Abstract.
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. At the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. At the second stage, the two managers compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each other. The findings substantially differ from the results for Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly: There exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one, although the structure of the game is completely symmetric. If the influence of noise vanishes, the owner of the more aggressive firm will even induce sales maximization to his manager in order to preempt his competitor.
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Received: 22 April 2004, Accepted: 25 December 2005
JEL Classification:
L1, M2
I would like to thank the editor Semih Koray, two anonymous referees, Ulf Schiller, Dirk Sliwka, Gunter Steiner, and the participants of the Microeconomics Seminar of the Humboldt University at Berlin for very helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant KR 2077/2-3 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.
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Kräkel, M. Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments. Rev. Econ. Design 9, 377–396 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0136-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0136-8