International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 1031–1052

Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

  • Patrick Hummel
  • R. Preston McAfee
  • Sergei Vassilvitskii
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0501-y

Cite this article as:
Hummel, P., McAfee, R.P. & Vassilvitskii, S. Int J Game Theory (2016) 45: 1031. doi:10.1007/s00182-015-0501-y


This paper illustrates a method for making side payments to advertiser networks that creates an incentive for the advertiser networks to submit the second-highest bids they received to an ad exchange and simultaneously ensures that the publishers will make more money on average in the short run as a result of adopting this scheme. We also illustrate how this payment scheme affects publisher payoffs in the long run after advertisers have a chance to modify their strategies in response to the changed incentives of the mechanism.


Advertiser networks Advertising exchanges Auctions 

Supplementary material

182_2015_501_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (86 kb)
ESM 1 (PDF 87 kb)

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick Hummel
    • 1
  • R. Preston McAfee
    • 2
  • Sergei Vassilvitskii
    • 3
  1. 1.Google Inc.Mountain ViewUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft Corp.RedmondUSA
  3. 3.Google Inc.New YorkUSA

Personalised recommendations