Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Extendability and von Neuman–Morgenstern stability of the core

  • Original Article
  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper introduces a strengthening of the notion of a stable core and characterizes it in terms of Kikuta and Shapley’s extendability condition.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Biswas AK, Parthasarathy T, Potters JAM, Voorneveld M (1999) Large cores and exactness. Games Econ Behav 28: 1–12

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Biswas AK, Parthasarathy T, Ravindran G (2001) Stability and largeness of the core. Games Econ Behav 34: 227–237

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gillies DB (1953) Some theorems on n-person games. PhD Thesis, Princeton University.

  • Kikuta K, Shapley LS (1986) Core stability in n-person games. Manuscript

  • Lucas WF (1968) A game with no solution. Bull Am Math Soc 74: 237–239

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lucas WF (1992) von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 543–590

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmeidler D (1972) Cores of exact games. J Math Anal Appl 40: 214–225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shapley LS (1971) Cores of convex games. Int J Game Theory 1: 11–26

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sharkey WW (1982) Cooperative games with large cores. Int J Game Theory 11: 175–182

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Gellekom JRG, Potters JAM, Reijnierse JH (1999) Prosperity properties of TU-games. Int J Game Theory 28: 211–227

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic behaviour. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams HP (1986) Fourier’s method of linear programming and its dual. Am Math Mon 93: 681–695

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, 1 Microsoft Way, Redmond, WA, 98052-6399, USA

    Kamal Jain

  2. Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Rakesh V. Vohra

Authors
  1. Kamal Jain
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Rakesh V. Vohra
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rakesh V. Vohra.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Jain, K., Vohra, R.V. Extendability and von Neuman–Morgenstern stability of the core. Int J Game Theory 39, 691–697 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0223-0

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0223-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation