Abstract
We propose a new axiom, weakest collective rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both weak Pareto optimality (WPO) in Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) original characterization and strong individual rationality (SIR) in Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the Nash solution by symmetry (SYM), scale invariance (SI), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and our weakest collective rationality (WCR) axiom.
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References
Kalai E, Smorodinsky M (1975) Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem. Econometrica 43: 513–518
Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18: 155–162
Roth AE (1977) Individual rationality and Nash’s solution to the bargaining problem. Math Oper Res 2: 64–65
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Anbarci, N., Sun, Cj. Weakest collective rationality and the Nash bargaining solution. Soc Choice Welf 37, 425–429 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0497-y