Abstract
This paper aims to explain the behavior of certain religious organizations in countries with severe regulation that limits the religious market, such as those under communist rule. Religious organizations in those countries sometimes choose to operate both legally and illegally. The model proposed here shows that such behavior may increase the consumer welfare of religionists compared to solely legal or illegal provision of religious services. It assumes that religious organizations maximize the consumer surplus of their adherents. The choice of a religious organization between legal and illegal provision of religious services depends on the costs of religious participation imposed by the government and the set-up costs of dual operation. As an illustration, the paper accounts for the different response of the Catholic Church to restrictions imposed by the communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
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Notes
Iannaccone (1995) summarizes and responds to some of the criticism.
The difference may be superficial. Froese (2004) points to the fact that the state-sponsored atheism under communist regimes was a de facto competitor in religious markets that sought to achieve a monopoly position.
Historian Norman Davies (2001: 9) characterized the change in the following way: “The Polish People’s Republic ceased to be a puppet state, and became instead a client state.” In particular, it meant concessions to the peasantry (end of collectivization) and the Catholic Church.
Consider that the population of Czechoslovakia was less than half of Poland.
The state can sponsor specific religious organization or provide some quasi-religious services. Beyond secular goods, such as schools or charity, some totalitarian and authoritarian states provided secular substitutes for religious activities, such as the veneration of revolutionary leaders instead of church saints and martyrs, or mass public celebrations that replace religious feasts.
The church may have a reason to increase costs further to screen for commitment of (potential) members, as explained by Iannaccone (1992). We assume that the costs imposed by the government are sufficiently high, if not higher, than needed for that purpose.
The most significant deviations would be ordination of married men and women as priests.
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I am grateful to the referee of this journal for many important suggestions. The usual caveat applies.
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Minarik, P. An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation. J Econ 124, 289–302 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0578-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0578-9