Abstract
We study in this paper a social welfare optimal congestion-pricing scheme for multiclass queuing services which can be applied to telecommunication networks. Most of the literature has focused on the marginal price. Unfortunately, it does not share the total cost among the different classes. We investigate here an optimal Aumann–Shapley congestion-price which verifies this property. We extend the work on the Aumann–Shapley price for priority services, based on the results on the marginal price: instead of just determining the cost repartition among classes for given rates, we obtain the rates and charges that optimize the social welfare.
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Hayel, Y., Tuffin, B. An Optimal Congestion and Cost-sharing Pricing Scheme for Multiclass Services. Math Meth Oper Res 64, 445–465 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0075-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0075-3