Abstract
In this paper I to ask an old fashioned question, “Why do capitalist economies evolve in the way that they do?” The answer will lie, in the nature of human curiosity and the corresponding growth of knowledge and in the particular instituted rules of the game that induce the self transformation of each particular economic order. The essential idea is this; the manner of self transforming is contingent on the manner of self-ordering, so that different instituting frames have different dynamic consequences. The notion of order provides the bridge to the systemic properties of the economy, the nature of its parts and the manner of their interconnection, while the notion of transformation provides the link with evolution and the open-ended, essentially unpredictable, development of capitalism. From my perspective capitalist economies are ignorance economies, in which highly specialised individuals and teams know a great deal about very little, so that the productive strength of the system, its collective knowing, depends on how the pools of specialised, narrow understandings are connected. Connectivity requires organisation and organisation depends on rules of the game and on belief and trust so that we can rely upon the testimony and actions of others. Failure of trust leads to failure of connectivity and a corresponding loss of system coherence. Order is central to the notion of economic evolution and, in practice, economic configurations demonstrate immense richness and subtlety but order is not equilibrium. Systems in equilibrium do not evolve. That the day to day structures of capitalism are the product of ordering processes in the epistemic as well as the material realm seems to me self evident and it is equally self evident that these structures are restless, that their development is open-ended and unpredictable.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See, for example, the authoritative treatment of Andersen (2011).
I have attempted to connect the ideas of Hayek, Marshall and Schumpeter in relation to economic evolution in Metcalfe (2008).
To state that part of the problem lies in inadequate labour mobility is not too helpful. The stickiness of social ties relative to the fluidity of economic ties is perhaps the more productive way to pose the problem. Of itself the mismatch provides ample justification for a welfare state to compensate for the loss of human capital that occurs when firms and industries are forced into absolute decline. For example, the growth of the Lancashire cotton industry stimulated the growth of numerous urban centres (the ones famously characterised on canvas by L.S.Lowry) but as the industry declined after 1920, and disappeared in the mid 1980s, those urban centres were left without their primary economic rationale. Manchester adjusted well, eventually, other towns did not.
Even Schumpeter expressed the view that “a majority of would be entrepreneurs never get their projects under sail and that, of those that do, nine out of ten fail to make a success of them” (1939, p. 117).
See Shackle (1966), p. 36 for an interpretation of Marshall on similar lines.
See, for example, the discussion in Kirman (2011), chapter 4. We may note that the theory of the pricing of financial assets as developed by Keynes and Shackle rests exactly on a diversity of views as to how those prices will evolve in the future. I am grateful to a referee for drawing my attention to this point.
A model study of its kind is Landes’ account of the evolution of the international clock and watch industry (1983).
The evolutionary nature of Smiths theory of knowing and connecting is detailed in Loasby (1999). In Smith’s theory of knowledge (first outlined in his Essay on Astronomy, published posthumously in 1795) knowledge is derived from the connection of disparate phenomena and is thus a product of human imagination and has no existence beyond human minds.
The weaknesses have been admirably exposed by Mirowski (1989).
Dopfer and Potts (2008) call this the bimodal axiom, that the same broad idea may admit many alternative instantiations in practice. Thus when we talk of the method of producing a particular class of commodity we are in effect talking about a population of alternative methods.
See Loasby (1990) for further elaboration of this Marshallian theme. We should also note the relevance here of Edith Penrose’s theory of the firm, that it is an incompletely connected administrative structure premised on many specialised knowings and thus constrained in its development by the limitations on the rate at which new knowings can be generated and old understandings abandoned. Penrose (1959).
See Potts (2000) for a very clear articulation of the view that the use of fields in economic theory is a means to avoid the significance of connection, to replace specific relations and interactions with the idea of complete and anonymous immersion in a field of forces acting equally on all.
Quite remarkably, Marshall writes of this in Industry and Trade (1919), where he depicts a tripartite ecology of research organisations, an almost exact description of a modern innovation system. For, an excellent exemplar, see the penetrating account of the role of Stanford university in the development of semiconductor technology by Lecuyer (2007).
A referee rightly drew my attention to Herbert Simon’s emphasis on the quasi-decomposability of evolving systems. The incompleteness o f connectivity, the mutability of connectivity are two essential aspects of organisation in capitalism and the immanent possibilities for creative destruction. See Simon (1969). The referee also pointed out that this is the reason why Marshall developed his reasoning in partial equilibrium terms; since he was writing about an evolving system it necessarily could not be completely and immutably connected. The impossibility of general equilibrium as an economic frame is, of course, premised on the incompleteness of market connectivity, which, in turn, is premised upon our ineluctable ignorance of the future. “Would someone please write me a contract to purchase an unspecified device to solve an unspecified problem at some indeterminate date beyond today” is not a request that is likely to elicit action.
The reader puzzled by a claim that libraries and book stacks constitute technologies might care to read Petroski (1999).
