Abstract
Why divided societies face particular obstacles in maintaining democracy is one of the most challenging questions posed in the literature. Several studies posit that ethnically, religiously, and linguistically divided societies are incapable of establishing and holding a democratic system because of their social divisions and institutional weaknesses. We challenge this argument and examine whether political institutional arrangements (constraints over the executive, geographic distribution of political power, and form of government) in addition to economic performance are the crucial factors of success to establish and sustain a democratic regime and social unity in divided states. We use the Quality of Governance time-series standard dataset to test this hypothesis. By analyzing data on 163 states (1960–2012) we find that institutional constraints imposed over the executive and economic performance are the two primary influential factors in sustaining democratic regimes in multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious societies.
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Notes
We conducted a Hausman test for each model before deciding to run a fixed versus random effect model. Hausman tests indicated (p > 0.10) that a random effects model is a better estimation method for our variables. Also, after conducting each random effects model for our dependent variables, we conducted the Breusch-Pagan lagrange multiplier test to decide whether the random effects regression would be a better estimator than the OLS regression. For both dependent variables (p < 0.001) we rejected the null that the random effects estimation is not appropriate.
To account for serial correlation we conducted a random effects linear model with an AR(1) disturbance. This estimation method fits the cross-sectional time-series regression model with a GLS estimator when the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive. We report that none of our results (for both dependent variables) changed when controlling for autoregressive disturbances.
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Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the American Association for Public Opinion Research, International Studies Association, and the Midwest Political Science Association annual meetings. Authors thank to Resat Bayer, Jeanne-Marie Col, Elif Erisen, Shelly Hurt, Ekrem Karakoc, Paul Kubicek, Eduardo Viola and Dan Wiltse, in addition to the reviewers and the editor for their comments and suggestions. We also thank Emrah Gulsunar for his research assistance.
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Erisen, C., Wiltse, E.C. Dividedness, Institutions and Economic Performance: A Cross-National Analysis of Democratic Stability. Soc Indic Res 132, 1145–1161 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1343-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1343-0