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Patent value indicators and technological innovation

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Abstract

I provide empirical evidence that patent value indicators can identify technological innovation among inventors and small- and medium-sized enterprises in Sweden. Survey data on the commercialization of patents are related to patent value indicators (patent renewal, patent family size and forward citations) from archival sources. Among the patent value indicators, both the length of patent renewal and the size of the patent family indicate that a patent has been commercialized. Patent renewal for at least 6 years is sufficient to predict an accurate probability of commercialization. Furthermore, patent renewal is the only indicator revealing whether commercialization is successful. Forward citations have a moderate relationship with both commercialization and successful innovation, which may reflect the fact that citations are outside the control of the patentees or that forward citations measure spillovers rather than the private value. Although the correlations of the patent value indicators with technological innovation are noisy, this study provides stronger empirical support for the true relative value of different indicators with respect to innovation.

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Notes

  1. The introduction of the OSLO manual in 1997 and its extension in 2005 were important steps in the measurement of innovation output (OECD 1997, 2005). Its guidelines made it possible to collect harmonized and internationally comparable data on innovation output for the first time. In the OSLO manual, innovations include not only product and process innovations but also innovations related to organizational change/business practices and new marketing concepts/strategies (OECD 2005). An example of surveys based on this manual to identify innovations is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) conducted by Eurostat (Gault 2013). In this survey, respondents provide information on four different types of innovations from the OSLO manual. However, since CIS is a cross-sectional survey, the main disadvantage is that the exact timing of the year of introduction of an innovation is not known (Mairesse and Mohnen 2010). Another disadvantage is that innovation measures are subjective in nature, as they depend on the judgment of respondents. Furthermore, the value of innovations is likely to be uneven across firms and industries, with random errors of classification and measurement in both qualitative and quantitative variables (Mairesse and Mohnen 2010). However, in contrast to innovation (input) expenditures, the share of sales due to new products can be regarded as relatively accurate, although the measure is rounded to five or ten percent (Mairesse and Mohnen 2010).

  2. The basic conditions for granting a patent are that the invention is novel, inventive, nonobvious and industrially applicable.

  3. In our survey, inventors were asked the following question: Did you introduce a product or process based on the patent in the market?

  4. Unfortunately, oppositions are not available for patents granted in Sweden.

  5. Some studies have also related the characteristics of patents with firm value (see, e.g., Griliches et al. (1987); Hall (1993), Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004).

  6. Fischer and Leidinger (2014) did not include patent renewals in the model to explain patent value.

  7. De Rassenfosse et al. (2013) present a new patent-based indicator of inventive activity on country level. The indicator counts all priority patent applications filed by a country’s inhabitants, regardless of the patent office in which the patent application is filed. This indicator covers more inventions than PCT or triadic family counts.

  8. In 1998, 2,760 patents were granted in Sweden. A total of 776 of these patents were granted to foreign firms, 902 to large Swedish firms with more than 1,000 employees and 1,082 to Swedish individuals and SMEs with less than 1,000 employees.

  9. For a more thorough description of the data set, data collection and nonrespondents, see Svensson (2007).

  10. Turning to the filing routes, only eight of 867 patents were first filed abroad, and all of these were in the USA. No patent was filed first with the EPO or WIPO and thereafter in Sweden. This pattern markedly contrasts with the filing routes undertaken by multinationals (see, e.g., Guellec and van Pottelsberghe 2000). Various explanations may account for this result; for example, the patentees in the database used in this study are individuals and small firms, and the data cover patent filings in the 1990s, when it was still common to first file patents in the home country.

  11. The grouping of firm size classes is based on the grouping in the survey.

  12. A contingency table test suggests that this difference in the commercialization rate between firms and individuals is statistically significant at the one percent level (Chi-square value of 30.55 with 3 d.f.).

  13. For the vast majorities of patents, commercialization had reached a stage such that there was no uncertainty about the patent’s performance in 2003. In 2007, importation on the profitability of commercialization was updated via phone calls to inventors who had earlier announced an uncertain outcome.

  14. It would have been desirable to measure the outcome in terms of money, but such information was impossible to collect. Estimating profit flows is very complicated because most firms have many products in their statement of accounts, and many individual inventors do not have any statement of accounts at all.

  15. Patents applications that have not been granted are excluded.

  16. Oppositions are only available for those Swedish patents that have a sister patent at EPO.

  17. A given IPC class can be associated with several industry sectors. In the study, we use the most likely industry class associated with a specific IPC class (Breschi et al. (2004). The alternative would be to use IPC classes in the estimations instead. We have experimented with this alternative. However, even using dummies on a three-digit level for IPC classes would create too many dummies and too few patents in each IPC class. As a result, such estimations breakdown and do not converge.

