Abstract
The endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the private duopoly where firms set prices sequentially, in the mixed duopoly firms choose prices simultaneously. Moreover, the result obtained in the mixed duopoly under price competition differs from the one under quantity competition, since in the latter case decisions are taken sequentially.
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Bárcena-Ruiz, J.C. Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition. J Econ 91, 263–272 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0255-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0255-5