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To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths

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Abstract

John Broome (Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) has developed an influential theory of fairness, which has generated a thriving debate about the nature of fairness. In its initial conception, Broomean fairness is limited to a comparative notion. More recent commentators such as Hooker (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:329–52, 2005), Saunders (Res Publica 16:41–55, 2010), Lazenby (Utilitas 26:331–345, 2014), Curtis (Analysis 74:47–57, 2014) have advocated, for different reasons, to also take into account non-comparative fairness. Curtis’ (Analysis 74:47-57, 2014) theory does just that. He also claims that he furthers Broome’s theory by saying precisely what one must do in order to be fair. However, Curtis departs from Broome’s (Proc Aristot Soc 91:87-101, 1990) requirement that claims are satisfied in proportion to their strength. He neglects claim-strengths altogether and identifies claims with their amount. As a result, the theory of Curtis has limited scope. I present a theory of fairness that fulfils all three desiderata: it incorporates non-comparative fairness, it recognizes that claims have both amounts and strengths, and it tells us precisely what one must do in order to be fair.

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Notes

  1. See Hooker (2005), Saunders (2010), Tomlin (2012), Curtis (2014), Lazenby (2014), Henning (2015), Kirkpatrick and Eastwood (2015), Paseau and Saunders (2015), Vong (2015, 2018, 2020), Sharadin (2016), Heilmann and Wintein (2017), Piller (2017), Wintein and Heilmann (2018, 2020, 2021).

  2. Broome contrasts claims with teleological reasons and side-constraints but does not offer a detailed account of the nature of claims. Hence, in this sense his theory of fairness is incomplete. However, as Piller (2017: 216) observes, “this incompleteness might not matter ...because we understand talk of claims pre-theoretically”.

  3. Applying method P to Owing Money yields allocation (10, 30). Method L, which applies to Horses, is described in §2.

  4. Curtis (2014: 55) writes that he departs from Broome in this respect for the same reason that Hooker (2005: 340–341) and Saunders (2010: 44-47) do.

  5. Note that Anna has a claim to receive part of the £20K whereas Abram, in Owing Money, has a claim to receive all of the 20 ducats. As I will explain in Sect. 3.1, this means that Abram’s claim is absolute while Anna’s claim is notional.

  6. This formalizes a concern for efficiency that has been raised in the literature, e.g. Hooker (2005), Saunders (2010), Lazenby (2014), and Curtis (2014).

  7. Absolute fairness requires the satisfaction of absolute claims (cf. footnote 5) and justifies MFC(i). For Investing Time, MFC(i) is justified by the fact that, as explained in section 3.1, the group consisting of Anna and Beta has an absolute claim.

  8. As we are assuming that the number \(\mid N \mid\) of receiving agents is greater-than-or equal to 2 and as, in this paper, claims strengths only figure in the requirements of comparative fairness, this assumption is justified for the situations that we consider in this paper.

  9. Below, in the text following the Lottery Theorem, we elaborate on this interpretation.

  10. Note that the alternative method is not a proper method in the sense that it does not prescribe how to allocate the estate in an arbitrary Broomean problem.

  11. See Wintein and Heilmann (2024a) and Wintein and Heilmann (2022b)

  12. E.g. Hooker (2005), Saunders (2010), Curtis (2014), Lazenby (2014), Vong (2018).

  13. Vong uses ‘individual’ for what we label ‘absolute’.

  14. We will delete the units (\(\pounds K\)) for the numbers in Investing Time from here on.

  15. With fairness understood as having both a comparative and a non-comparative (absolute) dimension, the question arises what exactly distinguishes fairness from justice For, as Phillip Montague (1980: 131) writes “discussions of justice have traditionally focused on two very general kinds of concerns: [non-comparative and comparative ones]”. The interesting and complex question as to how fairness and justice relate I hope to address in depth on another occasion. For now, I just want to remark that my intuitions concerning this relation resemble those of Thomas Mulligan (2017: 106), who writes that “as best I can tell, justice and fairness are one and the same thing conceptually”.

  16. For an in-depth discussion of the Fairness formula and its constitutive notions, I refer the reader to Wintein and Heilmann (2024a) and Wintein and Heilmann (2022a).

  17. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this question.

  18. See Wintein and Heilmann (2021) for a general account of how the philosophical literature on fairness relates to various economic literatures e.g. cooperative game theory, apportionment theory and that on bankruptcy problems.

  19. Thomson (2019) presents an excellent and extensive overview of this literature, of which Thomson himself is one of the leading scholars.

