological notions used in Table 2, thus supporting the communication and avoiding misunderstandings between the stakeholder and the requirements analyst. For example, having the concepts of gain event or loss event as well as the specialization of ethical requirements may guide the analyst in asking the right questions during requirements elicitation. This is done by first capturing first the positive and negative impact events concerning Driverless Cars, then relating them with the ethical principles (Beneficence and Non-maleficence, in this case), and finally coming up with particular requirements for the system-to-be to accomplish such principles. In particular, regarding the latter, these are requirements for the developing of functions and capacities that enable the manifestation of gain events, or that block the manifestation of loss events (e.g., by eliminating the vulnerabilities of the object at risk, or by changing either the intention or the threatening capacities of the threatening agent).
Here below are two guidelines that may help requirements analysts to capture Beneficence and Non-maleficence requirements based on ontological concepts.
![figure e](http://media.springernature.com/lw685/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10270-023-01115-3/MediaObjects/10270_2023_1115_Fige_HTML.png)
![figure f](http://media.springernature.com/lw685/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10270-023-01115-3/MediaObjects/10270_2023_1115_Figf_HTML.png)
5.2 Autonomy requirements analysis
Table 3 exemplifies some autonomy requirements for the driverless car case.
Note that it is important to identify what action or decision is delegated to the system, also determining the legal relation that such delegation entails. We also make explicit in the table, the level of autonomy of each delegation, indicating if the system has high, medium or low autonomy in making decisions or taking actions.
The last line in table 3 presents a requirement related to the conflict case illustrated in Sect. 4.2. Analyzing ethical conflict is very important to guarantee the development of ethical systems. This leads to the following requirements analysis guideline: The requirements analysis should consider for each two (or more) stakeholders, if there are any risk experience in which they participate. And if so, if it is possible to defer the choice to the system’s user or which choice the system needs to take in each case.
Here below are three guidelines that support requirements analysts in eliciting Autonomy requirements based on ontological concepts.
![figure g](http://media.springernature.com/lw685/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10270-023-01115-3/MediaObjects/10270_2023_1115_Figg_HTML.png)
![figure h](http://media.springernature.com/lw685/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10270-023-01115-3/MediaObjects/10270_2023_1115_Figh_HTML.png)
![figure i](http://media.springernature.com/lw685/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10270-023-01115-3/MediaObjects/10270_2023_1115_Figi_HTML.png)
5.3 Explicability requirements analysis
For the explicability requirements, it is important that the Requirements Analyst think in advance for which decisions and actions the system should provide an explanation. Table 4 presents some Explicability requirements for the driverless car case.
Note that Table 4 does not have columns for ontological concepts, like for Beneficence, Non-maleficence and Autonomy. This is because for Explicability, the ontological concepts (e.g. Decision, Decision Resulting Action, Prospect Bearer etc.) are meant to enable the system to create the explanation in itself. In other words, they are supposed to be embedded in the explanation mechanism designed for the system-to-be. In this sense, this approach goes beyond only eliciting requirements, also defining how the system should be designed to meet Explicability requirements.
In what follows, the reader may find a guideline to help the analyst to elicit Explicability requirements.
![figure j](http://media.springernature.com/lw685/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10270-023-01115-3/MediaObjects/10270_2023_1115_Figj_HTML.png)
5.4 Goal modeling of the driverless car scenario
Going beyond the use of requirements tables, let us now use goal modeling for analyzing the requirements of the Driverless car case. Figure 13 depicts a goal model for this case, using the i* framework [15].Footnote 6
For simplification, this model considers only three of the stakeholders referred to in Table 2, namely, Passenger, Pedestrian and Nearby Car. Moreover, the model depicts the dependency of each of these stakeholders and the Driverless Car. Many of the dependencies and goals depicted in this model have been already elicited by using the requirements tables of the previous sections. For example, with respect to the Passenger, the reaching destination on time goal dependency relates to the positive impact event elicited to Passenger (see Table 2, first line), while the feeling at ease dependency relates to the negative impact captured for this same stakeholder (see Table 2, second line). Nevertheless, new dependencies have been added, for instance, when drawing the model, we realized that avoiding accidents dependency (previously only attributed to the Nearby Car stakeholder, see Table 2, line 6) is also relevant for the PassengerFootnote 7
Besides dependencies, the goal model of Fig. 13 depicts the internal perspective of the Driverless Car, assisting in the analysis of the system’s requirements. Note that the ethical principles of Beneficence, Non-maleficence, Autonomy and Explicability are represented there by qualities (consistent with our ontological notion of NFR). Then, for each of these qualities, more specific goals and qualities are identified and related to them by contribution links. For instance, the choosing quicker route quality helps (i.e. partially contributes to) the achievement of Beneficence. Additionally, choosing quicker route may be indirectly related to the reaching destination on time goal dependency of the Passenger. Similarly, the goals that help to achieve the Explicability quality are also indirectly related to the having explanations about system’s decisions and actions goal dependency of the Passenger.
