Abstract
This paper studies the effects of alternative tax policies (a consumption tax, seigniorage tax, and tax switch) on economic growth under different methods of government budget adjustment in a monetary endogenous growth model with a labor–leisure choice and a cash-in-advance constraint which is only imposed on consumption. It is found that the validity of both the Mundell–Tobin effect and the consumption tax neutrality crucially depends on the adjustment methods used to maintain the balanced government budget. In addition, we find that a switch from a consumption tax to a seigniorage tax unambiguously enhances economic growth. This result stands in sharp contrast to that of Ho et al. (J Money Credit Bank 39:105–131, 2007), in that it does confirm the validity of the qualitative equivalence between the money-in-the-utility-function and cash-in-advance approaches in terms of the effect of tax shifting away from a consumption tax towards a seigniorage tax.
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Notes
Chang et al. (2000) and Dotsey and Sarte (2000) are exceptions. In a monetary model without labor–leisure choice (inflexible labor), Chang et al. (2000) shed light on the motive of status-seeking to support the Mundell–Tobin effect. Under the one sector AK model with the stochastic money supply rule, Dotsey and Sarte (2000) point to a negative relationship between the output growth rate and the average inflation rate, implying that economic growth decreases with an expansionary monetary policy.
For the sake of comparison and to make our result more striking, we follow Pelloni and Waldmann (2000) and assume that the government expenditure in our model is used wastefully, and not with the purpose of being utility-enhancing or in order to improve infrastructure.
Wang and Yip (1992) establish a qualitative equivalence between the MIUF and CIA approaches on the inflation-growth relationship, where the CIA constraint is only imposed on consumption.
To emphasize the macroeconomic effects under the two different methods of the government budget adjustment, we abstract the case of \(0<\theta <1\) from our analysis.
See Hasanov (2005) for a comprehensive survey.
It is easy to derive \(\partial \hat{z}/\partial \tau _c =0\), which implies that the increase in \(\tau _c \) offsets the decrease in \(\hat{c}\), leaving \(\hat{m}=(1+\tau _c )\hat{c}\) unchanged.
This wealth effect is similar to the resources withdrawal effect, emphasized in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995).
It is easy to derive that \(\left| {\frac{d\hat{z}}{d\mu }\frac{\mu }{\hat{z}}} \right| <\left| {\frac{d\hat{z}}{d\mu }\frac{(1+\mu )}{\hat{z}}} \right| =\frac{\Sigma _1 +\hat{z}(\Sigma _1 -\sigma \Sigma _2 )}{\frac{\Lambda }{(1+\mu )}\Sigma _1 +\hat{z}(\Sigma _1 -\sigma \Sigma _2 )}<1\), where \(\Lambda =\frac{\delta }{(1-\delta )\hat{z}}\beta A\hat{l}(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}=1+\mu \,\,\,+\frac{\rho +\alpha (\sigma -1)A(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}}{\sigma }>1+\mu .\)
The steady-state effects of a tax switch on leisure and economic growth are qualitatively equivalent in both Cases \(\theta =1\) and \(\theta =0\). We then focus on Case \(\theta =0\) to facilitate a comparison with that for Ho et al. (2007).
A mathematical proof is available upon request.
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We would like to thank an anonymous referee and the editor of this journal for their helpful suggestions and insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any remaining errors are, of course, our own responsibility.
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Appendices
Appendix A (The proof of Theorem 1)
By substituting (15c) and (16) into (15d) and (15e), the dynamic system can be represented as follows:
where \(\Sigma _1 =(\sigma -\alpha )\beta A(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}>0,\, \Sigma _2 =(1-\alpha )\beta A(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}-\Lambda \frac{1-\beta \hat{l}}{\hat{l}(1-\hat{l})}, \Sigma _3 =\Sigma _1 l_z +\sigma [\frac{\theta }{1+\tau _c }+(1-\theta )(1+\mu )], \Sigma _4 =\Sigma _2 l_z +[\frac{\theta }{1+\tau _c }+(1-\theta )(1+\mu )+\frac{\Lambda }{\hat{z}}]\), \(\Gamma _1 =(1-\theta )\sigma \hat{z}\), \(\Gamma _2 =1+(1-\theta )\hat{z}\), \(\Pi _1 =\Sigma _1 l_{\tau _c } -\theta \frac{\sigma }{(1+\tau _c )^2}\hat{z}\), \(\Pi _2 =\Sigma _2 l_{\tau _c } -\theta \frac{\hat{z}}{(1+\tau _c )^2}\), and \(\Lambda =\frac{\delta }{1-\delta }\frac{1}{\hat{z}}\beta A\hat{l}(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}>0\). Thus, we can compute the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state and, accordingly, have:
where
This implies that regardless of Case \(\theta =1\) or Case \(\theta =0\), the dynamic system has two roots with real positive parts. Since the dynamic system has two jump variables \(x_t \) and \(z_t \), there is a unique path leading to the determinate steady-state equilibrium.
By focusing on Case \(\theta =1\), the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by \(\dot{x}_t =0\) and \(\dot{z}_t =0\) in (15d) and (15e), i.e.:
where \(\hat{l}\) and \(\hat{z}\) are the steady-state values of \(l_t \) and \(z_t \), respectively. For ease of exposition, combining (19) with (20) yields:
In what follows, we will use (19) and (21) to solve \(\hat{l}\) and \(\hat{z}\). In the (\(z\), \(l)\) space, the XX locus characterizes all the combinations which satisfy (19) and the XZ locus describes all the combinations which satisfy (20). From (19), the XX locus is downward sloping, i.e., \(\frac{dz_t }{dl_t }\vert _{XX} =\frac{-\Sigma _1 (1+\tau _c )}{\sigma }<0\), and it intersects the \(z_t \)-coordinate at \(\frac{(1+\tau _c )}{\sigma }\left[ {(\sigma -\alpha )A+\rho } \right] >0\) when \(l_t =0\), as shown in Fig. 1 below. Moreover, given the restriction of non-negative working hours (\(0\le l_t \le 1)\), the ratio of real money balances to capital converges to \(z_t =\frac{(1+\tau _c )}{\sigma }\rho >0\), if the working hours approach \(l_t =1\).