  20. For formal definitions and an in-depth comparison of these three rules see e.g. Herrero and Villar (2001) who jointly refer to the three rules as “The Three Musketeers”. The role of D’Artagnan, i.e. a fourth rule that is axiomatically related to the three rules but not part of the original three, is reserved for the “Talmud Rule” (Aumann and Maschler 1985).

  21. When a matrix equation \(Ap = s\) is induced from a remainder problem \({\mathcal {B}}^\star\), the columns of A correspond to the integer allocations of \(\textbf{MaxSat}({\mathcal {B}}^\star )\) and both the sum of the entries of each column of A and the sum of the entries of s equal \(E^\star\). Thus, neither (4) nor (5) can be induced from a remainder problem \({\mathcal {B}}^\star\).

  22. With A and s as in (4): A has rank 2 whereas the rank of (A|s) is 3.

  23. It is not hard to show that the rank of the \(|N^\star | \times m\) matrix A of an instantiation of (\(\star\)) equals \(|N^\star |\) from which, as \(|N^\star | \le m\), it follows that for any \(s \in {\mathbb {R}}^n\) the rank of (A|s) equals \(|N^\star |\) as well.

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Appendix

Appendix

Appendix I shows that Curtis’s argument for \(L^\dag\) being well-defined is flawed. Appendix II presents the proof of the Lottery Theorem.

1.1 I. Curtis’s flawed argument

Remember from Sect. 2.3 that method \(L^\dag\) constructs a lottery in terms of a probability vector that solves equation

$$\begin{aligned} Ap = s^\star \end{aligned}$$
(⋆)

Also, remember that Curtis argued that the construction of \(L^\dag\) is well-defined:

The number of equations in the system generated will be equal to the number of receiving agents, and the number of variables equal to the number of allocations. Moreover, the only possible coefficients in any equation generated are 0 and 1, and there can never be more receiving agents than there are allocations. These two latter facts are enough (due to the Rouché-Capelli theorem) to guarantee that every system of linear equations will have at least one solution.

Curtis (2014: 53)

Indeed, “the number of equations in the system” equals the number \(|N^\star |\) of receiving agents and the number of variables equals the number m of integer allocations of \(\textbf{MaxSat}({\mathcal {B}}^\star )\), which is to say that, in (\(\star\)), A is an \(|N^\star | \times m\) matrix. Also, it is immediately clear that the only possible entries of A are 0 and 1 and that \(|N^\star | \le m\). But from these observations it does not follow, pace Curtis, that (\(\star\)) will have at least one solution. To see this, consider the following system of equations of form \(Ap = s\):

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} 1 &{} 1 &{} 0 \\ 1 &{} 1 &{} 1 \\ 0 &{} 0 &{} 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \\ p_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0.8 \\ 0.6 \\ 0.6 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$
(4)

Matrix Eq. (4) involves a matrix A which fully respects the conditions cited by Curtis. And yet, as one readily verifies, the equation has no solution. Further, the matrix of the following equation also fully respects the conditions cited by Curtis:

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} 1 &{} 1 &{} 0 \\ 1 &{} 0 &{} 1 \\ 0 &{} 1 &{} 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \\ p_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0.35 \\ 0.05 \\ 0.6 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$
(5)

Now, (5) has a unique solution. However, this solution is \((-0.1, 0.45, 0.15)\), which is not a probability vector and so does not induce a lottery.

Although (4) and (5) both respect Curtis’s conditions, neither of them provides an instantiation of (\(\star\)). For, instantiations of (\(\star\)) are induced by remainder problems \({\mathcal {B}}^\star\) and neither (4) nor (5) can be induced as such.Footnote 21 Curtis further mentions the so-called Rouché-Capelli theorem. This theorem states that an arbitrary matrix equation of form \(Ap = s\) has a solution if and only if the rank of its coefficient matrix A is equal to the rank of its augmented matrix (A|s). As testifiedFootnote 22 by (4), the conditions cited by Curtis do not ensure that the Rouché-Capelli theorem is applicable. Now, for proper instantiations of (\(\star\)) it canFootnote 23 be shown that the rank of A equals that of (A|s). But this only establishes, via the Rouché-Capelli theorem, that instantiations of (\(\star\)) have solutions, not that they have probability vectors amongst their solutions. And yet clearly, we have to establish the latter in order to show that method \(L^\dag\) is well-defined.

