Abstract
Let a society’s unhappiness be measured by the aggregate of the levels of relative deprivation of its members. When two societies of equal size, F and M, merge, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be higher than the sum of the levels of unhappiness in the constituent societies when apart; merger alone increases unhappiness. But when societies F and M merge and marriages are formed such that the number of households in the merged society is equal to the number of individuals in one of the constituent societies, unhappiness in the merged society is shown to be lower than the aggregate unhappiness in the two constituent societies when apart. This result obtains regardless of which individuals from one society form households with which individuals from the other, and even when the marriages have not (or not yet) led to income gains to the married couples from increased efficiency, scale economies, and the like. While there are various psychological reasons for people to become happier when they get married as opposed to staying single, the very formation of households reduces social distress even before any other happiness-generating factors kick in.
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Notes
This result extends quite straightforwardly to the case of a general convex and homogenous index of deprivation.
This measure of relative deprivation is explained further in Stark and Hyll (2011). The measure is based on the seminal work of Runciman (1966), on a proposal made by Yitzhaki (1979), and on axiomatization by Ebert and Moyes (2000) and Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2006). However, in the Appendix we show that the results derived in the body of the paper are robust with respect to two other measures of relative deprivation: the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, and the distance from the highest income. It is worth noting that since the 1960s, a considerable body of research evolved, demonstrating empirically that interpersonal comparisons of income (that is, comparisons of the income of an individual with the incomes of higher income members of his reference group) bear significantly on the perception of well-being, and on behavior. (For a recent review see Clark et al., 2008.) One branch of this body of research has dealt with migration. Several studies have shown empirically that a concern for relative deprivation impacts significantly on migration outcomes (Stark and Taylor, 1989; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Quinn, 2006; Stark et al., 2009). Theoretical expositions have shown how the very decision to resort to migration and the choice of migration destination (Stark, 1984; Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988; Stark and Wang, 2007; Stark and Fan, 2011; Fan and Stark, 2011), as well as the assimilation behavior of migrants (Fan and Stark, 2007), are modified by a distaste for relative deprivation.
This is not a result that informed intuition yields. Consider, for example, the most intuitive measure of heterogeneity - the variance. The merger of two populations can result in a decrease of the variance to a level below the sum of the variances of the constituent populations. For example, consider the merger of two populations with incomes \(\boldsymbol{f}\) = (1,9) and \(\boldsymbol{m}\) = (2,10). Prior to the merger, \(Var\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+Var(\boldsymbol{m})=16+16=32\). But after the merger, \(Var\left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)=16\frac{1}{4}<Var\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+Var(\boldsymbol{m})\), the very opposite of the result rendered by resorting to TRD.
To see this vividly, let \(\boldsymbol{m}\) = (1,2) and \(\boldsymbol{f}\) = (3,4). Prior to a merger, the levels of relative deprivations are, respectively, (1/2,0) for the members of the M population, and (1/2,0) for the members of the F population, yielding TRD(\(\boldsymbol{m}\)) = 1/2 and TRD \(\big(\boldsymbol{f}\big)\) = 1/2. Upon a merger, the RD of the individual earning 3 declines from 1/2 to 1/4, whereas the RD’s of the members of the poorer population rise to, respectively, (3/2, 3/4). The TRD of the merged population then registers an increase: \(\textit{TRD}\left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)=5/2 \geq \textit{TRD}\left( {\boldsymbol{f}}\right) + \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right)\).
Once again, this is not a result that informed intuition yields. The perception that upon a decrease of the number of income units by half we should unreservedly expect a decrease in inequality is incorrect. To see this, we resort again to the variance as a measure of income differences in a population and consider the merger of populations with incomes \(\boldsymbol{f}\) = (1, 9) and \(\boldsymbol{m}\) = (2, 10). Then, as noted in footnote 4, prior to the merger \(Var\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+Var(\boldsymbol{m})=16+16=32\). However, following marriages that result in (h 1, h 2) = (3, 19), the variance rises to Var (h) = 64.