In addition, (21) tells us that the XZ locus is upward sloping (\(\frac{dz_t }{dl_t }\vert _{XZ} =\frac{\hat{z}(\Sigma _1 -\sigma \Sigma _2 )}{\sigma \Lambda }>0)\) and satisfies \(\lim _{l_t \rightarrow 0} z_t =0\) and \(\lim _{l_t \rightarrow 1} z_t =\infty \). Thus, as is evident in Fig. 1, the steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique.
We then turn our focus to Case \(\theta =0\). With the government’s budget constraint (15c) \(( {( {\frac{\tau _c }{1+\tau _c }+\mu })z_t =\frac{G_t }{k_t }})\), we have the following relationship of the steady-state equilibrium from (15d) and (15e) with \(\dot{x}_t =0\) and \(\dot{z}_t =0\):
By putting the above equations together, we further have:
Similar to Case \(\theta =1\), we use (22) and (24) to characterize the steady-state equilibrium. It follows from (22) that the XX locus is downward sloping, i.e., \(\frac{dz_t }{dl_t }\vert _{XX} =\frac{-\Sigma _1 }{\sigma (1+\mu )}<0\), and it intersects the \(z_t \)-coordinate at \(\frac{1}{\sigma (1+\mu )}[(\sigma -\alpha )A+\rho ]>0\) when \(l_t =0\). As shown in Fig. 2, the ratio of real money balances to capital converges to \(z_t =\frac{\rho }{\sigma (1+\mu )}>0\), if the working hours approach \(l_t =1\). On the other hand, it follows from (24) that the XZ locus is upward sloping, i.e., \(\frac{dz_t }{dl_t }\vert _{XZ} =\frac{\Sigma _1 +\hat{z}(\Sigma _1 -\sigma \Sigma _2 )}{\alpha (\sigma -1)A(1-\hat{l})^\beta +\rho }>0\). Moreover, the XZ locus intersects the \(z_t \)-coordinate at a negative value (i.e., \(-\frac{(\sigma -\alpha )A+\rho }{\alpha (\sigma -1)A+\rho }<0\) when \(l_t =0)\) and the ratio of real money balances to capital approaches \(z_t =\infty \) as \(l_t =1\).
As shown in Fig. 2, in Case \(\theta =0\)the steady-state equilibrium also exists and is unique. \(\square \)
Appendix B (The proof of Propositions 1 and 2)
Given (16), by using (15c)–(15e) with \(\dot{x}_t =0\) and \(\dot{z}_t =0\), the steady-state effects of \(\mu \) on the leisure time \(\hat{l}\) under Cases \(\theta =1\) and \(\theta =0\), respectively, are given by:
In addition, it follows from (10) that the balanced-growth rate is given by:
Accordingly, the steady-state effects of \(\mu \)on the growth rate under Cases \(\theta =1\) and \(\theta =0\) are, respectively:
By applying a similar procedure, we can easily derive the steady-state effects of \(\tau _c \) on \(\hat{l}\)and \(\hat{\phi }\) under both Cases \(\theta =1\) and \(\theta =0\):
\(\square \)
Appendix C (The proof of Proposition 3)
Expanding (18a) and (18b) in the neighborhood of the steady-state equilibrium yields:
where \(\Phi _1 =[\sigma (1-\bar{g})-\alpha ]\beta A(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}\), \(\Phi _2 =[(1-\bar{g})-\alpha -\frac{\bar{g}}{\hat{z}}]\beta A(1-\hat{l})^{\beta -1}-\frac{\Lambda (1-\beta \hat{l})}{\hat{l}(1-\hat{l})}\), \(\Phi _3 =\Phi _1 l_z +\frac{\sigma }{1+\tau _c }\), \(\Phi _4 =\Phi _2 l_z +\frac{1}{1+\tau _c }+\frac{\Lambda }{\hat{z}}-\frac{\bar{g}}{\hat{z}^2}A(1-\hat{l})^\beta \), \(\mathrm{H}_1 =\Phi _1 l_{\tau _c } -\frac{\sigma \hat{z}}{(1+\tau _c )^2}\), and \(\mathrm{H}_2 =\Phi _2 l_{\tau _c } -\frac{1+\hat{z}}{(1+\tau _c )^2}\).We impose a sufficient condition of \(1-\alpha =\beta >\bar{g}\) so that the steady-state equilibrium is determinate. Given the fact that the labor income share \(1-\alpha =\beta \) is around 0.6 and the government spending to GDP ratio is around 0.2, this sufficient condition is empirically plausible. Accordingly, this above equation allows us to solve the steady state \(\hat{z}\) and \(\hat{x}\). Thus, substituting \(\hat{z}\) and \(\hat{x}\) into (16) yields the steady-state effect of a tax switch on \(\hat{l}\):
where
Accordingly, we can further derive the growth effect of a tax switch from (25):
\(\square \)
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Chang, Wy., Tsai, Hf., Chang, Jj. et al. Consumption tax, seigniorage tax and tax switch in a cash-in-advance economy of endogenous growth. J Econ 114, 23–42 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0382-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0382-0