International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 1031–1052 | Cite as

Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

  • Patrick Hummel
  • R. Preston McAfee
  • Sergei Vassilvitskii
Original Paper
  • 180 Downloads

Abstract

This paper illustrates a method for making side payments to advertiser networks that creates an incentive for the advertiser networks to submit the second-highest bids they received to an ad exchange and simultaneously ensures that the publishers will make more money on average in the short run as a result of adopting this scheme. We also illustrate how this payment scheme affects publisher payoffs in the long run after advertisers have a chance to modify their strategies in response to the changed incentives of the mechanism.

Keywords

Advertiser networks Advertising exchanges Auctions 

Supplementary material

182_2015_501_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (86 kb)
ESM 1 (PDF 87 kb)

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick Hummel
    • 1
  • R. Preston McAfee
    • 2
  • Sergei Vassilvitskii
    • 3
  1. 1.Google Inc.Mountain ViewUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft Corp.RedmondUSA
  3. 3.Google Inc.New YorkUSA

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