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Essential collections for equilibrium concepts

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to identify and characterize the parts of an extensive form game that are “relevant” to determining whether the outcome of a certain strategy profile is an equilibrium outcome. We formally define what we mean by “relevant” and refer to the associated collection of information sets as essential. We apply this idea to a number of classic equilibrium concepts and discuss some implications of our approach.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Santiago de Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

    Julio González-Díaz

  2. Science Department, University of Chieti and Pescara, Chieti, Pescara, Italy

    Federica Briata

  3. Department of Mathematics, Coruña University, Coruña, Spain

    Ignacio García-Jurado

  4. DIPTEM, University of Genova, Genova, Italy

    Fioravante Patrone

Authors
  1. Julio González-Díaz
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  2. Federica Briata
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  3. Ignacio García-Jurado
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  4. Fioravante Patrone
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julio González-Díaz.

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González-Díaz, J., Briata, F., García-Jurado, I. et al. Essential collections for equilibrium concepts. Int J Game Theory 41, 517–552 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0301-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0301-y

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