Abstract
The first minimum wage in Germany was introduced in 1997 for blue-collar workers in sub-sectors of the construction industry. In the setting of a natural experiment, blue-collar workers in neighboring 4-digit industries and white-collar workers are used as control groups for differences-in-differences-in-differences estimation based on linked employer–employee data. Estimation results reveal a sizable positive impact on mean wages in East Germany, but no significant effect in West Germany. Size and significance of effects are neither homogeneous across wage regimes (individual vs. collective contracts) nor across the distribution. The patterns suggest a compression in the lower part of the wage distribution and spillover effects to wages where the minimum is not binding, even in West Germany, where the bite of the MW was low. No effects on hours of work or substitution between workers of different qualification levels are found.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In 2000, trade union density was only at 25 % in the overall economy, but 68 % of employees were covered by collective wage bargaining (OECD 2004, p. 145). This mirrors the fact that if an employer makes part of the employers’ association and only one of his employees is in the union, the tariff is extended to all his employees (for greater detail see Haucap et al. 2006, p. 363). Studies on the effects of union membership in Germany in earlier years find mixed evidence for the union wage premium (Schmidt and Zimmermann 1991; Wagner 1991).
Also see Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a concise overview of empirical evidence.
Head masons are categorized either as blue-collar (Werkpolier) or white-collar workers (Polier).
Employers could have tried to escape MW coverage by shifting the major part of their economic activity to a non-covered sub-sector, while generating a marginally smaller fraction of value-added in economic activities typical of the covered sector. The combination of occupations, thus the skill input by workers, neither changes greatly in the covered nor in the non-covered part of the construction industry; this indicates that dodging the MW legislation by switching industry affiliation is not an issue. Given the subsequent introduction of MW in neighboring sub-sectors, such behavior would have been short-sighted. (IAB et al. (2011), p. 163) analyze this question using administrative data from the employment agency and find no evidence of a systematic reclassification of establishments towards sectors not covered by the MW.
Refer to Appendix for more details on the data source, the calculation of hourly wages and the exact distinction between treatment and control group based on the industry classification system.
If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, the term “collective agreement” (CA) is used as a synonym for all three types of agreements in the following.
The size of theoretical wage growth needed for compliance hinges on the assumptions about wage inflation between October 1995 and January 1997. The general hourly wage inflation for the entire economy is assumed to constitute a lower bound given the unfavorable developments in the construction sector compared to the economy as a whole. As an upper bound, the theoretical wage growth under compliance with no inflation adjustment is provided.
The employees that appear most susceptible to spillover effects in the control group are head masons and foremen; they are classified as white-collar workers in the wage bargaining and the data yet their tasks are closest to those of the eligible workers. As a robustness check, this group of employees is excluded from the baseline estimation and results barely change (see Appendix).
Regressions for the effect on monthly earnings show the same patterns and magnitudes as those on hourly wages for both parts of the country and are available from the author upon request. According to the IAB establishment panel, roughly 71 % (62 %) of firms in the construction sector employed 10 or more employees in 1995 (2001). Given the selectivity of the database and that smaller establishments pay lower wages, the estimates can be considered as conservative.
Hourly wage = [gross wage for October-remuneration for extra work-remuneration for shifts worked-remuneration for work on weekends/bank holidays-remuneration for night shifts]/(weekly work time according to contract*4.3).
References
Bewley T (1999) Why wages don’t fall during a recession. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Bosch G, Zühlke-Robinet K (1999) Der Bauarbeitsmarkt in Deutschland. Industrielle Beziehungen 6(3):239–265
Card DE, Krueger AB (1995) Myth and measurement: the new economics of the minimum wage. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Dickens R, Manning A (2004a) Has the national minimum wage reduced UK wage inequality? J R Stat Soc Ser A 167(4):613–626
Dickens R, Manning A (2004b) Spikes and spill-overs: the impact of the National Minimum Wage on the wage distribution in a low-wage sector. Econ J 114(494):C95–C101
DiNardo J, Fortin NM, Lemieux T (1996) Labor market institutions and the distribution of wages, 1973–1992: a semiparametric approach. Econometrica 64(5):1001–1044
Dittrich M, Knabe A (2010) Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages. CESifo Working Paper 3149, CESifo
Dolton P, Bondibene CR, Wadsworth J (2010) The UK National Minimum Wage in retrospect. Fiscal Stud 31(4):509–534
Eichhorst W (2005) Equal pay for equal work in the same place? The posting of workers in the European Union. J Labour Mark Res 38(2/3):197–217
Firpo S, Fortin NM, Lemieux T (2009) Unconditional quantile regressions. Econometrica 77(3):953–973
Fitzenberger B, Kohn K, Lembcke AC (2013) Union density and varieties of coverage: the anatomy of union wage effects in Germany. Ind Labor Relat Rev 66(1)
Franz W, Pfeiffer F (2006) Reasons for wage rigidity in Germany. LABOUR 20(2):255–284
Gerlach K, Stephan G (2006) Bargaining regimes and wage dispersion. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 226(6):629–645
Grossman JB (1983) The impact of the minimum wage on other wages. J Hum Resour 18(3):359–378
Hafner HP, Lenz R (2007) Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung: Methodik. Datenzugang und Forschungspotential, FDZ-Arbeitspapier 18
Haucap J, Wey C, Pauly U (2006) Institutions in perspective: Festschrift in honor of Rudolf Richter on the occasion of his 80th birthday. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck
Hirsch B, Schnabel C (2011) Let’s take bargaining models seriously: the decline in union power in Germany, 1992–2009. IZA Discussion Paper 5875. Institute for the Study of Labor
Howitt P (2002) Looking inside the labor market: a review article. J Econ Lit 40(1):125–138
