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On the distribution of lifetime wealth accumulation

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Abstract

I derive a stationary distribution of lifetime wealth accumulation factor in a model featuring inheritance of productivity, wealth, and health condition, where lifetime wealth is the sum of financial wealth and human wealth. Assuming ex-ante heterogeneity in the death rate, I show that the distribution of the lifetime wealth accumulation factor is constituted by a weighted sum of shape-differing Pareto distributions. It is shown that raising the wealth tax reduces inequality of lifetime wealth not only within a death-rate type but also across all the death-rate types.

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Notes

  1. See Heathcote et al. (2005) and Kaplan (2012) for an empirical perspective of inequality of wages, hours worked, and consumption over the life cycle.

  2. Grabka and Sierminska (2015) find that inheritance is one of the determinants of the wealth gap between men and women within German couples.

  3. Our model implies that there is a very small probability that some individuals will live on forever or to a very old age and that this very small group of individuals tends to be super wealthy and therefore owns a large wealth share. While the former is unrealistic, the latter is strongly supported by empirical evidence. For example, Saez and Zucman (2016) find that the shares of wealth owned by the top 0.1% and 1% families in the US were 22% and 42% in 2012, respectively, and that these figures continue to rise. Since our model features ’full inheritance’ of wealth, labor productivity, and the death rate, fixing a certain death age would not alter the cross-sectional distribution of wealth at any point in time. Setting a certain death age would probably affect the cross-sectional distribution of wealth in an otherwise environment. We thank the referee for pointing this out.

  4. This wealth accumulation process would be a Kesten process and hence imply a stationary distribution of financial wealth a with a thick right tail if labor income w(t) was an i.i.d process (Benhabib et al., 2011; Benhabib and Bisin, 2018; Di Pietro and Sorge (2018)). However, due to growing labor income and wealth inheritance, financial wealth a in this model grows without bound.

  5. See Bayer et al. (2019) for a formal proof.

  6. Trivially, one could call \(q(t)-1=\left[ W^x(t)-W^0(t-x)\right] /W^0(t-x)\) the (effective) lifetime wealth accumulation rate.

  7. See Appendix B for a more general distribution of the death rate.

  8. Nguyen and Khieu (2020) study the effect of a wealth tax on long-run inequality of financial wealth and find a threshold effect. Khieu and Nguyen (2020) also find a threshold effect of a progressive consumption tax on long-run inequality of financial wealth and consumption.

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Acknowlegment

I would also like to acknowledge financial support from the GRIPS Policy Research Center under the project Investment Insurance and the Dynamics of Wealth Inequality in a Heterogeneous Agent Macroeconomic Model.

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Correspondence to Hoang Khieu.

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I would like to thank Klaus Wälde for his guidance during my doctoral study at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz.

Supplementary Appendix

Supplementary Appendix

1.1 A Proof of Lemma 1

For convenience, we now work with the effective time preference rate \(\rho ={\tilde{\rho }}+\delta\). The household’s problem reads

$$\begin{aligned} \max _{\{c(t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty }}U(0)&=\int _{0}^{\infty }e^{-\rho t}u\left( c(t)\right) dt\end{aligned}$$
(A.1)
$$\begin{aligned}&\text {subject to}\nonumber \\ dw(t)&=gw(t)dt\end{aligned}$$
(A.2)
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{a}\left( t\right)&=(r-\tau ^a)a(t)+w\left( t\right) -c\left( t\right) . \end{aligned}$$
(A.3)

The household chooses a consumption path to maximize her intertemporal utility (A.1) subject to the law of motion of wage (A.2) and the budget constraint (A.3). Let us denote the value function by V(aw) that maps the two dimensional state space (aw) into real numbers through a mapping V. The Bellman equation for the household’s problem therefore reads

$$\begin{aligned} \rho V(a(t),w(t))=\max _{c\left( t\right) }\left\{ u(c(t))+\frac{dV(a(t),w(t))}{dt}\right\} . \end{aligned}$$

Computing the differential dV(a(t), w(t)), taking the constraints (A.2) and (A.3) into account yields, suppressing the time argument t for simplicity,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho V(a,w)=\max _{c}\left\{ u(c)+V_{1}(a,w)((r-\tau ^a)a+w-c)+gwV_{2}(a,w)\right\} \end{aligned}$$
(A.4)

The first-order condition for this problem reads

$$\begin{aligned} u^{\prime }(c(a,w))=V_{1}(a,w). \end{aligned}$$
(A.5)

We guess \(V(a,w)=\frac{\Gamma _{1}(a+\Gamma _{2}w)^{1-\sigma }-\Gamma _{3} }{1-\sigma }\), \(\Gamma _{1}\ne 0\). Using the first order condition (A.5) yields

$$\begin{aligned} c(a,w)=\Psi (a+\Gamma _{2}w), \end{aligned}$$
(A.6)

where \(\Psi \equiv \Gamma _{1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma }}\). Plugging (A.6) into the Bellman equation (A.4) yields

$$\begin{aligned}&(a+\Gamma _{2}w)^{1-\sigma }\left[ \sigma \Gamma _{1}^{\frac{\sigma -1}{\sigma }}+\Gamma _{1}\left[ (1-\sigma )(r-\tau ^a)-\rho \right] \right] \nonumber \\&+w(a+\Gamma _{2}w)^{-\sigma }\Gamma _{1}(1-\sigma )(g\Gamma _{2}+1-(r-\tau ^a)\Gamma _{2})+\rho \Gamma _{3}-1=0. \end{aligned}$$
(A.7)

