Skip to main content
Log in

Geopolitical risk spillovers and its determinants

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
The Annals of Regional Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Geopolitical risk (GPR) tends to cascade from one country to another. Understanding GPR transmission is important to devising risk management strategies for institutional investors and corporate managers, and national security policies for governments. In this paper, we measure and explain cross-country transmission of GPR. Our sample covers 19 country-based GPR indexes of Caldara and Iacoviello (Measuring geopolitical risk, 2018) from January 1985 to December 2016. We apply the spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (Int J Forecast 28:57–66, 2012) to measure pairwise as well as system-wide GPR transmission. The estimation results show a substantial amount of GPR transmission across our sample countries, with certain countries and geographical clusters being more prominent than others. We then explain the pairwise GPR transmission using a cross-sectional regression motivated by a gravity model framework. We find that certain bilateral linkages such as bilateral trade and geographical proximity significantly explain the pairwise GPR transmission. This transmission is positively associated with both countries’ debt burdens and geographical sizes, transmitting country’s fiscal imbalance, and is negatively associated with recipient country’s economic size. The results imply that these factors may be used to predict the trajectory of GPR, which is an important input for the assessment of cross-border investment appraisals as well as international stability initiatives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Instead of distinguishing between contagion, spillover, diffusion, and spread, we view GPR contagion as a transmission mechanism/process.

  2. See Global Risks Reports published in 2016, 2017, and 2018; World Economic Outlook, October 2017, and Economic Bulletin, March 2016, published by the World Economic Forum, International Monetary Fund, and European Central Bank, respectively. These reports highlight the growing importance of GPR and its transmission. See Suárez-de Vivero and Mateos (2017) for a good collection of such reports.

  3. Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) refer to two separate surveys, one conducted by Bank of England and another by Wells Fargo/Gallup in 2017, which highlight growing concerns among investors, managers, and policy makers about heightened GPR.

  4. For the USA, the Web site also contains other components of GPR index such as GPR_Threat, GPR_Act, GPR_Narrow, GPR_Broad, and GPR_Nuclearthreat. However, to ensure consistency in our analysis, we use the ‘benchmark’ GPR index for the US.

  5. According to Caldara and Iacoviello (2018), the following keywords are used to capturing six dimensions of GPR: Group 1 [(Geopolitical AND (risk* OR concern* OR tension* OR uncertaint*) “United States” AND tensions AND (military OR war OR geopolitical OR coup OR guerrilla OR warfare) AND (“Latin America" OR “Central America” OR “South America” OR Europe OR Africa OR “Middle East” OR “Far East” OR Asia)];

    Group 2 [(“nuclear war" OR “atomic war” OR “nuclear conflict" OR “atomic conflict" OR “nuclear missile*") AND (fear* OR threat* OR risk* OR peril* OR menace*)];

    Group 3 [“war risk*” OR “risk* of war” OR “fear of war" OR “war fear*” OR “military threat*” OR “war threat*” OR “threat of war” (“military action” OR “military operation” OR “military force”) AND (risk* OR threat*)];

    Group 4 [“terrorist threat*" OR “threat of terrorism” OR “terrorism menace” OR “menace of terrorism” OR “terrorist risk” OR “terror risk” OR “risk of terrorism” OR “terror threat*”];

    Group 5 [“beginning of the war” OR “outbreak of the war” OR “onset of the war” OR “escalation of the war” OR “start of the war” (war OR military) AND “air strike” (war OR battle) AND “heavy casualties”];

    Group 6 [“terrorist act” OR “terrorist acts”].

  6. In simple VAR framework, the results of variance decomposition and therefore spillovers are driven by Cholesky factor orthogonalization and are potentially order dependent. However, the spillover measures based on a generalized VAR framework, the results are not order dependent. For more details, see Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998).

  7. Some of these factors such as common language and geographical proximity were also suggested by the Emerging Risk Report (2016), produced by LLOYD’S, in their “framework for understanding the emergence and spread of civil unrest.”

  8. For the sake of grouping, we consider Turkey as part of Gulf region, because being a Muslim country it may be affected more by the GPRs of Israel and Saudi Arabia than other countries, except the USA, in the sample.

  9. Bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Venezuela increased by 500% in the last 6–7 years. It is because the initial level of bilateral trade was very low.

  10. Note that budget deficit, debt (central government debt), and market capitalization of each country have been measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the respective country. See Appendix A for variable description.

References

  • Balli F, Balli HO, Louis RJ, Vo TK (2015) The transmission of market shocks and bilateral linkages: evidence from emerging economies. Int Rev Financ Anal 42:349–357

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Balli F, Uddin GS, Mudassar H, Yoon S-M (2017) Cross-country determinants of economic policy uncertainty spillovers. Econ Lett 156:179–183. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.016

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barbieri K (1996) Economic interdependence: a path to peace or a source of interstate conflict? J Peace Res 33(1):29–49

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baruník J, Křehlík T (2018) Measuring the frequency dynamics of financial connectedness and systemic risk. J Financ Economet 16(2):271–296

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bearce DH, Fisher EON (2002) Economic geography, trade, and war. J Confl Resolut 46(3):365–393

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck N, King G, Zeng L (2000) Improving quantitative studies of international conflict: a conjecture. Am Polit Sci Rev 94(1):21–35

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck N, King G, Zeng L (2004) Theory and evidence in international conflict: a response to de Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski. Am Polit Sci Rev 98(2):379–389

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beiser J (2011) Looking beyond borders: identification, information, and ethnic conflict contagion. Working paper, University College London, London

  • Beiser J (2013) Trampling out the spark? Governments' strategic reaction to the threat of ethnic conflict contagion. PhD thesis, Working paper, University College London, London

  • Blanchard J-MF, Ripsman NM (1994) Peace through economic interdependence? Appeasement in 1936. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York