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Acknowledgements
We are indebted to Giulio Codognato, Giacomo Corneo, Martyna Kobus, Andrew Oswald, and Gerhard Sorger for their wise advice.
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Appendix
Appendix
The results derived in the body of the paper are not dented when alternative measures of relative deprivation are employed. We consider two such measures: the aggregate of the excesses of incomes, and the distance from the highest income. We attend to these two measures in turn.
In population F, let the relative deprivation of an individual with income f i , i = 1,2,...,n, be defined as
Then, the total relative deprivation of population F, as the sum of the excesses of incomes, is
A property that is analogous to Lemma 1 characterizes this measure:
When a second population, M, merges with population F, we derive the superadditivity result once again.
Claim A1
\( \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)\ge \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)
Proof
We have that
Noting that \(\frac{1}{2}\!\sum\limits_{i=1}^n \!{\sum\limits_{j=1}^n\! {\left| {f_j -f_i } \right|} } =\textit{TRD}^\prime \!\left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)\), that \(\frac{1}{2}\sum\limits_{k=1}^n {\sum\limits_{l=1}^n {\left| {m_l -m_k } \right|} } =\textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right)\), and that \(\sum\limits_{i=1}^n {\sum\limits_{k=1}^n {\left|\vphantom{\boldsymbol{f}} {f_i -m_k } \right|} } \ge 0\), completes the proof. □
For the merged population H, introduced in the same manner as in Case 2 in the body of the paper, a claim akin to Claim 2 is now stated and proved.
Claim A2
\( \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{h} \right)\le \textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^\prime \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)
Proof
Since TRD ′ differs from TRD only by a scaling factor (the size of the population), TRD ′ too is convex and of homogeneity of degree 1. Therefore, the proof of Claim A2 tracks the same steps as those undertaken in proving Claim 2. □
We next consider measuring relative deprivation as the distance from the highest income.
In population F, let the relative deprivation of an individual with income f i , i = 1,2,...,n, be defined as
where f* = max{f 1, ...,f n }. The total relative deprivation of population F, measured as the aggregate of the distances from the highest income, is
When a second population, M, the total relative deprivation of which is measured in the same way as that of population F, merges with population F, we obtain the superadditivity result once again. The reasoning is straightforward. Unless the two populations have each the same highest income, a merger results in exposure of members of one of the populations to a higher post-merger highest income, while members of the other population continue to be exposed to the same highest income as prior to the merger. Thus, the aggregated distances from the highest income in the merged population will not be less than the sum of the corresponding distances in the constituent populations when apart. For the sake of completeness, we state this result in the following claim.
Claim A3
\( \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( {\boldsymbol{f}\cup \boldsymbol{m}} \right)\ge \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)
Proof
The proof is contained in the preceding discussion.□
For the merged population H, introduced in the same manner as in Case 2 in the body of the paper, a claim akin to Claim 2 is now stated and proved.
Claim A4
\( \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{h} \right)\le \textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{f} \right)+\textit{TRD}^{\prime\prime} \left( \boldsymbol{m} \right). \)
Proof
For the highest income in population H, h *, we have
where \(m_1^\prime,...,m_n^\prime \) are the elements of the permutated \(\boldsymbol{m}^\prime\) vector introduced in Case 2 of Section 2, and where \(m^\ast =\max \left\{ {m_1^\prime,...,m_n^\prime } \right\}\), as the vectors \(\boldsymbol{m}^\prime\) and \(\boldsymbol{m}\) differ only in the order of their elements. Then,
Noting that, obviously, TRD ″(\(\boldsymbol{m}^\prime)\) = TRD ″ (\(\boldsymbol{m}\)) completes the proof. □
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Stark, O., Rendl, F. & Jakubek, M. The merger of populations, the incidence of marriages, and aggregate unhappiness. J Evol Econ 22, 331–344 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0234-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0234-4