Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

The merger of populations, the incidence of marriages, and aggregate unhappiness

  • Regular Article
  • Published:
Journal of Evolutionary Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Let a society’s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when apart; merger alone increases unhappiness. But when societies F and M merge and marriages are formed such that the number of households in the merged society is equal to the number of individuals in one of the constituent societies, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be lower than the aggregate unhappiness in the two constituent societies when apart. This result obtains regardless of which individuals from one society form households with which individuals from the other, and even when the marriages have not (or not yet) led to income gains to the married couples from increased efficiency, scale economies, and the like. While there are various psychological reasons for people to become happier when they get married as opposed to staying single, the very formation of households reduces social distress even before any other happiness-generating factors kick in.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This result extends quite straightforwardly to the case of a general convex and homogenous index of deprivation.

  2. Two individuals who live together as a couple can enjoy the same level of consumption as two individuals who live singly for 27 to 41 percent less income (Browning et al., 2006; Fleurbaey and Gaulier, 2009).

  3. This measure of relative deprivation is explained further in Stark and Hyll (2011). The measure is based on the seminal work of Runciman (1966), on a proposal made by Yitzhaki (1979), and on axiomatization by Ebert and Moyes (2000) and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006). However, in the Appendix we show that the results derived in the body of the paper are robust with respect to two other measures of relative deprivation: the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, and the distance from the highest income. It is worth noting that since the 1960s, a considerable body of research evolved, demonstrating empirically that interpersonal comparisons of income (that is, comparisons of the income of an individual with the incomes of higher income members of his reference group) bear significantly on the perception of well-being, and on behavior. (For a recent review see Clark et al., 2008.) One branch of this body of research has dealt with migration. Several studies have shown empirically that a concern for relative deprivation impacts significantly on migration outcomes (Stark and Taylor, 1989; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Quinn, 2006; Stark et al., 2009). Theoretical expositions have shown how the very decision to resort to migration and the choice of migration destination (Stark, 1984; Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988; Stark and Wang, 2007; Stark and Fan, 2011; Fan and Stark, 2011), as well as the assimilation behavior of migrants (Fan and Stark, 2007), are modified by a distaste for relative deprivation.

  4. This is not a result that informed intuition yields. Consider, for example, the most intuitive measure of heterogeneity - the variance. The merger of two populations can result in a decrease of the variance to a level below the sum of the variances of the constituent populations. For example, consider the merger of two populations with incomes \(\boldsymbol{f}\) = (1,9) and \(\boldsymbol{m}\) = (2,10). Prior to the merger, \(Var\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+Var(\boldsymbol{m})=16+16=32\). But after the merger, \(Var\left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)=16\frac{1}{4}<Var\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+Var(\boldsymbol{m})\), the very opposite of the result rendered by resorting to TRD.

  5. To see this vividly, let \(\boldsymbol{m}\) = (1,2) and \(\boldsymbol{f}\) = (3,4). Prior to a merger, the levels of relative deprivations are, respectively, (1/2,0) for the members of the M population, and (1/2,0) for the members of the F population, yielding TRD(\(\boldsymbol{m}\)) = 1/2 and TRD \(\big(\boldsymbol{f}\big)\) = 1/2. Upon a merger, the RD of the individual earning 3 declines from 1/2 to 1/4, whereas the RD’s of the members of the poorer population rise to, respectively, (3/2, 3/4). The TRD of the merged population then registers an increase: \(\textit{TRD}\left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)=5/2 \geq \textit{TRD}\left( {\boldsymbol{f}}\right) + \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right)\).

  6. Once again, this is not a result that informed intuition yields. The perception that upon a decrease of the number of income units by half we should unreservedly expect a decrease in inequality is incorrect. To see this, we resort again to the variance as a measure of income differences in a population and consider the merger of populations with incomes \(\boldsymbol{f}\) = (1, 9) and \(\boldsymbol{m}\) = (2, 10). Then, as noted in footnote 4, prior to the merger \(Var\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+Var(\boldsymbol{m})=16+16=32\). However, following marriages that result in (h 1, h 2) = (3, 19), the variance rises to Var (h) = 64.

References

  • Beckfield J (2009) Remapping inequality in Europe. Int J Comp Sociol 50:486–509

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Behrens K, Gaigné C, Ottaviano GIP, Thisse JF (2007) Countries, regions and trade: on the welfare impacts of economic integration. Europ Econ Rev 51:1277–1301

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blanchflower DG, Oswald AJ (2004) Well-being over time in Britain and the USA. J Publ Econ 88:1359–1386

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bossert W, D’Ambrosio C (2006) Reference groups and individual deprivation: an axiomatic characterization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Econ Lett 90:421–426

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Browning M, Chiappori PA, Lewbel A (2006) Estimating consumption economies of scale, adult equivalence scales, and household bargaining power. Boston College Working Paper No. 588

