Abstract
For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we define a family of two-claimant rules that offer a compromise between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules. We identify the members of the family that satisfy particular properties. We generalize the rules to general populations by requiring “consistency”: The recommendation made for each problem should be “in agreement” with the recommendation made for each reduced problem that results when some claimants receive their awards and leave. We identify which members of the two-claimant family have consistent extensions, and we characterize these extensions. Here too, we identify which extensions satisfy particular properties. Finally, we propose and study a “dual” family.
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Notes
The terminology concerning properties of rules is not uniform in the literature. Here is how the terms we use correspond to the terms that are most common to designate the properties we define below: We use the “\(\frac{1}{2}\)-truncated claims lower bound” instead of “securement,” “order preservation under endowment variation” instead of “super-modularity,” “homogeneity” instead of “scale invariance,” “minimal rights first” instead of “composition from minimal rights,” “composition down” instead of “path independence,” and “composition up” instead of “composition”.
This is only a necessary condition. For necessary and sufficient conditions, see Thomson (2006).
Any other function obtained from f be subjecting to a monotone transformation is also a representation of S.
When talking about steepness, we imagine that claimant 2’s award is plotted along the horizontal axis of \({\mathbb {R}}^{\{2,3\}}\) and claimant 3’s award is plotted vertically.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Yoichi Kasajima and two anonymous referees for their very useful comments.
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Appendix
Appendix
As mentioned in the body of the paper, the family of rules in \({\mathcal {G}}^{N}\) that satisfy composition down but not claims monotonicity is complex. We only give examples to illustrate the various ways in which the family of rules satisfying these axioms (Theorem 1) is enlarged by dropping this second property. Each of the examples is defined by delimiting subregions in awards space and specifying what to do in these regions. The complexity of the family comes from the choices we have in specifying the boundary between these regions and, for points that belong to the boundaries of two adjacent regions, in deciding whether they should be thought of as belonging to one region or as belonging to the other. These choices cannot be made independently however.
Let \(L^1\) be the region of awards space above the 45\(^\circ \) line. Figure 9a shows a rule for which \(L^1\) is partitioned into two cones, \(R^1\) (shaded) and \(R^2\). The boundary ray shared by these cones is denoted r. A typical branch of the tree in \(R^1\) consists of a segment in \(\Lambda \) emanating from the origin followed by a vertical segment to r, excluding the point at which r is reached. A typical branch of the tree in \(R^2\) consists of a segment in r followed by an unbounded vertical segment.
Figure 9b shows a rule for which \(L^1\) is partitioned into three cones, \(R^1\), \(R^2\) (shaded) and \(R^3\). The boundary ray shared by \(R^1\) and \(R^2\) is denoted \(r^1\). The boundary ray shared by \(R^2\) and \(R^3\) is denoted \(r^2\). A typical branch of the tree in \(R^1\) consists of a segment in \(\Lambda \) emanating from the origin followed by a vertical segment to r, excluding the point at which \(r^1\) is reached. A typical branch of the tree in \(R^2\) consists of a ray from the origin. A typical branch of the tree in \(R^3\) consists of a segment in \(r^2\) followed by an unbounded vertical segment.
Figure 9c shows a rule for which \(L^1\) is partitioned into two cones, \(R^1\) (shaded) and \(R^2\). The boundary ray shared by these cones is denoted r. In \(R^1\), there is a downward-sloping continuous curve \(D^1\) (the segment \(\mathrm{seg}[b,a]\)) that is visible from below from the origin. A typical branch of the tree in \(R^1\) consists of a segment to \(D^1\) emanating from the origin followed by a vertical segment to r, excluding the point at which r is reached. In \(R^2\), there is a downward-sloping continuous curve \(D^2\) (the segment \(\mathrm{seg}[d,b]\)) that is visible from below from the origin. A typical branch of the tree in \(C^2\) consists of a segment to \(D^2\) emanating from the origin followed by an unbounded vertical segment.
Figure 9d shows a rule for which \(L^1\) is partitioned into two regions, \(R^1\) (shaded) and \(R^2\), defined as follows. There is a point \(a \in L^1\) such that \(R^1\) consists of the union of the cone with boundary rays \(\Lambda \) and the ray through a as well as all points in \(L^1\) whose abscissa is at least \(a_1\). There is a downward slope curve D from a to \(\Lambda \). Region \(R^2\) is the complement. The unbounded vertical half line V with lowest point is a and is part of the boundary of \(R^2\). A typical branch of the tree in \(R^1\) consists of a segment to \(D^1\) followed by an unbounded vertical segment. A typical branch of the tree in \(R^2\) consists of a segment to V.
There is also a point b on the vertical segment V such that all branches in \(R^2\) whose limit point is in \({\mathrm{seg}}[a, b]\) do not contain their upper limit point, and all branches in \(R^2\) whose limit point is in the vertical half line with lowest end point is b do contain their upper limit point. Then, \({\mathrm{seg}}[0, a]\cup {\mathrm{seg}}[a, b]\) is a branch of the tree.
Figure 10 shows a rule that exhibits all of these features described in Figs. 9a–d. It illustrates the general definition.
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Thomson, W. For claims problems, compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules. Econ Theory 60, 495–520 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0888-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0888-5