The goal model also allows the requirements analyst to progressively identify more concrete requirements and solutions and the resources needed to accomplish them. For example, the use a GPS with frequent map updates task makes (i.e. fully accomplishes) the choosing quicker route quality, and the GPS itself is a resource needed in this task. Moreover, the be aware of traffic laws task is a means for the following traffic laws goal.
Another task worth clarifying is use the 2 s rule. This is a well-known rule for maintaining a safe distance between vehicles. It is adopted in some countries as a good code for driver conduct for human drivers [53], and it can also be adopted as a requirement for driverless cars. Note that this task makes the keeping a safe following distance while driving quality. However, to accomplish the higher level keeping a safe following distance quality, other tasks and qualities are involved.
Note that most entities in the goal model can be obtained directly by mapping elements from the ontology instantiation. Furthermore, for each of them, more specific goals, qualities, tasks and resources can be identified and represented. The mapping between the ontology concepts and their representation in the i* Goal Model is presented in Table 5.
The reader may have noticed that each of the RE approaches has its advantages and limitations. For example, the relation between the relevant ontological concepts for each principles and the ethical requirements are easier to spot in the requirements table, much easier and fast to create in comparison with the goal model. The goal model, however, makes more explicit which intention (and thus which requirement) is related to each of the agents involved in our case. Moreover, it is visual and it allows a much more detailed requirements analysis, in terms of more and less abstract requirements, solutions and needed resources. We emphasize that ObRE does not subscribe to a specific RE method, leaving this choice for the requirements analyst, based on their particular preference or skill.
6 Validation
In this section, we describe two analyses made to assess the quality of OBRE to elicit ethicality requirements. In Sect. 6.1, we compare the requirements elicitation done with our method for the driverless car case to one made for another project focusing on the same type of system. In Sect. 6.2, we assess the coverage of our method w.r.t. European Union guidelines for developing Trustworthy AI.
6.1 Validating the use of OBRE for the driverless car case
To validate the use of ObRE for the driverless car case, we compared the requirements elicited with the use of ObREFootnote 8 and the requirements elicited for the AutoCar Project, a project carried out at the Çankaya University also focusing on autonomous car. This project was chosen for comparison for eliciting requirements for the same kind of system of our case, and for having published the requirements online, both in requirements tables and in goal models.Footnote 9
The AutoCar requirements report contains tables of functional and non-functional requirements. In our report, requirements tables are classified by the type of ethical requirements: Beneficence, Non-maleficence, Autonomy and Explicability. We compared these reports’ requirements based on the following research questions:
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RQ1: Which requirements are equal/similar in both reports?
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RQ2: Which requirements are exclusive to one of the cases (i.e. the AutoCar Project or the ObRE Autonomous Car Case)?
Table 6 shows examples of equal/similar requirements in both projects.
After comparing the requirements of both cases, we counted how many coincidences there were and how many requirements were exclusive to either project. The results of our comparison in quantitative terms are summarized in Table 7.
As can be seen in table 7, using ObRE, we were able to capture most of the requirements elicited for the AutoCar Project (22 requirements, to be specific). Moreover, 19 ethicality requirements captured for our case were not present in the AutoCar requirements report. Among these are all 6 explicability requirements, 6 of the autonomy requirements, 5 of the beneficence requirements and 2 of the non-maleficence requirements. A careful look shows that focusing on the ethical principles to define these different requirements types allied to the ontological concepts that support capturing them provide a powerful mechanism to elicit ethicality requirements.
We acknowledge that our case misses 12 requirements that were elicited for the AutoCar Project. Some of these requirements are specific functional requirements that would probably come up in a more refined version of the goal model analysis of our case, for example "The user gives basic orders to system with voice." Some other requirements that our method did not capture are related to non-functional requirements which are not the focus of ethicality requirements, e.g., portability ("The system should work on Linux and Windows"); easiness to learn ("The system needs to be simple enough to learn by users"); and extensibility ("New functionalities can be added to the system at anytime"). This suggests that the use of ObRE may need to be complemented with the use of other approaches focusing on different non-functional requirements not related to ethicality. And finally, there are 3 of these requirements that can be characterized as ethicality requirements according to ObRE and were simply missed: “The user may see information about the car (speedometer, tachometer, odometer, engine coolant temperature gauge, and fuel gauge, turn indicators, gearshift position indicator, seat belt warning light, parking-brake warning light, and engine-malfunction lights).” (explicability requirement); “When an unpredictable failure occurs, system need to recover briefly” (beneficence requirement); and “The autonomous car system shall not start moving when its doors are still open. And notify user when safety belt has not worn.” (non-maleficence requirement).