  • Clark AE, Frijters P, Shields MA (2008) Relative income, happiness, and utility: an explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles. J Econ Lit 46:95–144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark AE, Oswald AJ (2002) A simple statistical method for measuring how life events affect happiness. Int J Epidemiol 31:1139–1144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ebert U, Moyes P (2000) An axiomatic characterization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Econ Lett 68:263–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fan CS, Stark O (2007) A social proximity explanation of the reluctance to assimilate. Kyklos 60:55–63

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fan CS, Stark O (2011) A theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma. Int Econ Rev 52:549–571

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischer P, Greitemeyer T, Omay SI, Frey D (2007) Mergers and group status: the impact of high, low and equal group status on identification and satisfaction with a company merger, experienced controllability, group identity and group cohesion. J Community Appl Soc Psych 17:203–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleurbaey M (2009) Beyond GDP: the quest for a measure of social welfare. J Econ Lit 47:1029–1075

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleurbaey M, Gaulier G (2009) International comparisons of living standards by equivalent incomes. Scand J Econ 111:597–624

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenaway D, Gullstrand J, Kneller R (2008) Surviving globalization. J Int Econ 74:264–277

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henrekson M, Torstensson J, Torstensson R (1997) Growth effects of European integration. Europ Econ Rev 41:1537–1557

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Qiu LD, Zhou W (2006) International mergers: incentives and welfare. J Int Econ 68:38–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quinn MA (2006) Relative deprivation, wage differentials and Mexican migration. Rev Devel Econ 10:135–153

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rivera-Batiz LA, Romer PM (1991) Economic integration and endogenous growth. Quart J Econ 106:531–555

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rivera-Batiz LA, Xie D (1993) Integration among unequals. Reg Sci Urban Econ 23:337–354

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Runciman WG (1966) Relative deprivation and social justice. University of California Press, Berkeley

    Google Scholar 

  • Stark O (1984) Rural-to-urban migration in LDCs: a relative deprivation approach. Econ Devel Cult Change 32:475–486

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Fan CS (2011) Migration for degrading work as an escape from humiliation. J Econ Behav Organ 77:241–247

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Hyll W (2011) On the economic architecture of the workplace: repercussions of social comparisons among heterogeneous workers. J Lab Econ 29:349–375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Micevska M, Mycielski J (2009) Relative poverty as a determinant of migration: evidence from Poland. Econ Lett 103:119–122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Taylor JE (1989) Relative deprivation and international migration. Demography 26:1–14

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Taylor JE (1991) Migration incentives, migration types: the role of relative deprivation. Econ J 101:1163–1178

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Wang YQ (2007) Towards a theory of self-segregation as a response to relative deprivation: steady-state outcomes and social welfare. In: Bruni L, Porta PL (eds) Economics and happiness: framing the analysis. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 223–242

    Google Scholar 

  • Stark O, Yitzhaki S (1988) Labour migration as a response to relative deprivation. J Popul Econ 1:57–70

    Google Scholar 

  • Tajfel H, Turner JC (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In: Austin WG, Worchel S (eds) The social psychology of intergroup relations. Brooks/Cole, Monterey, pp 33–47

    Google Scholar 

  • Terry DJ, Carey CJ, Callan VJ (2001) Employee adjustment to an organizational merger: an intergroup perspective. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 27:267–280

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Terry DJ, O’Brien AT (2001) Status, legitimacy, and ingroup bias in the context of an organizational merger. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 4:271–289

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Elkan R (1996) Catching up and slowing down: learning and growth patterns in an open economy. J Int Econ 41:95–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Veenhoven R (1989) Does happiness bind? Marriage chances of the unhappy. In: Veenhoven R (ed) How harmful is happiness? Universitaire Pers Rotterdam, Rotterdam, pp 44–60

    Google Scholar 

  • Yitzhaki S (1979) Relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient. Quart J Econ 93:321–324

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zeng DZ, Zhao L (2010) Globalization, interregional and international inequalities. J Urban Econ 67:352–361

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to Giulio Codognato, Giacomo Corneo, Martyna Kobus, Andrew Oswald, and Gerhard Sorger for their wise advice.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Oded Stark.

Appendix

Appendix

The results derived in the body of the paper are not dented when alternative measures of relative deprivation are employed. We consider two such measures: the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, and the distance from the highest income. We attend to these two measures in turn.

In population F, let the relative deprivation of an individual with income f i , i = 1,2,...,n, be defined as

$$ \textit{RD}^\prime \left( {f_i ,{\textbf{\emph{f}}}} \right)\equiv \sum\limits_{k=i+1}^n \left( \vphantom{\boldsymbol{f}}{f_k -f_i } \right). $$

Then, the total relative deprivation of population F, as the sum of the excesses of incomes, is

$$ \textit{TRD}'\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)\equiv \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n-1} \textit{RD}'\left( {f_i ,\boldsymbol{f}} \right)=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum\limits_{k=i+1}^n \left(\vphantom{\boldsymbol{f}} {f_k -f_i } \right). $$

A property that is analogous to Lemma 1 characterizes this measure:

$$ \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)=\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n-1} \sum\limits_{k=i+1}^n \left(\vphantom{\boldsymbol{f}} {f_k -f_i } \right)=\frac{1}{2}\sum\limits_{i=1}^n \sum\limits_{k=1}^n \left|\vphantom{\boldsymbol{f}} {f_k -f_i } \right|. $$

When a second population, M, merges with population F, we derive the superadditivity result once again.

