Abstract
This paper identifies a family of scoring rules that are robust against coalitional manipulations that result in inefficient outcomes. We discuss the robustness of a number of Condorcet consistent and “point runoff” voting rules against such inefficient manipulation and classify voting rules according to their potential vulnerability to inefficient manipulation.
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Baharad, E., Neeman, Z. Robustness against inefficient manipulation. Soc Choice Welfare 29, 55–67 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0197-9