6.2 How does our approach stand against the EU checklist of objectives for ethical requirements?
To assess ObRE-based method for eliciting and analyzing ethicality requirements, we analyze if it addresses the goals set up in the initiative of the European Union towards the development of ethical system. This initiative prepared a document entitled "Ethics By Design and Ethics of Use Approaches for Artificial Intelligence"Footnote 10 and in the annex entitled "Specification of Objectives against Ethical Requirements", the document brings a checklist of goals an AI system needs to meet in order to be considered ethical. In table 8, we present which of the ethicality requirements defined by the use of our approach can address each of these objectives. In that table, we use the letters B, NM, E, and A to represent, respectively, our treatments of Benevolence, Non-Maleficence, Explicability, and Autonomy. We place an ‘X’ on the columns representing each of these principles when our treatment of that principle supports the requirements engineering in addressing the respective EU objective, and place an ‘X’ in the column ‘None’ when that support remains lacking.
As can be noted in the table, with the use of the developed method, the requirements engineer is able to address most of the required goals, by eliciting ethicality requirements. For example, by eliciting Beneficence and Non-maleficence requirements, the requirements engineer makes sure that "the AI system takes the welfare of all stakeholders into account and do not unduly or unfairly reduce/undermine their well-being"; by capturing autonomy requirements, she guarantees that "end-users and others affected by the AI system are not deprived of the abilities to make all decisions about their own lives, have basic freedoms taken away from them." but also that "end-users are aware that they are interacting with an AI system" (since end-users can and should participate in the specification of autonomy delegation agreements); and by eliciting explicability requirements, she assures that "the system offers details about how decisions are taken and on which reasons these were based" but also that the system could keep record of the decisions made and why, as well as can provide traceability of which stakeholder intentions are adopted in the designed and implemented system.
Most of the goals not addressed in our work regard privacy and fairness. Our models partially support some aspects related to these objectives. For example, because values, risks and consequent intentions can be captured in a way that is specific to individual prospect beneficiaries, our model can support the elicitation of these elements to different end-users with different abilities. However, we believe these notions of privacy and fairness require in-depth dedicated ontological analyses, which are outside the scope of this paper and matter for future work.
Finally, since our approach is focused on requirements for a particular system, objectives that deal with the supply chain of components used in the design of the system, as well as objectives dealing with unforeseen future uses of these systems are considered to be out of scope (non-applicable–N/A) to our analysis.
7 Related work
We examine related works in two directions. First, we take a look at ontology-based methods for RE, especially those targeting NFRs, as these kinds of requirements are the main focus of ObRE. Next, we investigate works that aim at embedding systems with ethics.
ElicitO [3] is an ontology-based tool aimed at providing guidance during requirements elicitation, conducting the requirements analyst in performing a precise specification of NFRs. Taking a similar direction, the work of Veleda and Cysneiros [56] provides an ontology-based tool to help identify NFRs, making explicitly their interdependencies and possible conflicts. Hu et al. [42] also aim at detecting conflicts between NFRs, and conduct a trade-off analysis in case such conflicts arise. This is done by representing NFRs in a softgoal interdependency graph, which is formalized using an ontology. All these works follow a different path in comparison to ours, focusing much more on the automation of requirements analysis by the means of representing NFRs using OWL ontologies. Our work, on the other hand, uses reference ontologies to provide a deep understanding of NFRs whose semantics are usually subjective and complex, by interpreting these NFRs according to the particular domain of the system-to-be. And by the means of this interpretation, our work attempts to guide the requirements analyst in defining requirements that will support the analyzed NFRs.
Nowadays, many researchers have been busy trying to come up with frameworks and approaches targeting responsible AI and the development of systems embedded with ethics. Interesting initiatives are those of Rashid, Moore, May-Chahal and Chitchyan [47], Peters, Vold, Robinson and Calvo [45], Etzioni and Etzioni [19], Dignum [17] and Floridi et al. [22]. The latter has been proposed by several specialists, and has served as basis for the European Union Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI [20]. All these cited research works bring very relevant insight on how to develop ethical systems. However, their proposed frameworks and guidelines are still in an abstract level, and we believe that approaches specifically targeted at Requirements Engineering are still an open issue. Our proposal was designed with the goal of filling in this gap.
8 Final considerations
In this paper, we propose a method to elicit and analyze ethicality requirements based on the ObRE method. In particular, ObRE supports the precise definition of the concepts that underlie ethicality, through an ontology and offers these concepts for requirements analysis. This may help in the communication between analysts and stakeholders, besides assisting in the identification and analysis of requirements.
