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Cross border railway operations: improving safety at cultural interfaces

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Abstract

Organizations with different cultures will interface with each other as legislation is introduced to ensure the interoperability of railway systems across Europe. To approach the safety challenges related to interfaces between cultures, the International Union of Railways (UIC) initiated the project Safety Culture at Interfaces. The project covers the development of a method for assessing and trying to improve safety cultural interfaces. The project was performed by SINTEF. This paper presents the method, which is called SafeCulture. The project has piloted the method in three railway organizations with positive evaluations from the participants, identifying several issues that could improve safety at interfaces. It is not possible to isolate safety culture at interfaces from the whole system, embracing environment, infrastructure, organization, individual and teamwork. Safety culture at interfaces is an integrated part of the “whole picture”. Building safety culture at interfaces has been seen as a learning process that requires involvement and commitment between organizations. This is a difficult challenge. One of the first challenges is to motivate and get involvement from the relevant parties in the process. The next challenge is to develop real commitment from the organizations that are involved to agree on common solutions. Our approach to these challenges has been to establish a qualitative method, consisting of questionnaires and exploration of scenarios where the involved parties feel confident of their knowledge and can be motivated to share experience. Involvement and participation from the workforce and management, from the beginning of the learning loop, will create ownership and commitment to the problems and their solutions.

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Notes

  1. It is outside the scope of this paper to review theory and research on safety culture. The reader is referred to Schein (1992) and the special edition of Safety Science on Safety Culture (vol. 34, 2000), for example, the review by Guldenmund (2000), and to Haukelid (2000). The special edition of Safety Science emphasizes psychological approaches, whereas Haukelid writes from a social anthropology point of view.

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Acknowledgements

This research has in part been funded by the UIC Safety Culture at Interfaces project awarded by UIC to SINTEF. We would like to thank to Mr. Bill Gall, Mr. Teodor Grădinariu and the project team at UIC for their valued support. The method is available at http://www.safetrack.sintef.no

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Correspondence to S. O. Johnsen.

Appendices

Appendix A: SCFs in railway

Main categories of SCFs are described.

1.1 SCF-1: SCFs related to normal operation

The situation is that all technical systems are functioning sufficiently. The infrastructure is also without any (apparent) deficiency, and the trains are within their schedules. We will assume that the line is either single- or double-track, and that the line is equipped with a complete signalling system. Six primary SCFs are evident in this situation:

  • Ensuring that a train do not enter a section, which is occupied by another train.

  • Identify and take proper action if a train enters a section, which is occupied, or reserved for another train.

  • Identify any “system” change that takes the system to a degenerated operation mode.

  • Ensure the safety of passengers at stations.

  • Safe operation of level crossings.

  • Avoid excessive speed.

1.2 SCF-2: SCFs related to ordinary traffic disturbances

The situation is similar to section 0. The situation now is that trains are delayed, cancelled, etc. Hence it is required to change the scheduled crossings. A new SCF is thus: safe change of crossing.

Note that change of crossing is usually not a problem. However, on lines without a complete signalling system (controlled by train messages) the change of crossings is important. For example, on train message (single-track) lines in Norway, the locomotive driver shall verify that the passing train has arrived before he enters the next block, even if the train dispatcher has indicated “green”. Thus, when the scheduled crossing is changed, the procedure need to be altered as well.

1.3 SCF-3: SCFs related to technical failures in signalling system/CTC system

Relevant SCFs in these situations are:

  • Diagnose system in order to reveal which functions are trustful in the new degenerated state.

  • Allow trains to enter sections that could not be confirmed free from other trains.

  • Issue relevant traffic circular when, for example, level-crossing is in defect.

  • For rolling stock; comply with orders given by traffic circular, radio messages, etc.

1.4 SCF-4: SCFs related to degenerated infrastructure

When the infrastructure is degenerated, or threatened by extreme weather conditions it would be necessary to imply traffic restrictions. Further repair or maintenance activities must be conducted. Relevant SCFs in this situation are:

  • Issue relevant traffic circular (speed restrictions, signal out of order due to maintenance, etc.)

  • Comply with instructions in traffic circular.

1.5 SCF-5: SCFs related to work on the track

When maintenance is conducted on the track, special safety arrangements are necessary. The most important SCFs are:

  • Issue relevant traffic circular.

  • Comply with instructions in traffic circular.

  • Put up signpost with reduced speed information.

  • Install track coils with reduced speed signature.

  • Comply with traffic circulars, signposts, etc.

  • Timely and accurate notification and dissemination of information in contingency situations.

1.6 SCF-6: SCFs related to deficiency on rolling stock

When there are problems with the rolling stock, it is important that this is detected, and relevant actors are being informed. Relevant SCFs are:

  • Detect deficiency (by train crew, or by infrastructure systems like hot-boxes, stroke detectors).

  • Timely and accurate notification and dissemination of information in contingency situations.

  • Take appropriate action (e.g., stop the train when necessary, and take the train to the nearest station with speed restrictions).

  • Fetching defect train.

  • Emergency preparedness in case of accidents.

1.7 SCF-7: SCFs related to cross border activity

  • Ensuring that rolling stock is compatible for cross-border traffic.

  • Ensuring that rolling stock is maintained adequately.

  • Ensuring that train crew is qualified and trained for cross-border traffic.

  • Ensuring that technical systems are reset/configured when passing the border.

  • Ensuring that dangerous freight is handled properly in relation to cross-border traffic.

Appendix B: The track to Safety Culture Questionnaire

  1. 1.

    How is the attitude and involvement of management in safety issues reflected in day-to-day work?

  2. 2.

    Who causes accidents in the eyes of the management?

  3. 3.

    How is safety prioritized when it competes with other concerns in the organization, like profitability and punctuality?

  4. 4.

    How precise and transparent are the contracts between operators and contractors?

  5. 5.

    Is management interested in communicating safety issues related to interfaces with the workforce?

  6. 6.

    How do the organizations adapt to new interfaces and co-operation across borders?

  7. 7.

    How are rules and regulations used at interfaces?

  8. 8.

    How are emergency situations planned for at interfaces?

  9. 9.

    How is Benchmarking, trends and statistics used at interfaces?

  10. 10.

    How do individual attitudes towards competing organizations affect safety work at interfaces?

  11. 11.

    Do management and labour unions co-operate and work towards the same safety goals?

  12. 12.

    Is there willingness to co-operate with stakeholders across national borders?

  13. 13.

    Have arrangements been made to co-operate at interfaces?

  14. 14.

    How does the company co-operate with authorities?

  15. 15.

    What is the attitude in the organization towards standardization across borders?

  16. 16.

    How is company structure adapted to manage cultural differences? Evaluate this question for how this is handled:

    • within an organization and

    • between organizations.

  17. 17.

    How are skills upgrading and competency training ensured in the organization?

  18. 18.

    How are incident and accident reporting, investigation and analysis performed? Evaluate how this is done both at: (a) domestic and (b) international levels.

  19. 19.

    How is experience feedback used in the organization?

  20. 20.

    How is commitment to procedures and rules in the organization?

  21. 21.

    How are audits and reviews performed?

  22. 22.

    Your input or suggestions: “What issues are missing and should be discussed?”

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Johnsen, S.O., Vatn, J., Rosness, R. et al. Cross border railway operations: improving safety at cultural interfaces. Cogn Tech Work 8, 76–88 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-005-0022-8

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