  18. In some estimations, we had to reduce the number of industry classes because of the limited number of observations in each class. For example, only 25 classes are included when the ordered probit model is estimated.

  19. Note that only one patent was applied for in 1985 and in 1986, respectively, and no patents during the 1987–1989 period. Therefore, 1985, 1986 and 1990 have been merged into one group.

  20. This average number of countries is the same as that for EPO patents in general (van Zeebroeck 2011).

  21. Only 30 patents in the database were filed directly at the national patent offices in the EPO area without filing an EPO patent first.

  22. van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe (2011b) show a strong positive correlation between market size and the probability that an EPO patent will be validated in a country. The skewed country distribution of patents above indicates that country characteristics are important for international patenting.

  23. The model is not improved by including an additive dummy for a Triadic patent instead of the three dummies for EPO, US and Japanese patents.

  24. Nonlinear relationships might exist between commercialization and some of the traditional patent value indicators. For example, the probability of commercialization may increase with family size, but the rate of increase may decline for high numbers. Estimations with squared values of the number of citations, the family size and the number of years of renewal do not alter the results. None of the squared variables is significantly related to commercialization. Likelihood ratio tests between the estimations in Table 6 and those with squared values are not significant, indicating that the inclusion of squared values does not improve the models. Furthermore, the share of correct predictions of Com does not improve. These nonlinear estimations are available from the author upon request.

  25. Compared to the alternatives (4, 6), (4, 7), (4, 8), (4, 9), (4, 10), (5, 7), (5, 8), (5, 9), (5, 10), (6, 8), (6, 9), (7, 9), (7, 10) and (8, 10) years.

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Martin Falk and the participants at the 4th International Workshop on Entrepreneurship, Culture, Finance, and Economic Development (ECFED) in Klagenfurt for their insightful comments. Financial support from Vinnova, Statistics Sweden and the Wallander–Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged

Funding

This study was funded with grants by Vinnova, Statistics Sweden and the Wallander–Hedelius Foundation.

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Appendices

Appendix A

The ordered probit model can be described as (Greene 1997):

$$y_{i}^{*} = X_{i} \alpha + \varepsilon_{i}$$
(A1)

where Xi is a vector of patent quality indicators and technology dummies; α is a vector of coefficients that indicates the influence of the independent variables on the profit level; and εi is a residual vector that represents the combined effects of unobserved random variables and random disturbances. The residuals are assumed to have a normal distribution, and the mean and variance are normalized to 0 and 1. The vector with the latent variable, yi*, is unobserved. The model is based on the cumulative normal distribution function, F(), and is estimated via maximum likelihood procedures. The difference between this model and the two-response probit model is that in this model a parameter (threshold value), ω, is estimated by α. The probabilities Pi(y = k) for the three outcomes are:

$$\begin{gathered} P_{i} (0) = F( - X\alpha ), \hfill \\ P_{i} (1) = F(\omega - X\alpha ) - F( - X\alpha ), \hfill \\ P_{i} (2) = 1 - F(\overline{\omega } - X\alpha ), \hfill \\ {\text{where}}\;\sum\nolimits_{k = 0}^{2} {P_{i} (k) = 1} \hfill \\ \end{gathered}$$
(A2)

The threshold value, ω, must be larger than 0 for all probabilities to be positive.

To take account of selectivity, in the first step, a probit model estimates how different factors influence the decision to commercialize a patent (Greene 2002):

$$\begin{gathered} d_{i}^{*} = X_{i} \theta + u_{i} \hfill \\ d_{i} = 1\quad {\text{if}}\;d_{i}^{*} > 0\;{\text{and}}\;0\quad {\text{otherwise}} \hfill \\ \end{gathered}$$
(A3)

where di* is a latent index; di is the selection variable, indicating whether the patent is commercialized; Xi is a vector of explanatory variables that influence the probability that the patent is commercialized; θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated; and ui is a vector of normally distributed residuals with zero mean and a variance equal to 1.

From the probit estimates, the selection variable di is then used to estimate a full-information maximum likelihood model of the ordered probit model (Greene 2002). In addition, the first step probit model is re-estimated. The residuals [ε, u] are assumed to have a bivariate standard normal distribution and correlation ρ. There is selectivity if ρ is not equal to zero. Note that this specification is not a two-step Heckman model. No lambda is computed and used in the second step.

Appendix B

See Table 12

Table 12 Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables

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Svensson, R. Patent value indicators and technological innovation. Empir Econ 62, 1715–1742 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-021-02082-8

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