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Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions

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Abstract

This article considers the impact of sub-national political systems on economic growth by applying the case of Russian regions from 2000 to 2004. It investigates two dimensions of the sub-national systems. First, it studies the influence of democracy on economic performance, providing evidence of a non-linear relationship between democracy and economic growth. Regions with high levels of democracy, as well as strong autocracies, perform better than hybrid regimes. Second, this article considers the influence of the size of the bureaucracy on economic outcomes and confirms the “grabbing hand” view on bureaucracy rather than the Weberian idea. Increasing the size of the bureaucracy is associated with a decline in economic performance. In addition, this article analyzes the potential interaction between these two characteristics of sub-national politics as factors of economic growth, but does not establish any robust results.

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  1. Frankfurt School of Finance & Managements, Frankfurt, Germany

    Alexander Libman

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Libman, A. Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions. Empir Econ 43, 1321–1352 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0525-5

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