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Higher education expansion, tracking, and student effort

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Abstract

This paper studies the effects of tracking on student effort and academic achievement during secondary school. Students under the comprehensive school system make effort to increase their academic achievement that determines the probability of gaining admissions to college. As college admissions become less competitive or it becomes easier to gain admissions, it increases the benefits of effort, encouraging more effort. Those students streamed into academic tracks at early ages under tracking are most likely to be admitted to college, and the competitiveness of college admissions does not affect their effort. As a result, tracking tends to perform worse in terms of average secondary-school academic achievement, as higher education expands and college admissions become less competitive.

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Notes

  1. Tracking occurs even in these countries. For example, in the US, schools often offer various gifted programs at all levels. However, such tracking occurs within a school (Epple et al. 2002), and is not the focus of this paper.

  2. Duflo et al. (2011) study the effects of tracking on teachers’ incentives and effort to teach.

  3. For example, for OECD countries, enrollments in higher education had increased 36 % during 2000–2010 (OECD 2013), and tertiary education entry rates had increased on average 25 % during 2000–2007 (OECD 2010).

  4. \(n\) may well be endogenously determined by economic and social environments. For instance, economic conditions or economic policy goals may dictate an increase or a decrease in the pool of skilled labor and the number of college admissions. As another example, as society becomes more inclusive or more democratized, the demand for higher education would increase. However, the determination of \(n\) endogenously as an equilibrium of economic and social conditions is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.

  5. Period 2 actually includes the time after college, which may be called period 3. However, it is not necessary to create period 3, because the analysis concerns academic achievement during secondary school, as will become clear below.

  6. Alternatively, when the college entrance exams are required, students may fail to pass the exams.

  7. A normal distribution of \(\epsilon \) will be discussed later.

  8. This assumption, along with the usual assumptions of \(w_{bb} < 0\) and \(w_{ee} < 0\), is equivalent to concavity of \(w(.)\).

  9. All students are assumed to make effort and study to be admitted to college under C. However, it is straightforward to consider a model in which some students give up college education at time 1 and do not attend secondary school, or a model in which some students prepare to be workers like in the vocational track under T, as analyzed in an earlier version of this paper. Such a model is not pursued here, because it does not affect the nature of the analysis and results while making the presentation more complicated, and because secondary school is compulsory in most countries under consideration that adopt C.

  10. This assumption means that \(a^*\) is endogenously adjusted to \(n\).

  11. The analysis focuses on effort to increase academic achievement, as in the literature, and the vocational track will not be analyzed.

  12. Arguments of functions are and will be omitted (especially in the first-order conditions) for simplicity whenever such omissions do not create confusion.

  13. This assumption may not hold for some students, but will be maintained throughout the analysis, given that students are assumed to make effort and improve academic achievement to gain college admissions. The consideration of those students with \(v < k\) amounts to creating another track from an analytical point of view, as mentioned in Note 9.

  14. The first-order condition (8) includes the additional term, \(p[w_e - c_2{'}]e_2^C{'}(b)b_e\). However, the additional term vanishes due to the envelop result or due to the first-order condition (5).

  15. The relationship between \(a\) and \(e_1^C\) will be discussed later.

  16. The first-order condition includes the additional term, \([w_e - c_2']e_2'(b)b_e,\) but the term vanishes again due to envelope result.

  17. The idea of students in the academic track having less incentives to make effort may also apply to students in selective colleges. The reason is that the benefit of education in the form of earnings largely depends on college selectivity (Brewer et al. 1999; Black and Smith 2006). Thus, rational students in those selective colleges would have lower incentives to make effort than in less-selective colleges. At the same time, college GPAs also matter in the labor market (James et al. 1989; Rumberger and Thomas 1993), and even those students in selective colleges make effort. Nevertheless, they would make less effort than those in less-selective colleges to the extent that college selectivity is an important determinant of earnings.

  18. Note that \(\partial t/\partial n\) in (12) does not depend on \(a\).

  19. The formulation means that the size of the academic track \(\theta n\) varies with the size of higher education or the number of college students \(n\). For instance, in Germany, the expansion of higher education was accompanied by the expansion of grammar schools and academic tracks in the 1970s (Jürges et al. 2011).

