Abstract
Barberà-Sonnenschein (J Econ Theory 18:244–254, 1978) have shown that any binary and Paretian random social choice function can be associated with a mapping which associates a real number with each coalition of individuals. This function gives, for each coalition, the power that this group has in imposing on society, their common preference relation on a pair of alternatives. The aim of this paper is to extend this result, showing that the Pareto criterion is not a necessary condition for the existence of such a coalitional power function.
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This paper is a part of my Ph. D. dissertation. I want to thank so much Arunava Sen for his help, for his multiple readings and for all his precious advices. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their suggestions and comments which significantly improved this paper.
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Picot, J. Random aggregation without the Pareto principle. Rev Econ Design 16, 1–13 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-011-0111-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-011-0111-5