Shackle (1966) captures this with his usual élan, “To ask for a non-determinist history is to ask for a history which is not completely structured, a history, that is to say, in which we need not regard every situation or event as the inevitable, sole and necessary consequence of antecedent situations and events, a history in which, therefore, a situation or event can be essentially and inherently not fully explainable, not fully analysable, not fully assignable to conditions or causes which are sufficient to guarantee the occurrence of it and it alone” (p. 107, italics in original) The connection with age-old debates on the distinction between “free will” and “determinism” is drawn in Popper (1972).
Richardson (1975) has provided a very cogent account of this non-equilibrium dimension to Smith’s economic dynamics.
Just as scandals that arose with new medical products lead to strict regulation so the scandals that have arisen more recently about the conduct of financial organisations may instigate a raft of new rules and regulations as to “innovative” lending practices and the design of financial instruments.
It is one of the canons of economic theory that decisions to produce and consume depend on relative prices not absolute prices. If an economy, a simple economy, trades one hundred goods or services this generates 4,950 relative prices, a considerable volume of information. The same information is contained in 99 money prices (one of the goods being taken as money or the accounting unit) from which any relative price can be deduced. The effect this has on the economy of information when keeping track of transactions and changes in the ownership of property will be obvious.
The post 2008 financial crisis was a phenomena based on the breakdown of trust in financial markets, a breakdown that arose from an inability to access the true risk profile of an important class of financial assets (innovations in fact) held on the balance sheets of retail banks and other financial institutions. Lacking this information, no counter party could be confident in the solvency of those it lent to. I recall being told, some years ago, of a shop in Buenos Aires, at a time of very high inflation, being “closed for lack of prices”. It is the same point, when information breaks down so does trade and our ignorance is manifest.
One might add that the rules which facilitate the establishment of new business entities are of central importance to a Schumpeterian view of economic evolution. The wider lessons in relation to inter society differences in development potential has been drawn by De Soto (2000).
This is why the disclosure rules attached to patents are so important. The information placed in the public domain signifies the ideas which must be avoided if a patent is to be invented around. The wider point of relevance is the transience of the innovator’s profits, a central part of Schumpeter’s theory of economic development. “No industrial company of the type indicated gratifies its shareholders with a constant shower of gold; on the contrary it soon declines into a stage that has the most lamentable similarity with the drying up of a spring.” (Schumpeter 1912, p. 209).
Note the importance of the recent rebirth of the economic sociology of markets. For very different contributions see Callon (1998), Harvey (2010) and Beckert (2009). That economists do not seem much bothered by the organisation of real markets is oft’ said (e.g., Richardson 1972) but see Kirman (2011) for an outstanding counterexample. There is a connection here to the debates on markets as evolving systems of computable rules. Consult Mirowski (2007) and the commentaries on this paper for further elucidation of the point. Richard Nelson has long emphasized the importance of rule sets as social technologies and their associated innovations. On this see Nelson and Sampat (2001).
The “Vital Few” is the perceptive title of Jonathan Hughes’ (1966) instructive account of American enterprise.
As explored in Georghiou et al. (1984).
The intra ocular lens, an astounding development in the treatment of cataract, was first used in London in 1948. It took four decades for a sequence of problems to be identified and solved that turned the treatment from a surgeon’s craft into a quasi-industrial process, a procedure that is today the most frequently performed medical intervention in the world. A new branch of cataract surgery was instigated to train the practitioners and channel the growth of understanding, a new industry emerged to produce the devices and process equipment required, and, along the way, new rules for regulating practice were introduced. The pace at which these changes occurred differed between the USA and the UK as a result of their differentially instituted medical systems. See Metcalfe et al. (2005) for an account of this radical innovation. Here too one might also remember Marshall’s, dictum “constructive movements which had long been in preparation” (Marshall 1920, p. xiii).
For a complementary view see Nelson (2013).
Simplified not least because of the neglect here of the role of labour and capital markets in the process of economic change.
