Abstract.
We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme.
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Received: 28 April 1997/Accepted: 30 January 1998
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Barberà, S., Massò, J. & Neme, A. Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes. Soc Choice Welfare 16, 321–336 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050146