Abstract
Under incomplete environmental enforcement, the high-cost (less efficient) firm may strategically violate the environmental standard, causing the low-cost (more efficient) firm to exit the market—a phenomenon similar to Gresham’s law in which bad money drives out good money. Tightening environmental regulation without increasing probability and penalties helps the high-cost firm to drive the low-cost firm out of the market. This explains why serious pollution and inefficient production co-exist in developing economies.
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Notes
Gresham’s law is originally the law of “bad money drives out good money.”
Cohen (2000) reviews state-of-the-art techniques for estimating the costs and benefits of criminal justice and prevention programs.
The reason why a duopoly model is adopted here is because we want to study the impacts of both the production efficiency (cost asymmetry) and the compliance behavior of the competing firms on the market structure. It is necessary to use such a simplified model to make the model workable. If the current model is replaced by an n-oligopoly model, then the qualitative results and intuitions are still the same, but the computation is more complicated.
The authors also interviewed an official in the Environmental Protection Bureau of Tainan City in south Taiwan for its inspection practice in August 2011. Local governments in Taiwan also follow the same rule for environmental enforcement.
This game structure is like that of Markusen et al. (1993) which contains a two-stage game model allowing firms to enter or exit. To change the number and location of their plants in response to environmental policies, the game structure (referred to in the third paragraph in p. 73) is that, in stage one, x and y producers make a choice among three options: no production, a plant only in their home region, or a plant in each region of their home region. In stage two, x and y play a one-shot Cournot game, and moves in each stage are assumed to be simultaneous.
Horiuchi and Ishikawa (2009) also take the oligopoly as a benchmark market structure to study the behavior of the North firm. They find that the import tariff rate and the licensing strategy of the North firm jointly determine whether the import market structure is a duopoly or a monopoly.
A firm will adopt the strategy of exit, if given the strategy of its rival, the equilibrium output of compliance being negative and the expected profit of non-compliance being negative must both hold.
The first (second) strategy on the superscript of expected profit is the one adopted by firm x(y), where C denotes a compliance strategy, N denotes a violation strategy, and O represents an exit strategy.
Horstmann and Markusen (1992) develop a simple model that generates alternative market structures as Nash equilibrium for different parameterizations of the basic model. They find that small tax-policy changes can produce large welfare effects as the equilibrium market structure shifts. Markusen et al. (1993) discuss the location choice of two firms from two countries. They point out that any small policy changes may cause a shift in the equilibrium regime, hence making a drastic welfare change. Motta and Norman (1996) build up a three-country, three-firm model. They study how a free trade zone formed by two countries affects the foreign direct investment behavior of the third country’s firm.
The marginal cost of the two firms cannot be greater than a (\( c_{i} + s < a \)) when they comply with the environmental standard, and so \( s < 4 - c_{i} \) if \( a = 4 \). The variation of \( a \) by keeping the other parameters constant is the reverse of the variation of the other parameters while keeping \( a \) constant.
Other things being equal, if \( b \ne 1 \), then the denominator of the expected payoff, except the expected penalty (\( \theta f \)), of all the outcomes should be multiplied by \( b \). For example, by Appendix 1, we know that when \( s = 1 \) and \( c_{x} = 1 \), for (C, C) to be an SPNE, \( c_{y} \le 2,\,\theta f \ge \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9b} \), and \( \theta f \ge \frac{{8 + 4c_{y} }}{9b} \) must hold, and for (C, N) to be an SPNE, both \( \frac{{4 + 4c_{y} }}{9b} \le \theta f \le \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9b} \) and \( 0 \le c_{y} \le \frac{4}{3} \) must be satisfied. This tells us that for any given \( c_{y} \), all the boundaries of an SPNE pertaining to the expected fine (\( \theta f \)) should be inflated (deflated) by \( b \) if \( b > ( < )1 \). Thus, all the boundaries pertaining to \( \theta f \) in Figs. 1 and 2 will shift rightward (leftward) if \( b > ( < )1 \), but the relative position of the boundary of all SPNEs will not be altered. To sum up, a proportional expansion or contraction in b will not change at all the relative positions of the equilibrium regimes in Figs. 1 and 2.
As Appendix 1 shows, for (N, C) to be an SPNE, both \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} \ge E\pi_{x}^{OC} = 0 \) must hold. Because \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(1 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \) is always greater than 0, it implies the latter condition automatically holds, and so we need not indicate \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} = 0 \) in Fig. 1. For (N, O) to be an SPNE, both \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} > E\pi_{x}^{\text{CO}} \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} > E\pi_{x}^{\text{OO}} = 0 \) must hold. Because the former implies the latter, the line \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} = 0 \) is not needed to show in Fig. 2. By the same reason as the above, for (C, N) to be an SPNE, \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} > E\pi_{y}^{CC} ,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} > E\pi_{y}^{\text{CO}} = 0,\,E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} > E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} \), and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} > E\pi_{x}^{\text{ON}} = 0 \). By the first and the last two conditions, we can obtain \( \frac{{4 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \le \theta f \le \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \) and \( 0 \le c_{y} \le \frac{4}{3} \), implying that \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} > E\pi_{y}^{\text{CO}} = 0 \) must hold and hence the line \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = 0 \) is not needed in Fig. 1.
