Abstract
In this paper, we theoretically characterize robust empirically implementable normative criteria for evaluating socially risky situations. Socially risky situations are modeled as distributions, among individuals, of lotteries on a finite set of state-contingent pecuniary consequences. Individuals are assumed to have selfish Von Neumann–Morgenstern preferences for these socially risky situations. We provide empirically implementable criteria that coincide with the unanimity, over a reasonably large class of such individual preferences, of anonymous and Pareto-inclusive Von Neuman Morgenstern social rankings of risks. The implementable criteria can be interpreted as sequential expected poverty dominance. An illustration of the usefulness of the criteria for comparing the exposure to unemployment risk of different segments of the French and US workforce is also provided.
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Notes
The generalization to societies involving different numbers of individuals is immediate.
In Fleurbaey (2010) socially risky situations are described as probability distributions over profiles of VNM utility levels. The restriction of the analysis to a finite set \(\mathbb {X}\) is a pedagogical simplification that enables us to use the version of Harsanyi social aggregation theorem provided by Weymark (1991) as a theoretical justification to our criteria.
An ordering is a reflexive, complete and transitive binary relation.
A VNM preference is strictly risk averse if the function \(U\) whose expectation numerically represents it satisfies, for every \(j\in \Omega \) and \(y\in \{1,\ldots ,m-2\}\), \(U(j,y+2)-2U(j,y+1)+U(j,y)<0\).
For the individual state \(j\) and the income level \(y\), the discrete Arrow–Pratt coefficient is the number \(a(j,y)\) defined by:
$$\begin{aligned} a(j,y)=\frac{-[U(j,y+2)-2U(j,y+1)+U(j,y)]}{U(j,y+1)-U(j,y)} \end{aligned}$$We are cheating a bit here with respect to the discrete setting in which the rest of the analysis is conducted by considering a differentiable framework.
However, the need literature typically assumes that incomes are available in any (real) quantity whatsoever. This difference with the current setting is not essential.
See Howes (1994) for a critical appraisal of this inference methodology, that can be contrasted with another, more conservative, Intersection–Union (IU) one.
Another empirical use of the criteria developed in this paper to understand the evolution of the exposures of Indian citizens to risks of death is provided in Gravel et al. (2008).
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This work has immensely benefited from the comments made by Conchita d’Ambrosio, Marc Fleurbaey, Patrick Moyes, Alain Trannoy and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.
Appendix: Proofs of theorems 1–2
Appendix: Proofs of theorems 1–2
1.1 Proof of theorem 1
For the first implication, assume that \(p\succsim _{\mathbb {U}_{1}}q\). Then, the inequality:
holds for every function \(U:\Omega \times \mathbb {I}\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) in \(\mathbb {U}_{1}\). Consider, for any \(k\in \{1,\ldots ,l\}\) and \(t\in \mathbb {I}\), the function \(V^{kt}:\Omega \times \mathbb {I}\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) defined, for any \(j\in \Omega \) and \(y\in \mathbb {I}\) by:
It can be checked that the function \(V^{kt}\) so defined belongs to \(\mathbb {U}_{1}\) for any \(k\in \{1,\ldots ,l\}\) and \(t\in \mathbb {I}\). Hence, inequality (16) holds for the functions \(V^{kt}\) so that we have:
as required by (6).
For the other implication, consider a subdivision of the interval \([0,1]\) into \(r\) sub-intervals \([\rho _{h},\rho _{h+1}]\) for \(h=0,\ldots ,r-1\) such that:
and, for all \(i\in N\), \(j\in \Omega \) and \(y\in \mathbb {I}\), there are \(h\) and \(h^{\prime }\in \{0,1,\ldots ,r\}\) such that \(p(i,j,y)=\rho _{h}\) and \(q(i,j,y)=\rho _{h^{\prime }}\). We this notation, we can write (16) as:
where, for \(h=1,\ldots ,r\), \(j=1,\ldots ,l\) and \( y=1,\ldots ,m \),
(we of course allow for the possibility that the cardinality of either of the two sets that enters in (18) be zero). We now proceed by decomposing the left hand side of (17) using Abel identity (see for instance Fishburn and Vickson 1978; eq 2.49). Doing first the decomposition with respect to the \(y\)-indexed summation operator yields:
Decomposing (19) using Abel identity applied this time to the \(j\)-indexed sum operator yields:
Now, using (18), one can see that that, for every \(t\in \mathbb {I}\) and \(k\in \Omega :\)
Combining this with the fact that:
we can write (20) as:
As can be seen, having:
for all \(j\in \Omega \) and all \(k\in \mathbb {I}\) is sufficient for inequality (22) to hold for all state-dependent utility functions \(U_{j}\) in \(\mathbb {U}_{1}\).
1.2 Proof of theorem 2
Assume first that \(p\succsim _{\mathbb {U}_{2}}q\) and, accordingly, that inequality (16) holds for all utility functions \(U:\Omega \times \mathbb {I}\ \rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) in \(\mathbb {U}_{2}\). Consider, for any \(k\in \Omega \) and \(t\in \mathbb {I}\), the function \(\widetilde{V} ^{kt}:\Omega \times \mathbb {I}\ \rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) defined, for \(j\in \Omega \) and \(y\in \mathbb {I}\), by:
For a given \(j\in \Omega \), the function \(\widetilde{V} ^{kt}\) is the “angle” function used in the classical proof of the Hardy-Littlewood-Polya theorem made by Berge (1959). The reader can verify that the functions \(\widetilde{V}^{kt}\) belong to \(\mathbb {U}_{2}\). For this reason the inequality:
holds for every \(k\) and \(t\). Using the definition of the functions \(\widetilde{V}^{kt}\), inequality (23) writes:
as required by condition (8) of SEPG dominance. To obtain condition (9) of SEPG dominance, we consider, for every \(k\in \Omega \), the functions \(V^{k}\): \(\Omega \times \mathbb {I} \rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) defined, for \(j\in \Omega \) and \(y\in \mathbb {I}\), by:
These \(k\)-indexed functions clearly satisfy \( V^{k}(j+1,y)\ge V^{k}(j,y)\) for every \(y\in \mathbb {I}\) and \(j=1,\ldots ,l-1\) and are all (trivially) increasing with respect to income for every \(j\). It can be checked that these functions satisfy (very often trivially) the conditions imposed on the functions in \(\mathbb {U}_{2}\). Hence, inequality (16) holds for any such functions \(V^{k}\) so that we have, for all \(k\in \Omega \):
or
as required by condition (9). For the other implication, it proceeds just as in the Proof of theorem 1 by writing inequality (16) in the form of (17) and by doing the Abel decomposition of (17) until one reaches condition (20). If one then goes one step further and Abel decomposes each term of (20) with respect to the inner (\(y\)-indexed) term, one obtains:
where:
Noticing that:
and remembering Eq. (21) in the proof of theorem 1, one can write (24) as:
For any combination of functions \(U_{j}\) (for \(j\in \Omega \)) belonging to \(\mathbb {U}_{2}\), it is sufficient for (25) to hold to have, for all \(k\in \Omega \):
and:
for all \(t\in \mathbb {I}\), which is the definition of SEPG dominance.
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Gravel, N., Tarroux, B. Robust normative comparisons of socially risky situations. Soc Choice Welf 44, 257–282 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0833-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0833-8