Essential collections for equilibrium concepts
- 227 Downloads
The aim of this study is to identify and characterize the parts of an extensive form game that are “relevant” to determining whether the outcome of a certain strategy profile is an equilibrium outcome. We formally define what we mean by “relevant” and refer to the associated collection of information sets as essential. We apply this idea to a number of classic equilibrium concepts and discuss some implications of our approach.
KeywordsExtensive games Equilibrium concepts Relevant information sets Essential collections Reduced game Virtual equilibrium
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991a) Game theory. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Groenert V (2009) Trimmed equilibrium, MimeoGoogle Scholar
- Kalai E (2006) Structural Robustness of Large Games. Tech. rep., CMS-EMS Discussion Paper 1431. Kellogg School of Management, EvanstonGoogle Scholar
- Kuhn HW (1953) Extensive games and the problem of information. In: Kuhn H, Tucker A (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
- Wen-Tsun W, Jia-He J (1962) Essential equilibrium points of n-person non-cooperative games. Scientia Sinica 11: 1307–1322Google Scholar