Abstract
The Lipschitz constant of a game measures the maximal amount of influence that one player has on the payoff of some other player. The worst-case Lipschitz constant of an n-player k-action \(\delta \)-perturbed game, \(\lambda (n,k,\delta )\), is given an explicit probabilistic description. In the case of \(k\ge 3\), it is identified with the passage probability of a certain symmetric random walk on \({\mathbb {Z}}\). In the case of \(k=2\) and n even, \(\lambda (n,2,\delta )\) is identified with the probability that two i.i.d. binomial random variables are equal. The remaining case, \(k=2\) and n odd, is bounded through the adjacent (even) values of n. Our characterization implies a sharp closed-form asymptotic estimate of \(\lambda (n,k,\delta )\) as \(\delta n /k\rightarrow \infty \).
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Notes
Restricting the discussion to games with payoffs in [0, 1] does not cause a loss of generality, since the games considered are finite games whose payoffs can be normalized to be in [0, 1] through an affine transformation. The influence of such an affine transformation on the Lipschitz constant of the game is multiplication by the Lipschitz constant of the transformation.
The notion of perturbed strategies in not knew. It appeared in other contexts in game theory, for example, in the definition of Selten’s trembling hand perfect equilibrium (Selten 1975).
A referee noted that \(S^r_n\) is the sum of n i.i.d. random variables that take the value zero with probability \(1-r\) and the values plus and minus one with probability \(\frac{r}{2}\).
An example of a game that attains the asymptotic expression in the case \(k=3\) appears in (Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky 2000, p. 323).
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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to MathOverflow for facilitating this collaboration. We thank the members of the Facebook group https://www.facebook.com/groups/305092099620459/ for pointing out references related to the reflection principle. We thank anonymous editor and referee for many corrections and ideas for improvement that helped to shape the final version of the paper. Amnon Schreiber is supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation Grant 2897/20. Ron Peretz is supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation Grant 2566/20.
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Peretz, R., Schreiber, A. & Schulte-Geers, E. The Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games. Int J Game Theory 51, 293–306 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x