1.2 II. Proof of the Lottery Theorem

Theorem 1

(Lottery Theorem) Let \({\mathcal {B}} = (E, N, \textbf{1}, s)\) be a Broomean problem such that \(E >0\) is an integer and such that \(0< s_i < 1\) for all \(i \in N = \{1, \ldots , n \}\) and \(\sum _{i \in N} s_i = E\). Let A be an \(n \times m\) matrix whose columns \(\alpha _1, \ldots , \alpha _m\) are the integer allocations of \(\textbf{MaxSat}({\mathcal {B}})\). Then, the matrix equation \(Ap = s\) has at least one solution \(p \in {\mathbb {R}}^m\) that is a probability vector, i.e. \(p_i \ge 0\) for all \(i \in N\) and \(\sum _{i \in N} p_i = 1\).

Proof

See below. \(\square\)

We will call an equation of form \(Ap = s\) which respects the conditions of the Lottery Theorem a lottery equation. It readily follows that the entries of any solution of a lottery equation must sum to one:

Lemma 1

If \({\bar{p}}\) is a solution to lottery equation \(Ap =s\) then \(\sum _{i \in N} {\bar{p}}_i = 1\).

Proof

Let lottery equation \(Ap =s\) be induced from \((E, N, \textbf{1}, s)\). As the number of 1s and 0s in a column of A equal E and \(n-E\) respectively, it follows that, for any \(p \in {\mathbb {R}}^m\), \(\sum _{i \in N} (Ap)_i = E \cdot (\sum _{i \in N} p_i)\). So, when \(A{\bar{p}} =s\) we get \(\sum _{i \in N} s_i = E \cdot (\sum _{i \in N} {\bar{p}}_i)\) from which, as \(\sum _{i \in N} s_i = E\), it follows that \(\sum _{i \in N} {\bar{p}}_i = 1\). \(\square\)

Thus, showing that lottery equations have non-negative solutions suffices, in virtue of Lemma 1, to establish the Lottery Theorem. In order to show that lottery equations have non-negative solutions we will invoke Farkas’ lemma:

Proposition 2

(Farkas’ lemma) For any \(n \times m\) matrix A and \(b \in {\mathbb {R}}^n\), exactly one of the following two statements is true.

  1. 1.

    There is an \(x \in {\mathbb {R}}^m\) such that such that \(Ax = b\) and \(x \ge 0\)

  2. 2.

    There is an \(y \in {\mathbb {R}}^n\) such that \(A^\top y \ge 0\) and \(b^\top y < 0\)

Proof

See Goldman and Tucker (1956). \(\square\)

The following lemma shows that, for lottery equations, the second statement of Farkas’ lemma is false.

Lemma 2

Let \(Ap =s\) be a lottery equation with \(n \times m\) lottery matrix A. There is no \(y \in {\mathbb {R}}^n\) such that \(A^\top y \ge 0\) and \(s^\top y < 0\).

Proof

Let \(Ap = s\) be a lottery equation induced by Broomean problem \((E, N, \textbf{1}, s)\) and suppose, for a reductio, that \(A^\top y \ge 0\) and \(s^\top y < 0\) for some \(y \in {\mathbb {R}}^n\) from which, as I will show, it follows that (i) \(\sum \nolimits _{i \in X} y_i \ge 0\) for each \(X \subseteq N\) with \(|X| = E\) and that (ii) \(\sum \nolimits _{i \in N} s_i\cdot y_i < 0\).

The truth of (ii) follows immediate from the definition of matrix multiplication. To see that (i) is true, note that the columns of A correspond with the integer allocations of \(\textbf{MaxSat}({\mathcal {B}})\), where \({\mathcal {B}} = (E, N, \textbf{1}, s)\) satisfies the conditions of the Lottery Theorem. As such, x is a column of A, and hence \(x^\top\) a row of \(A^\top\), if and only if x is a vector of length \(\mid N \mid\) with E entries equal to 1 and \(\mid N \mid - E\) entries equal to 0. So, with any \(X \subseteq N\) with \(|X| = E\) there corresponds a column x of A, and hence a row \(x^\top\) of \(A^\top\), which is defined by letting \(x_i = 1\) if \(i \in X\) and \(x_i = 0\) if \(i \not \in X\). Now, from the definition of x in terms of X, it readily follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} x^\top y = \sum _{i \in N} x_i y_i = \sum _{i \in X} y_i \end{aligned}$$
(6)

As \(x^\top\) is a row of \(A^\top\), it follows from the supposition that \(A^\top y \ge 0\) and (6) that \(\sum _{i \in X} y_i \ge 0\), which establishes (i).