  20. The shape of the probability function in general may differ from that under C, and may be written as \(q(b, t) = (\lambda - t + b)/2 \lambda ,\) where \(\lambda \) is uniformly distributed over \([-\lambda ,\lambda ]\) with \(\lambda > 0.\) This formulation, however, has no effect on the result.

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Correspondence to Kangoh Lee.

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I am grateful to three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments that improve the paper significantly.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Derivation of the results in Sect. 5.1

With \(Prob\;(\epsilon \ge t-b) = 1 - H(t-b)\), the first-order condition for a maximum of \(U^C(e_1)\) is

$$\begin{aligned} U^{C'}(e_1) = [h (v - k) + (1 - H) w_b]b_e - c_1' = 0. \end{aligned}$$
(45)

The second-order condition is

$$\begin{aligned} U^{C''}(e_1)&= [h (v - k) + (1 - H) w_b]b_{ee}+ [2hw_b - h'(v - k) \nonumber \\&+ (1 - H)(w_{bb}+ {wbe}_{2}^{C'}(b)](b_e)^2 - c_1'' < 0. \end{aligned}$$
(46)

All terms in (46) are negative, except \(hw_b (b_e)^2\). For the satisfaction of the second-order condition, all other negative terms are assumed to dominate the only positive term. For example, \(c_1(e_1)\) is convex enough or \(b(.)\) is concave enough. Differentiation of (45) gives the expression for \(\partial e_1^C/\partial t\) in (23). If \(\partial e_1^C/\partial t \le 0\) in (23),

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dt}[t - b(a,e_1^C(a,t))] = 1 - b_e \frac{\partial e_1^C}{\partial t} > 0. \end{aligned}$$
(47)

If \(\partial e_1^C/\partial t > 0\), using (23) and (46),

$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{d}{dt}[t - b(a,e_1^C(a,t))] = 1 - b_e \frac{\partial e_1^C}{\partial t} = - \frac{1}{U^{C''}}\{-[h(v - k) + (1-H)w_b]b_{ee} \nonumber \\&\quad - [hw_b + (1-H)(w_{bb} +w_{be}e_2'(b))](b_2)^2 + c_1''\}. \end{aligned}$$
(48)

All terms in (48) are positive, except \(-hw_b(b_e)^2\). As in the second-order condition in (46), all other positive terms are assumed to dominate the only negative term, for example, by assuming that \(c_1(e_1)\) is convex enough or \(b(.)\) is concave enough. Alternatively, combining this negative term with \(-h(v-k)b_{ee}\), the first term of the numerator of (48),

$$\begin{aligned}&-hw_b(b_e)^2 - h(v-k)b_{ee} > - h'(v-k)(b_e)^2 - h(v-k)b_{ee}\nonumber \\&\quad = - h(v-k) \left[ \frac{h'}{h}(b_e)^2 + b_{ee}\right] = - h(v-k)\left[ - \frac{t-b}{\sigma ^2} (b_e)^2 + b_{ee}\right] \nonumber \\&\quad = h(v-k)\left[ \frac{t-b}{\sigma ^2} (b_e)^2 - b_{ee}\right] , \end{aligned}$$
(49)

where \(\sigma \) is the standard deviation of the normal random variable \(\epsilon .\) The inequality comes from \(-hw_b > - h'(v-k)\) when \(\partial e_1^C/\partial t > 0\) in (23). The second equality uses the normal density function with mean zero, \(h(\epsilon ) = \frac{1}{\sigma \sqrt{2\pi }}exp(-\frac{\epsilon ^2}{2 \sigma ^2})\), and \(h'(\epsilon ) = - \frac{\epsilon }{\sigma ^2}h(\epsilon ),\) so that \(h'/h = - \epsilon /\sigma ^2 = - (t-b)/\sigma ^2.\) Equation (49), and hence (48), become positive if \(\sigma \) is large or \(b_e\) is small (effort is not too productive) or \(b\) is concave enough.

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Lee, K. Higher education expansion, tracking, and student effort. J Econ 114, 1–22 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0369-x

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