References
Andersen ES (2011) Joseph A. Schumpeter. Palgrave Macmillan, London
Arrow K (1974) The limits of organization. W.W. Norton, New York
Audi R (1998) Epistemology. Routledge, London
Beckert J (2009) The social order of markets. Theory Soc 38:245–269
Berlin I (1991) The crooked timber of humanity. Fontana, London
Callon M (1998) The laws of the markets. Blackwell Publishers, London
Clark C (1944) The conditions of economic progress. Macmillan, London
Commons JR (1924) Legal foundations of capitalism. Macmillan, London
De Soto H (2000) The mystery of capital. Basic books, New York
Dopfer K, Potts J (2008) The general theory of economic evolution. Routledge, London
Dopfer K, Foster J, Potts J (2004) Micro-meso-macro. J Evol Econ 14(3):263–280
Dosi G (1982) Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. Res Policy 11:147–162
Foster J (2005) From simplistic to complex systems in economics. Camb J Econ 29:873–892
Georghiou L, Metcalfe JS, Evans J, Ray T, Gibbons M (1984) Post innovation performance. Macmillan, London
Goldman AI (1999) Knowledge in a social world. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Harvey M (2010) Markets, rules and institutions of exchange. Manchester University Press, Manchester
Hausmann R, Rodrik D (2003) Economic development as self-discovery. J Dev Econ 72(2):603–633
Hodgson G (2007) The enforcement of contracts and property rights: constitutive vs. epiphenomenal concepts of Law. In: Harvey M, Randles S, Ramlogan R (eds) 2007, Karl Polanyi. Manchester University Press, Manchester
Hodgson G, Knudsen T (2010) Darwin’s conjecture: the search for general principles of social and economic evolution. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Hughes JRT (1966) The vital few: American economic progress and its protagonists. Houghton Mifflin, Boston
Hughes TP (1989) American genesis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Jorgenson D, Timmer M (2011) Structural change in advanced nations: a new set of stylised facts. Scand J Econ 113:5–29
Kirman A (2011) Complex economics. Routledge, London
Knight F (1923) The ethics of competition, reprinted in Knight F., 1977. The ethics of competition. Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey
Knight F (1935) Statics and dynamics, reprinted in Knight F., 1977. The ethics of competition. Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey
Kuznets S (1954) Economic change. Heinemann, London
Kuznets S (1971) Economic growth of nations: total output, structure and spread. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA
Kuznets S (1977) Two centuries of economic growth: reflections on US experience. Am Econ Rev 67:1–14
Landes DA (1969) The unbound Prometheus. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Landes DA (1983) Revolution in time. Belknap Press, Boston
Lecuyer C (2007) Making silicon valley: innovation and the growth of high tech, 1930–1970. MIT Press, London
Loasby BJ (1990) Firms, markets and the principle of continuity. In: Whitaker JK (ed) Centenary essays on Alfred Marshall. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Loasby BJ (1999) Knowledge, institutions and evolution in economics. Routledge, London
Loasby B (2001) Time, knowledge and evolutionary dynamics: why connections matter. J Evol Econ 11(4):393–412
Maddison A (1995) Monitoring the world economy. OECD, Paris
Marshall A (1919) Industry and trade. Macmillan, London
Marshall A (1920) Principles of economics, 8th edn. Macmillan, London
Mathias P (1979) The transformation of England. Methuen, London
Metcalfe JS (1995) The economic foundations of technology policy: equilibrium and evolutionary perspectives. In: Stoneman P (ed) Handbook of the economics of innovation and technological change. Blackwell, Oxford
Metcalfe JS (2008) The broken thread: Marshall, Schumpeter and Hayek on the evolution of capitalism. In: Shionoya Y, Nishizawa T (eds) Marshall and Schumpeter on evolution: economic sociology of capitalist development. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Metcalfe JS, Foster J (2010) Evolutionary growth theory. In: Setterfield M (ed) Handbook of alternative theories of economic growth. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Metcalfe JS, Mina A, James A (2005) Emergent innovation systems and the development of the intraocular lens. Res Policy 34:1283–1304
Metcalfe JS, Foster J, Ramlogan R (2006) Adaptive economic growth. Camb J Econ 30(1):7–32
Mirowski P (1989) More heat than light. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Mirowski P (2007) Markets come in bits: evolution, computation and markomata in economic science. J Econ Behav Organ 63:209–242
Mokyr J (2002) The gifts of Athena. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Mokyr J (1990) The lever of riches. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Nelson R (2013) Demand, supply and their interaction in markets, as seen from the perspective of evolutionary economic theory. J Evol Econ 23(1):17–38
Nelson R, Sampat B (2001) Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance. J Econ Behav Organ 44:31–54
Penrose ET (1959) The theory of the growth of the firm. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Petroski H (1999) The book on the book shelf. A.A. Knopf, New York
Popper KR (1972) Of clouds and clocks: an approach to the problem of rationality and the freedom of man. In: Popper KR (ed) Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach, chapter 6. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Popper K (1987) The epistemological position of evolutionary epistemology, reproduced in Popper, K. (1994). All life is problem solving. Routledge, London
Potts J (2000) The new evolutionary microeconomics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Potts J (2001) Knowledge and markets. J Evol Econ 11(4):412–432
Pratten C (1993) The stock market. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Richardson GB (1972) The organisation of industry. Econ J 82:883–896
Richardson GB (1975) Adam Smith on competition and increasing returns. In: Skinner AS, Wilson T (eds) Essays on Adam Smith. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Rodrik D (2004) Industrial policy for the 21st Century, mimeo. J.F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Schumpeter JA (1912) The theory of economic development. First English translation, 1934. Harvard Economic Press, Harvard
Schumpeter JA (1939) Business cycles, volume one. McGraw-Hill, New York
Shackle GLS (1966) The nature of economic thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Shiller RJ (2000) Irrational exuberance. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Simon HA (1969) The sciences of the artificial. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
The financial support of the Autonomous Province of Trento, sponsor of the Openloc project, is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of the two referees are noted with particular gratitude, as are the response of the participants of the symposium organised by Geoff Hodgson at which the first draft of this paper was presented. Although it has not proved possible to incorporate all of their wide ranging comments, the argument in this final version is better connected thanks to their insights.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Metcalfe, S. Capitalism and evolution. J Evol Econ 24, 11–34 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-013-0307-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-013-0307-7
Keywords
- Economic evolution
- Economic order and epistemic order
- Restless capitalism
- Ignorance and organization
- Knowledge and connectivity
- Self organization and self transformation