With k the number of negative entries of y, observe that:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 \le k \le E-1 \end{aligned}$$
(7)

The fact that \(k \ge 1\) follows immediately from condition (ii) and the the fact that all entries of s are strictly positive. To see that \(k \le E-1\), suppose that \(k \ge E\). Then, there is a subset \(X \subseteq N\) with \(\mid X\mid = E\) such that \(y_i < 0\) for all \(i \in X\). Let \(x^\top\) be the row of \(A^\top\) that corresponds with this X and note that, per definition, \(x^\top y < 0\). This contradicts with the supposition that \(A^\top y \ge 0\).

Now rearrange the entries of y in ascending order so that, after the rearrangement, we have \(y_ i \le y_j\) whenever \(i \le j\). Let \(Y^+\) and \(Y^-\) be the sets consisting of the non-negative and negative entries of y respectively. With \(k = |Y^-|\), it follows from (ii), as \(y_ i < 0\) for \(i \le k\), and \(0< s_i < 1\) that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \nolimits _{i = 1}^k y_i + \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^n s_i y_i< 0 \end{aligned}$$
(8)

As \(y_ i \le y_j\) whenever \(i \le j\), it follows from (8) that:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \nolimits _{i = 1}^k y_i \ + \ \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} s_i y_i \ + \ y_{E+1} \sum \nolimits _{i = {E +1}}^n s_i \ < 0 \end{aligned}$$
(9)

Observe that the summations in (9) are well-defined in virtue of (7) and the fact that, per definition of a lottery equation, \(E < n\).

We argue that \(y_{E+1} > 0\). To do so, suppose that \(y_{E+1} \le 0\). Then, as\(E+1 > k\) so that \(y_{E+1}\) is non-negative, we have \(y_{E+1} =0\). But then, when \(y_{E+1} = 0\), per definition of k and the arrangement of the entries of y in ascending order, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} y_i < 0 &{} \text{ for } 1 \le i \le k \\ y_i = 0 &{} \text{ for } k+1 \le i \le E \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$
(10)

It then follows from (10) that \(\sum _{i = 1}^E y_i < 0\), which contradicts condition (i). Hence \(y_{E+1} > 0\).

Now let \(\bar{s_i} = 1 -s_i\), let \(m = \sum _{i = k + 1}^n s_i\) and rewrite \(\sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} s_i y_i \ + \ y_{E+1} \sum \nolimits _{i = {E+1}}^n s_i\), i.e. the last two terms of (9), as:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} (1 - {\bar{s}}_i) y_i + y_{E+1} (m - \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} (1 - {\bar{s}}_i)) \end{aligned}$$
(11)

Observe that (11), and so the last two terms of (9), may be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} y_i \ + \ ( m y_{E+1} \ - \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} y_{E+1}) \ + \ \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} {\bar{s}}_i (y_{E+1} - y_i) \end{aligned}$$
(12)

The middle term of (12) equals \((m - (E- k ) ) y_{E+ 1}\). As \(\sum _{i = 1}^n s_i = E\) we have \(m = E - \sum \nolimits _{i = {1}}^{k} s_i\). Hence, as each \(s_i < 1\), we have \(m > E-k\) so that, as \(y_{E+1} > 0\) the middle term of (12) is positive. Moreover, as \({\bar{s}}_i > 0\) and as, per arrangement of the entries of y in ascending order, \(y_{E+1} \ge y_i\) whenever \(k+1 \le i \le E\), the rightmost term of (12) is non-negative. Hence, the sum of the middle and rightmost term of (12) is positive so that (the sum of the three terms of) (12) is strictly larger than \(\sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} y_i\). And so, as (12) equals the sum of the last two expressions of (9), we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} s_i y_i + \ y_{E+1} \sum \nolimits _{i = {E+1}}^n s_i > \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} y_i \end{aligned}$$
(13)

By adding \(\sum _{i = k+ 1}^{E} y_i\) to both sides of the inequality sign of (9), we become:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \nolimits _{i = 1}^E y_i \ + \ \sum \nolimits _{i = {k+1}}^{E} s_i y_i \ + \ y_{E+1} \sum \nolimits _{i = {E +1}}^n s_i \ < \sum _{i = k+ 1}^E y_i \end{aligned}$$
(14)

So that it follows from (13) and (14) that \(\sum _{i = 1}^E y_i < 0\), which contradicts with condition (i) and which completes our reductio argument. \(\square\)

The Lottery Theorem readily follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Farkas’ lemma:

Lottery Theorem (proof): It follows from Farka’s lemma and Lemma 2 that any lottery equation has a non-negative solution \(p \ge 0\) whose entries must, according to Lemma 1, sum to 1. That is, any lottery equation has a solution which is a probability vector, which establishes the Lottery Theorem. \(\square\)

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Wintein, S. To be fair: claims have amounts and strengths. Soc Choice Welf 62, 443–464 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01494-y

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