Claim A1

\( \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)\ge \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)

Proof

We have that

$$ \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)=\frac{1}{2}\left[ {\sum\limits_{i=1}^n {\sum\limits_{j=1}^n {\left| {f_j -f_i } \right|} } +\sum\limits_{k=1}^n {\sum\limits_{l=1}^n {\left| {m_l -m_k } \right|} } } \right]+\sum\limits_{i=1}^n {\sum\limits_{k=1}^n {\left| {f_i -m_k } \right|} } . $$

Noting that \(\frac{1}{2}\!\sum\limits_{i=1}^n \!{\sum\limits_{j=1}^n\! {\left| {f_j -f_i } \right|} } =\textit{TRD}^\prime \!\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)\), that \(\frac{1}{2}\sum\limits_{k=1}^n {\sum\limits_{l=1}^n {\left| {m_l -m_k } \right|} } =\textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right)\), and that \(\sum\limits_{i=1}^n {\sum\limits_{k=1}^n {\left|\vphantom{\boldsymbol{f}} {f_i -m_k } \right|} } \ge 0\), completes the proof. □

For the merged population H, introduced in the same manner as in Case 2 in the body of the paper, a claim akin to Claim 2 is now stated and proved.

Claim A2

\( \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{h} \right)\le \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)

Proof

Since TRD differs from TRD only by a scaling factor (the size of the population), TRD too is convex and of homogeneity of degree 1. Therefore, the proof of Claim A2 tracks the same steps as those undertaken in proving Claim 2. □

We next consider measuring relative deprivation as the distance from the highest income.

In population F, let the relative deprivation of an individual with income f i , i = 1,2,...,n, be defined as

$$ \emph{RD}^{\prime\prime} \left( {f_i ,{\textbf{\emph{f}}}} \right)\equiv f^\ast -f_i , $$

where f* = max{f 1, ...,f n }. The total relative deprivation of population F, measured as the aggregate of the distances from the highest income, is

$$ \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( f \right)\equiv \mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left( {f^\ast -f_i } \right). $$

When a second population, M, the total relative deprivation of which is measured in the same way as that of population F, merges with population F, we obtain the superadditivity result once again. The reasoning is straightforward. Unless the two populations have each the same highest income, a merger results in exposure of members of one of the populations to a higher post-merger highest income, while members of the other population continue to be exposed to the same highest income as prior to the merger. Thus, the aggregated distances from the highest income in the merged population will not be less than the sum of the corresponding distances in the constituent populations when apart. For the sake of completeness, we state this result in the following claim.

Claim A3

\( \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)\ge \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)

Proof

The proof is contained in the preceding discussion.□

For the merged population H, introduced in the same manner as in Case 2 in the body of the paper, a claim akin to Claim 2 is now stated and proved.

Claim A4

\( \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{h} \right)\le \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)

Proof

For the highest income in population H, h *, we have

$$ \begin{array}{rll} h^\ast&=&\max \left\{{f_1 +m_1^\prime,...,f_n +m_n^\prime }\right\}\le \max \left\{ \vphantom{m_1^\prime}{f_1,...,f_n } \right\}\\&&+\max \left\{{m_1^\prime,...,m_n^\prime}\right\}=f^\ast +m^\ast , \end{array} $$

where \(m_1^\prime,...,m_n^\prime \) are the elements of the permutated \(\boldsymbol{m}^\prime\) vector introduced in Case 2 of Section 2, and where \(m^\ast =\max \left\{ {m_1^\prime,...,m_n^\prime } \right\}\), as the vectors \(\boldsymbol{m}^\prime\) and \(\boldsymbol{m}\) differ only in the order of their elements. Then,

$$ \begin{array}{rll} \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left(\boldsymbol{h}\right)&=&\mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left({h^\ast -h_i }\right)\mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left[{h^\ast -\left({f_i +m_i^\prime} \right)}\right]\le \mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left[ {\left( {f^\ast +m^\ast } \right)-\left( {f_i +m_i^\prime}\right)} \right] \\ &=&\mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left[ {\left( {f^\ast -f_i } \right)+\left( {m^\ast -m_i^\prime } \right)} \right]=\mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left( {f^\ast -f_i } \right)+\mathop \sum\limits_{i=1}^n \left( {m^\ast -m_i^\prime } \right)\\&=&\textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( {\boldsymbol{m}^\prime } \right). \end{array} $$

Noting that, obviously, TRD (\(\boldsymbol{m}^\prime)\) = TRD (\(\boldsymbol{m}\)) completes the proof. □

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Stark, O., Rendl, F. & Jakubek, M. The merger of populations, the incidence of marriages, and aggregate unhappiness. J Evol Econ 22, 331–344 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0234-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0234-4

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation