Abstract
For the class of tree games, a new solution called the average tree solution has been proposed recently. We provide a characterization of this solution. This characterization underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of the agents, between the average tree solution and the Myerson value for the class of tree games.
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Acknowledgments
We thank two anonymous referees for detailed comments about the paper. Stimulating conversations about the average tree solution with Gerard van der Laan and Zaifu Yang are sincerely acknowledged. The first author thanks CentER and NWO for financial support and hospitality at Tilburg University.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Mishra, D., Talman, A.J.J. A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games. Int J Game Theory 39, 105–111 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0194-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0194-1