To save space, we only construct more interesting cases of the switch of SPNE, especially cases of switch from one of the multiple SPNEs to a unique SPNE. From another viewpoint, we should not neglect the possibility that the switch of SPNE that we have analyzed may happen. Motta (Motta and Norman 1996) makes use of the same method (referred to in the last two paragraph of p. 766) to analyze the more interesting cases of switching one of the multiple SPNEs to a new unique SPNE.
Because \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(a - 2c_{y} + c_{x} - s)^{2} }}{9b} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} - s)^{2} }}{9} \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} + 1 - 2s)^{2} }}{9} \), the higher the value of \( s \) is, the more likely the equilibrium output level of firm y will be negative if \( c_{y} \) is high.
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Acknowledgments
Authors are grateful to an editor and two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments. Financial support from the National Science Council in Taiwan (NSC-99-2410-H-390-010 and NSC-99-2410-H-009-063) is gratefully acknowledged.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Substituting \( a = 4,b = 1,c_{x} = 1,s = 1 \) into the expected profit function in Table 1, we obtain the following expected (second-stage equilibrium) profits of all outcomes: \( \begin{gathered} E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(1 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},\,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},\,\,E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{c_{y}^{2} }}{9},\,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{(6 + 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \,\theta f,\, \hfill \\ E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \,\theta f,\,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},\,\,E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \,\theta f,\, \hfill \\ E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \,\theta f,\,E\pi_{x}^{\text{CO}} = \frac{4}{4},\,\,E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} = \frac{9}{4} - \,\theta f,\,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{OC}} = \frac{{(3 - c_{y} )^{2} }}{4},\, {\text{and}}\, \hfill \\ E\pi_{y}^{\text{ON}} = \frac{{(4 - c_{y} )^{2} }}{4} - \,\theta f. \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \)
According to the above expected profit, we find out the conditions for an outcome to be an SPNE and depict them in Fig. 1 as follows.
1.1 (C, C) as an SPNE
For (C, C) to be an SPNE, (1) and (2) must hold.
(1) Given firm x adopts C, firm y’s best response is adopting C.
\( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} > E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{(6 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} > E\pi_{y}^{\text{CO}} = 0 \) must hold. By rearranging the former condition, we have \( \theta f \ge \frac{{(6 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} = \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \), such that the function of line \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} \) in Fig. 1 is \( \theta f = \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \) and the points on the right (left) side of it represent \( \theta f > {(<)}\frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} > {(<)}E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} \). Rearranging the latter condition, we get \( c_{y} \le 2 \), and so the function of line \( E\pi_{y}^{CC} = 0 \) is \( c_{y} \le 2 \) and the points above (under) it represent \( c_{y} > {(<)}2 \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{CC} < {(>)}0 \).
(2) Given firm y adopts C, firm x’s best response is adopting C.
\( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(1 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(1 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{OC}} = 0. \) By rearranging the former condition, we have \( \theta f \ge \frac{{8 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \), such that the function of line \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} = E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} \) is \( \theta f \ge \frac{{8 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \), and the points on the right (left) side of it represent \( \theta f > ( < )\frac{{8 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} > ( < )E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} \). Moreover, the latter condition always holds.
To sum up, for (C, C) to be an SPNE, (1) and (2) must hold simultaneously, such that area (C, C) in Fig. 1 is surrounded by \( c_{y} \le 2,\,\theta f \ge \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \), and \( \theta f \ge \frac{{8 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \).
By the same way with (C, C), we also get the conditions for the other outcomes to be SPNE and depict them in Fig. 1.
1.2 (C, N) as an SPNE
All \( \begin{gathered} E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{(6 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},\quad E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{(6 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge 0, \hfill \\ E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{c_{y}^{2} }}{9} \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f, \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{c_{y}^{2} }}{9} \ge 0 \) must hold. Rearranging them, we get \( \frac{{4 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \le \theta f \le \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \) and \( 0 \le c_{y} \le \frac{4}{3} \). This is the area surrounded by line \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} \) and line \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} = E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} \) and the horizontal axis.
1.3 (N, C) as an SPNE
All \( \begin{gathered} E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(1 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{c_{y}^{2} }}{9} \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f, \hfill \\ E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \ge E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f, \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} \ge 0 \)must hold. By simplifying them, we have \( \frac{{16 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \le \theta f \le \frac{{8 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \) and \( \frac{2}{3} \le c_{y} \le \frac{3}{2} \). This is the area surrounded by line \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NC}} = E\pi_{x}^{\text{CC}} , \) line \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} , \) and line \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = 0. \)
1.4 (N, N) as an SPNE
All \( \begin{gathered} E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{c_{y}^{2} }}{9},E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge 0, \hfill \\ E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},{\text{ and }}E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \ge 0 \hfill \\ \end{gathered} \) must hold. By simplifying the above, we have: when \( 0 \le c_{y} \le 1,\,\theta f \le \frac{{4 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \); when \( 1 \le c_{y} \le \frac{3}{2},\,\theta f \le \frac{{16 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \); when \( \frac{3}{2} \le c_{y} \le \frac{5}{2},\,\theta f \le \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \). This is the area surrounded by lines \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} ,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} ,E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = 0, \) the vertical axis, and the horizontal axis.
1.5 (C, O) as an SPNE
All \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = \frac{{(4 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \le 0,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{(6 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \le 0 \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CO}} = \frac{4}{4} \le E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} = \frac{9}{4} - \theta f \) must hold. Simplifying them, we get \( c_{y} \ge 2 \) and \( \theta f \ge \frac{5}{4} \). This is the area on the top right side of lines \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CO}} = E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{CC}} = 0. \)
1.6 (N, O) as an SPNE
All \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = \frac{{(3 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} < 0,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \le 0, \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CO}} = \frac{4}{4} \ge \,E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} = \frac{9}{4} - \theta f \) must hold. By simplifying the above, we have \( 3 - 2c_{y} \le 0 \); when \( \frac{3}{2} \le c_{y} \le \frac{5}{2} \), \( \frac{{(5 - 2c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} \le \theta f \le \frac{5}{4} \); and when \( c_{y} \ge \frac{5}{2},\,\theta f \le \frac{5}{4}. \) This is the area surrounded by lines \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{NC}} = 0,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{NN}} = 0,\, \) and \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CO}} = E\pi_{x}^{\text{NO}} . \)
1.7 (O, N) as an SPNE
All \( E\pi_{x}^{\text{CN}} = \frac{{c_{y}^{2} }}{9} \le 0,E\pi_{x}^{\text{NN}} = \frac{{\left( {2 + c_{y} } \right)^{2} }}{9} - \theta f < 0, \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{\text{ON}} = \frac{{\left( {4 - c_{y} } \right)^{2} }}{4} - \theta f \ge \,\,E\pi_{y}^{\text{OC}} = \frac{{\left( {3 - c_{y} } \right)^{2} }}{4} \) must hold. By simplifying the above, we have \( c_{y} = 0 \) and \( \frac{4}{9} \le \theta f \le \frac{7}{4} \). This is the thick line on the horizontal axis. Furthermore, (O, C) as an SPNE is the dotted line on the horizontal axis, and (O, O) will not be an SPNE under these given parameters.
Appendix 2
By Table 1, when \( s = 1.7 \), for (O,N) to be a SPNE, the following conditions must hold: \( E\pi_{x}^{ON} = 0 \ge E\pi_{x}^{NN} = \frac{{(4 - 2 \cdot 1 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} - \theta f \) \( E\pi_{x}^{ON} = 0 \ge E\pi_{x}^{CN} = \frac{{(4 - 2 \cdot (1 + 1.7) + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9} = \frac{{(c_{y} - 1.4)^{2} }}{9} \) \( E\pi_{y}^{ON} = \frac{{(4 - c_{y} )^{2} }}{4} - \theta f \ge E\pi_{y}^{OC} = \frac{{(4 - c_{y} - 1.7)^{2} }}{4} \) and \( E\pi_{y}^{ON} = \frac{{(4 - c_{y} )^{2} }}{4} - \theta f \ge E\pi_{y}^{OO} = 0 \).
Rearranging them, we have \( c_{y} \le 1.4,\,\theta f \ge \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},\,\theta f \le \frac{{(4 - c_{y} )^{2} }}{4}, \) and \( \theta f \le \frac{{(6.3 - 2c_{y} ) \cdot 1.7}}{4} \). Because \( c_{y} \le 1.4 \) and \( \theta f \le \frac{{(6.3 - 2c_{y} ) \cdot 1.7}}{4} \) imply \( \theta f \le \frac{{(4 - c_{y} )^{2} }}{4} \), they are simplified to be \( c_{y} \le 1.4,\,\theta f \ge \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9}, \) and \( \theta f \le \frac{{(6.3 - 2c_{y} ) \cdot 1.7}}{4} \). Moreover, according to Appendix 1, for (O, N) to be an SPNE when \( s = 1 \), both \( \frac{{4 + 4c_{y} }}{9} \le \theta f \le \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9} \) and \( 0 \le c_{y} \le \frac{4}{3} \) must hold.
Based on the above, we overlap the area of (C, N) as an SPNE when \( s = 1 \) and that of (O, N) as an SPNE when \( s = 1.7 \) in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, \( tuv \) is the area of (C, N) as an SPNE when \( s = 1 \), whereas \( qrst \) is the area of (O, N) as an SPNE when \( s = 1.7 \), and \( lmn \) is their overlapping area. By the aforementioned conditions, we also find the equations of the lines surrounding \( lmn \) are \( \theta f = \frac{{(2 + c_{y} )^{2} }}{9},\,\theta f = \frac{{20 - 8c_{y} }}{9}, \) and \( c_{y} = 1 \).
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Yang, YP., Hu, JL. Gresham’s law in environmental protection. Environ Econ Policy Stud 14, 103–122 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-011-0025-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-011-0025-z