Abstract
In China, during certain politically sensitive periods, there are increased incentives for local officials to prioritize environmental protection over economic growth, resulting in the phenomenon of temporary “political blue sky.” This study investigates the relationship between national leaders’ visits and air quality, using the Air Quality Index (AQI), individual pollutant data and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to cities during November 2013 and May 2017. The results show that AQI begins to drop around 20 days prior to Xi’s visits. Nevertheless, this improvement of air quality is only temporary—after visits, air quality quickly deteriorates to usual conditions. Moreover, the improved air quality before visits is primarily contributed by decreases in particulate matter of PM2.5 and PM10, which receive more attention from both government and public than other pollutants do, while other pollutants show no obvious changes. The analysis of Premier Li Keqiang’s visits also yields similar results, with less significant influence though.
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Data Source: Ministry of Environmental Protection of China
Data Source: 1. AQI data of 2016 are from the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China. 2. Data of cities visited by Chinese President Xi Jinping are collected from news reports. 3. Between November 8, 2012 and May 31, 2017, Xi have visited 71 cities, some of which been visited more than once
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Notes
The Chinese government begun to disclose AQI standard and technical regulation in 2012, and it was implemented in batches in different cities from 2013.
For instance, in April 2014, General Office of the State Council circulated the Measures for Assessment of the Implementation of the Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution (For Trial Implementation). According to this measure, annul PM2.5 concentration serves as the indicator to evaluate the implementation of atmospheric pollution control in Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region, Yangtze River delta region, Pearl River delta region, and Chongqing municipality, while in other regions, PM10 leads the assessment.
Postponing the visits by one year would maintain the same seasonality as the actual tests. But, postponing the visits by one year will lose some visits samples because it is beyond our sample interval. So we did another counterfactual test which postponed the visits by 90 days; the result affirmed our conclusion again.
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This study was funded by the Shanghai Social Science Fund.
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Qingling Shi declares that she has no conflict of interest. Chenchen Shi declares that she has no conflict of interest. Feng Guo declares that he has no conflict of interest.
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Shi, Q., Shi, C. & Guo, F. National leaders’ visits and temporary improvement of air quality: evidence from Chinese cities. Empir Econ 58, 2105–2127 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1583-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1583-8