Abstract
The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters’ preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios. However this increase is limited and the probabilities remain close to the conventional probabilities of having a Condorcet winner when preferences are unrestricted.
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Notes
Agreements are not binding. Building on early work by Riker and Brams (1973) and Ferejohn (1974), Casella and Palfrey (2015) challenge this equivalence. They look at a specific trading mechanism and exhibit examples where coalitional stability is not equivalent to the non-existence of a Condorcet winner.
From a straightforward lexicographic argument, we note that \(\phi \left( k+1\right) \ge 2(k+1)\phi \left( k\right) \).
Each conceivable preference is identified by an index ranging from 1 to \( \phi (k)\).
The set of separable tournaments is the superset of separable linear orders which is obtained when we delete the transitivity requirement while keeping the separability one.
Hollard and Le Breton (1996) have proved that every separable tournament can be obtained through majority aggregation of separable preferences if the number of voters is large enough.
The number of ordered decompositions of the integer n into r integers is equal to \({r+n-1}\atopwithdelims (){r-1}\). In our case, r is the number of separable linear orderings.
To the best of our knowledge, values of the function \(\psi \) have not been tabulated, and its asymptotic behavior has not been studied.
The number of tournaments over m vertices is equal to \(2^{m \atopwithdelims (){2}}\).
The idea of exploiting symmetries already appears in Schürmann (2013).
As compared to IC, the bootstrap has been performed for \(N=10^{5}\) (instead of \(N=10^{6}\) simulations) with a bootstrap of 1000 (instead of 2000) and 1000 draws.
This Table displays exact values for \(k=2\) and rounded estimates for \(k=3\). The IAC value for \(k=3\) comes from Feix and Rouet (1999).
\(\Gamma \) denotes the Gamma function. In particular if x is an integer \(\Gamma (x)=(x-1)!\)
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We wish to thank the editor and the referees for their helpful comments. Some R programs have been prepared and used to compute random approximations of the values of some of the probabilities introduced in our paper. The codes of these programs are described in the working paper version of this note available at https://www.tse-fr.eu/fr/research/publications/working-papers.
Appendix: moving from uniform to Dirichlet: how to deal with the curse of dimensionality
Appendix: moving from uniform to Dirichlet: how to deal with the curse of dimensionality
Let \(S_{m}\) be the m-dimensional unit simplex i.e. the set of vectors p in \( {{\mathbb {R}}}^{m}\) such that:
The uniform distribution on \(S_{m}\) is a special case of a Dirichlet distribution. The Dirichlet distribution of order m with parameters \( \alpha _{1},\ldots ,\alpha _{m}>0\) has a probability density function with respect to Lebesgue measure defined by :
with:Footnote 13
When \(\alpha \equiv \left( 1,\ldots ,1\right) ,\) we obtain the uniform distribution. We know a lot of things about this parametric family of distributions. For our purpose, we only need the property called aggregation property. It asserts that if p follows a Dirichlet distribution of order m with parameters \(\alpha \), then if we sum the coordinates i and j while leaving the others the same, the new vector \(\left( p_{1},\ldots ,p_{i}+p_{j},\ldots ,p_{m}\right) \) follows a Dirichlet distribution of order \(m-1\) with parameters \(\left( \alpha _{1},\ldots ,\alpha _{i}+\alpha _{j},\ldots ,\alpha _{m}\right) \).
This result is used with the observation that a number of common subsets of the 96 \(p_i\) terms appear in the seven constraints that are required to have (1, 1, 1) as the Condorcet winner. These subsets consist of groups of 2, 4 and 12 \(p_i\) terms that are combined to create 32 variables denoted as \(q_i\) for \(1 \le i \le 32\).
From the aggregation property, since the vector p follows a Dirichlet distribution of order 96 with parameter \(\left( 1,1,1,\ldots ,1\right) \), we deduce that the vector q follows a Dirichlet distribution of order 32 with parameters:
So, we have moved from 96 dimensions to 32 dimensions but at the cost of moving from a simple Dirichlet (the uniform) to a more sophisticated one. We rewrite the seven inequalities to make (1, 1, 1) the Condorcet winner in terms of the 32 variables as:
Let \(H^{D}\) denote the polytope associated to these inequalities.
The probability of being in \(H^{D}\) when q is drawn over \(S_{32}\) according to the Dirichlet (12, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 12) is the same as the probability of being in H when p is drawn uniformly over \( S_{96}\).
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Gehrlein, W., Le Breton, M. & Lepelley, D. The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting. Soc Choice Welf 49, 315–327 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1063-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1063-7