Abstract
In a society of variable size, Quesada (Soc Choice Welfare 25(1): 221–226, 2005) establishes the existence of Arrovian social welfare functions which are not dictatorial. We show that this escape from the Arrovian impossibility collapses when a very mild monotonicity condition is introduced.
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Çengelci, M.A., Sanver, M.R. Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem?. Soc Choice Welfare 28, 439–442 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0180-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0180-5