This paper is part of an ongoing work on an RE method to create ethical systems by design. To recap, the paper presents ontological analyses of four of five principles previously defined guide the development of ethical systems. The analyzed principles are Beneficence, Non-maleficence, Autonomy and Explicability. Additionally, the paper conducts requirements elicitation and analysis by applying well-known RE methods, supported by the instantiation of the proposed ontologies.
It is important to note that our approach does not prescribe a specific way to implement the analyzed requirements in the system, for example, by developing a rule-based system, or by having the requirements hardcoded. Our ObRE-based approach focuses solely on the RE activity, supporting the elicitation and analysis of requirements, which can then be implemented, validated and monitored throughout the system’s life cycle.
We acknowledge that understanding well the ontological concepts underlying our approach may be a complex task. And we believe this complexity is actually given by the challenge of designing systems that exhibit ethical behavior. It is important to highlight that once the ontology has been created, it may be reused to enable the elicitation of ethicality requirements of different systems. In this paper, we applied it for a driverless car case, but in future project, it may serve for eliciting requirements for a financial system deciding who is eligible for a loan, a chatBot responding to user queries based on large data sets, or any other system with ethical implications. To alleviate the complexity of the application of our ontology-based method, this paper brings some explicit guidelines to support the requirements elicitation of each kind of ethicality requirement.
Our agenda for the future includes, firstly, a full fledged implementation and validation of our ObRE-based approach, by doing real case studies in the domain of ethical systems and having experts evaluate the results. Moreover, we intend to deepen our analysis of ethical conflicts, and to proposed an ontological analysis of the ethical principle of Justice, which is the only principle proposed by [22] that we have not yet targeted.
Notes
The ObRE method proposed here is agnostic w.r.t. to the AI approach that is employed to build the systems whose requirements are analyzed (e.g., whether based on symbolic or machine leaning approaches). It is also agnostic w.r.t. material domain (e.g., healthcare, penal recidivism) or application. Instead, it focuses on identifying and ontologically unpacking relevant ethical dimensions, as well as supporting the elicitation, explicit modeling and reasoning with requirements of any system that can directly impact (positively or negatively) human values and goals. In that sense, ObRE can be employed to address systems of all types that can potentially have this effect—the interest reader is referred to [44] for a collection of relevant examples. This particular paper focuses on AI systems given, on one hand, the scale of their potential effect on values and goals and, on the hand, given the existence of specific regulations and guidelines for AI systems that against which we could validate our proposal (see Sect. 6.2 of the paper).
We make no commitment here to the so-called Strong AI view [50], in which certain artificial agents are assumed to be able to bear mental states and support cognitive processes exactly in the same way as their human counterparts. Instead, we adopt the approach put forth by the Intentional Stance Theory, in which artificial agents are assumed to have what is termed derived or ‘as if’ intentionality. This stance assumes a strategy of interpreting the behavior of an agent as if it possessed certain beliefs and as if its behavior were directed by certain desires and goals. For a full defense of this approach for the analysis of computational systems and other complex artifacts, we refer to [16].
In all OntoUML diagrams, we adopt the following color coding: types are represented in purple, objects in pink, modes in blue, events in yellow, and abstract entities such as numbers, sets and propositions in white.
The original DMOnto ontology reuses the preference ontology module as proposed by [46]. In that paper, preference is grounded on value ascriptions and value is assume to be possibly positive and negative. Analogously, COVER countenances both positive and negative risk [49]. Here we use the abstract type prospect to generalize over positive (a value prospect) and negative value (i.e., a risk prospect).
See [55] for the role of contrast classes in Pragmatic Explanation.
The model was drawn using the piStar tool, available at https://www.cin.ufpe.br/~jhcp/pistar/.
We did not update our table on purpose, since although that would make both models more consistent, this is an interesting case in which the visualization of the goal model and its particular constructs (in this case, dependency, goals and qualities) helped us realize a missing requirement for one of the stakeholders. In this paper, the authors are playing the role of the requirements analyst, but cases such as this one may easily happen in practice.
see complete requirements list in the Requirements Elicitation Report available at https://github.com/unibz-core/obre/tree/main/ethicality-requirements-case.
The Autonomous Car Software Requirement Specification Report is available online at: https://acp317315180.wordpress.com/autonomous-car-software-requirement-specification-report/.
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Communicated by Iris Reinhartz-Berger and Dominik Bork.
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Guizzardi, R., Amaral, G., Guizzardi, G. et al. An ontology-based approach to engineering ethicality requirements. Softw Syst Model 22, 1897–1923 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-023-01115-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-023-01115-3