IAB, RWI, ISG (2011) Evaluation bestehender Mindestlohnregelungen - Branche: Bauhauptgewerbe. Abschlussbericht an das Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS). Tech. Rep
Katz LF, Krueger AB (1992) The effect of the minimum wage on the fast-food industry. Ind Labor Relat Rev 46(1):6–21
Koenker R, Bassett Jr G (1978) Regression quantiles. Econometrica 46(1):33–50
König M, Möller J (2007) Minimum wage effects of the worker posting law? A micro data analysis for the German construction sector. IAB Discussion Paper 30. Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg
Lee DS (1999) Wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s: rising dispersion or falling minimum wage? Q J Econ 114(3):977–1023
Machin S, Wilson J (2004) Minimum wages in a low-wage labour market: care homes in the UK. Econ J 114(494):C102–C109
Machin S, Manning A, Rahman L (2003) Where the Minimum Wage bites hard: introduction of minimum wages to a low wage sector. J Eur Econ Assoc 1(1):154–180
Manning A (2003) Monopsony in motion—imperfect competition in labor markets. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Metcalf D (2004) The impact of the National Minimum Wage on the pay distribution, employment and training. Econ J 114(494):C84–C86
Müller KU (2010) Employment effects of a sectoral minimum wage—semi-parametric estimations for Germany. DIW Discussion Papers 1061. German Institute for Economic Research, Germany
Neumark D, Wascher WL (2008) Minimum wages. MIT Press, Cambridge
OECD (2004) Wage-setting institutions and outcomes. In: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, chap 3, pp 127–171. OECD, Paris
OECD (2010) OECD database: minimum wages relative to median wages. OECD, Paris
Pettengill J (1981) The long-run impact of a minimum wage on employment and the wage structure. In: Report of the minimum wage study commission, vol 6. US Government Printing Office, Washington, pp 63–104
Radowski D, Bonin H (2010) Downward nominal wage rigidity in services: direct evidence from a firm survey. Econ Lett 106(3):227–229
Rattenhuber P (2011) Building the minimum wage: Germany’s first sectoral minimum wage and its impact on wages in the construction industry. DIW Discussion Papers 1111. German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin
Schmidt CM, Zimmermann KF (1991) Work characteristics, firm size and wages. Rev Econ Stat 73(4): 705–710
Stephan G, Gerlach K (2005) Wage settlements and wage setting: results from a multi-level model. Appl Econ 37(20):2297–2306
Teulings CN (2000) Aggregation bias in elasticities of substitution and the minimum wage paradox. Int Econ Rev 41(2):359–398
Wagner J (1991) Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft und Arbeitseinkommen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ifo-Studien 37:109–140
Zavodny M (2000) The effect of the minimum wage on employment and hours. Labour Econ 7(6):729–750
Acknowledgments
I thank Viktor Steiner, Kai-Uwe Müller, Peter Haan, Magne Mogstad and participants of the Economic Policy Seminar of Free University Berlin, the BeNA seminar and from the 2010 conference of the Verein für Socialpolitik for their very valuable comments and suggestions. Martin Gornig and Gregor Asshoff graciously shared information on the construction sector. I owe particular thanks to all the staff at the Federal Research Data Centre of the State Statistical Institute Berlin-Brandenburg.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Electronic supplementary material
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.
Appendix: Details on the data source
Appendix: Details on the data source
The GSES (Hafner and Lenz 2007) is an official micro database that every few years collects a cross section of data from establishments (Betrieb) with 10 or more employees. Establishments are legally bound to respond and non-response is low. At the employee level, the information supplied includes details on wages, hours worked, overtime, (payroll) taxes, education, job description, a rough classification of the tasks fulfilled in terms of intra-firm hierarchy, and time with the employer. At the establishment level, region, industry code, number of employees, fraction of blue- and white-collar workers, fraction of men and women, and participation in CAs are surveyed. The data do not contain any information on job quits.
I use two cross sections of the data from October 1995– 2001, restricting the sample to employees between 18 and 65 years of age, who are neither receiving vocational training nor participating in internships. The data allow for an accurate calculation of hourly wages as contracted hours are reported for every employee. Footnote 11 Hours, according to contract, are used to compute hourly wages, since the variable on hours paid only exists for 70 % of observations in the sample. For estimation results, it does not make a difference if I use log gross hourly wage based on total working hours or log of monthly labor income as the dependent variable instead of hourly wages based on hours according to contract. Hourly wages calculated to be lower (higher) than €3 (€150) are not considered in the analysis for plausibility. The data discern between individual wage contracts, coverage by a CA, firm or establishment agreement. The variable on the difficulty of tasks fulfilled captures differences in qualification needed for the job and degree of responsibility; yet it is not possible to identify directly the pay scale as implemented in the CAs.
The sub-sectors in the construction industry that were subject to the MW legislation cover the main construction trade (4-digit industry codes 4521 through 4525 in the WZ93 classification). Plumbing, building installation, floor and wall covering, painting, and glazing constitute the control sectors (industry codes 4533, 4534, 4543, 4544). The remaining sub-sectors in the construction industry are not assigned to any of the two groups due to one of the following reasons: (1) their industry classification changed between 1995 and 2001 and conversion of the classification is not unambiguously possible; (2) a few other sector-specific MWs were introduced from 1997 onwards (see Section 3); Sectors that implemented their own MW rate in 1997 were excluded; (3) it is not certain whether they were treated or not.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rattenhuber, P. Building the minimum wage: the distributional impact of Germany’s first sectoral minimum wage on wages and hours across different wage bargaining regimes. Empir Econ 46, 1429–1446 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-013-0726-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-013-0726-1
Keywords
- Minimum wage
- Wages and hours of work
- Differences-in-differences-in-differences
- Unconditional quantile regression
- Construction sector
- Linked employer–employee data