As Equation (A.7) must hold for any a and w, it implies

$$\begin{aligned} \Psi&=\frac{\rho -(1-\sigma )(r-\tau ^a)}{\sigma },\end{aligned}$$
(A.8)
$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma _{2}&=\frac{1}{r-\tau ^a-g}, \end{aligned}$$
(A.9)
$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma _{3}=\frac{1}{\rho }. \end{aligned}$$
(A.10)

Thus, the optimal consumption reads

$$\begin{aligned} c\left( t\right) =\frac{\rho -\left( 1-\sigma \right) (r-\tau ^a)}{\sigma }\left( a\left( t\right) +\frac{w\left( t\right) }{r-\tau ^a-g}\right) . \end{aligned}$$
(A.11)

Inserting the closed form solution (A.11) into the budget constraint (A.3) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{a}\left( t\right) -g^{c}a\left( t\right) =\eta w_{0}e^{gt}, \end{aligned}$$
(A.12)

where

$$\begin{aligned} g^{c}&\equiv \frac{r-\tau ^a-\rho }{\sigma },\\ \eta&\equiv \frac{r-\tau ^a-(\rho +\sigma g)}{\sigma (r-\tau ^a-g)}. \end{aligned}$$

Multiplying (A.12) by \(e^{-g^{c}t}\) and integrating gives

$$\begin{aligned} a(t)e^{-g^{c}t}=\frac{\eta w_{0}}{g-g^{c}}e^{(g-g^{c})t}+k, \end{aligned}$$

where k is the constant of integration. Further simplification gives

$$\begin{aligned} a(t)=-\frac{w_{0}}{r-g}e^{gt}+ke^{g^{c}t}. \end{aligned}$$
(A.13)

Evaluating (A.13) at \(t=0\) gives \(k=a_{0}+\frac{w_{0}}{r-g}\). Thus, the evolution of (financial) wealth is described by

$$\begin{aligned} a(t)=\left[ a_{0}+\frac{w_{0}}{r-\tau ^a-g}\left( 1-e^{\left[ g-g^{c}\right] t}\right) \right] e^{g^{c}t}. \end{aligned}$$
(A.14)

This can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} a(t)=\,&a_{0}e^{g^{c}t}+\frac{w_{0}}{r-\tau ^a-g}e^{g^{c}t}-\frac{w_{0}}{r-\tau ^a-g}e^{gt}\\ a(t)+\frac{w_{0}}{r-\tau ^a-g}e^{gt}=\,&a_{0}e^{g^{c}t}+\frac{w_{0}}{r-\tau ^a-g}e^{g^{c}t}\\ a(t) + \frac{w(t)}{r-\tau ^a-g}=\,&\left[ a(0) + \frac{w(0)}{r-\tau ^a-g}\right] e^{g^{c}t}. \end{aligned}$$

Using the definitions of W(t), W(0), and \(g^c\) gives

$$\begin{aligned} W(t)=W_{0}e^{\frac{\left( r-\tau ^{a}\right) - \rho }{\sigma }t}. \end{aligned}$$
(A.15)

1.2 B Continuous distribution of the death rate

Now let us assume the death rate \(\delta\) follows a continuous distribution with a density function \(f(\delta )\) and support \([\underline{\delta },\overline{\delta }]\).

Consider the joint probability

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left( q<Q,\delta =\hat{\delta }\right)&=\Pr \left( q<Q|\delta =\hat{\delta }\right) \Pr \left( \delta =\hat{\delta }\right) \\&=\Pr \left( q<Q|\delta =\hat{\delta }\right) f(\hat{\delta })\\&=q^{-\frac{\sigma \hat{\delta }}{r-\tau ^{a}-{\tilde{\rho }}-\hat{\delta }}}f(\hat{\delta }). \end{aligned}$$

The probability distribution function of q is therefore given by

$$\begin{aligned} F\left( q\right) \equiv \Pr \left( q<Q\right) =\int ^{\bar{\delta }}_{\underline{\delta }}\Pr \left( q<Q|\delta \right) f({\delta })d \delta =\int ^{\bar{\delta }}_{\underline{\delta }}q^{-\frac{\sigma {\delta }}{r-\tau ^{a}-{\tilde{\rho }}-{\delta }}}f({\delta })d \delta . \end{aligned}$$

F(q) is the ‘weighted sum’ of Pareto distributions, which can be interpreted as an ‘average’ Pareto distribution.

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Khieu, H. On the distribution of lifetime wealth accumulation. J Econ (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00867-w

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