Abstract.
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
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Manuscript received: June 2002/Final version received: November 2002
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ID="*"The research was done in line with research cooperation between Russian Federation and The Netherlands approved by The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (Research grant corr.nr. 2000/4/ib, dos.nr. 047-008-010); it was initiated while the first author visited the Faculty of Mathematical Sciences, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands (November–December 1999), and funding from the SWON (Stichting Wiskunde Onderzoek Nederland) is also sincerely appreciated. The paper was partially written during her visit to International Center for Economic Research (ICER) at Turin, Italy, (February–May 2001) whose hospitality and financial support are gratefully acknowledged as well.
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ID="**"We would like to thank Natalia Naumova and Elena Yanovskaya for interesting remarks and comments.
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Khmelnitskaya, A., Driessen, T. Semiproportional values for TU games. Mathematical Methods of OR 57, 495–511 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200271
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200271