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Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties

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Abstract

We examine a continuous-time principal-agent problem under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties. Both the principal and the agent exhibit Gilboa–Schmeidler’s extreme ambiguity aversion with exponential utilities. We distinguish between expost realized and exante perceived volatilities, and argue that the second-best contract necessarily consists of two sharing rules: one for realized outcome and the other for realized volatility. The outcome-sharing rule is for uncertainty sharing and work incentives, as usual, and the volatility-sharing rule is to align the agent’s worst prior with that of the principal. At optimum, their worst priors are symmetrized, and realized compensation is positively related to realized volatility. This theoretical positive relation can be consistent with popular managerial compensation practices such as restricted stock plus stock option grants. A closed-form solution to a linear-quadratic example is provided.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business Administration, Ajou University, Suwon, 16499, South Korea

    Jaeyoung Sung

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Correspondence to Jaeyoung Sung.

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I would like to thank for useful comments/discussions anonymous referees, Xiaoyan Chen, Zengjing Chen, Jaksa Cvitanić, Shige Peng, Jianfeng Zhang, and participants in seminars at Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, University of Southern California, 2017 Workshop on Mathematical Finance and Financial Data Processing at Qufu Normal University, China, and North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2018. All remaining errors of course are mine.

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Sung, J. Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties. Econ Theory 74, 593–642 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9

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