  • Blomberg SB, Rosendorff BP (2006) A gravity model of globalization, democracy and transnational terrorism. USC CLEO research paper no. C06-6. SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=904204

  • Braithwaite A (2010) Resisting infection: how state capacity conditions conflict contagion. J Peace Res 47(3):311–319. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310362164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buhaug H, Gleditsch KS (2008) Contagion or confusion? Why conflicts cluster in space. Int Stud Q 52(2):215–233

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buzan B (1984) Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case. Int Organ 38(4):597–624

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caldara D, Iacoviello M (2018) Measuring geopolitical risk. Federal Reserve Board, International Finance Discussion Paper. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3117773

  • Chadefaux T (2014) Early warning signals for war in the news. J Peace Res 51(1):5–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313507302

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Marchi S, Gelpi C, Grynaviski JD (2004) Untangling neural nets. Am Polit Sci Rev 98(2):371–378

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Mesquita BB (2010) The predictioneer's game: using the logic of brazen self-interest to see and shape the future: Random House Incorporated

  • Dew-Becker I, Giglio S (2016) Asset pricing in the frequency domain: theory and empirics. Rev Financ Stud 29(8):2029–2068

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dickey DA, Fuller WA (1979) Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series with a unit root. J Am Stat Assoc 74(366a):427–431

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diebold FX, Yilmaz K (2012) Better to give than to receive: predictive directional measurement of volatility spillovers. Int J Forecast 28(1):57–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Emerging Risks Report (2016) A framework for understanding the emergence and spread of civil unrest. https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds-around-the-world/asia/dubai/dubai-news/2016/lloyds-emerging-risk-reporthttp://www.policyuncertainty.com

  • Fearon JD, Laitin DD (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. Am Polit Sci Rev 97(1):75–90

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fidrmuc J, Karaja E (2013) Uncertainty, informational spillovers and policy reform: a gravity model approach. Eur J Polit Econ 32:182–192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.07.003

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Glaser CL (2000) The causes and consequences of arms races. Annu Rev Polit Sci 3(1):251–276

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gleditsch KS, Ward MD (2013) Forecasting is difficult, especially about the future: using contentious issues to forecast interstate disputes. J Peace Res 50(1):17–31

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegre H (2008) Gravitating toward war: preponderance may pacify, but power kills. J Confl Resolut 52(4):566–589

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hegre H, Oneal JR, Russett B (2010) Trade does promote peace: new simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict. J Peace Res 47(6):763–774

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill S, Rothchild D, Cameron C (1998) Tactical information and the diffusion of peaceful protests. In: The international spread of ethnic conflict. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 61–88

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hill S, Rothchild D (1986) The contagion of political conflict in Africa and the world. J Confl Resolut 30(4):716–735

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huff DL, Lutz JM (1974) The contagion of political unrest in independent Black Africa. Econ Geogr 50(4):352–367

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huth PK (2009) Standing your ground: territorial disputes and international conflict. University of Michigan Press

  • Iqbal Z, Starr H (2008) Bad neighbors: failed states and their consequences. Confl Manag Peace Sci 25(4):315–331. https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940802397400

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kang SH, Yoon SM (2019) Dynamic connectedness network in economic policy uncertainties. Appl Econ Lett 26(1):74–78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kenneth BE (1962) Conflict and defense: a general theory. Harper & Row, Publishers, New York

  • Keshk OM, Pollins BM, Reuveny R (2004) Trade still follows the flag: the primacy of politics in a simultaneous model of interdependence and armed conflict. J Polit 66(4):1155–1179

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim HM, Rousseau DL (2005) The classical liberals were half right (or half wrong): new tests of the ‘'Liberal Peace’’, 1960–88. J Peace Res 42(5):523–543

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klößner S, Sekkel R (2014) International spillovers of policy uncertainty. Econ Lett 124(3):508–512

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koop G, Pesaran MH, Potter SM (1996) Impulse response analysis in nonlinear multivariate models. J Econometr 74(1):119–147

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuran T (1998) Ethnic dissimilation and its international diffusion. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, 35, 60. Princeton University Press

  • Leetaru K (2011) Culturomics 2.0: Forecasting large-scale human behavior using global news media tone in time and space. First Monday 16(9). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v16i9.3663

  • Levy JS (1989) The causes of war: a review of theories and evidence. In: Tetlock P, Husbands JLL, Jervis R, Stern PC, Tilly C (eds) Behavior, society, and nuclear war. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Liow KH, Liao WC, Huang Y (2018) Dynamics of international spillovers and interaction: evidence from financial market stress and economic policy uncertainty. Econ Model 68:96–116

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morley C, Rosselló J, Santana-Gallego M (2014) Gravity models for tourism demand: theory and use. Ann Tour Res 48:1–10

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mowlana H (1997) Global information and world communication: new frontiers in international relations. Sage Publications, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Oneal JR, Russett B (1999) Assessing the liberal peace with alternative specifications: trade still reduces conflict. J Peace Res 36(4):423–442

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pesaran HH, Shin Y (1998) Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multivariate models. Econ Lett 58(1):17–29

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pevehouse JC, Goldstein JS (1999) Serbian compliance or defiance in Kosovo? Statistical analysis and real-time predictions. J Confl Resolut 43(4):538–546

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Powell R (2004) The inefficient use of power: costly conflict with complete information. Am Polit Sci Rev 98(2):231–241

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salehyan I, Gleditsch KS (2006) Refugees and the spread of civil war. Int Organ 60(2):335–366

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schneider G, Gleditsch NP, Carey SC (2010) Exploring the past, anticipating the future: a symposium. Int Stud Rev 12(1):1–7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schrodt PA, Gerner DJ (2000) Cluster-based early warning indicators for political change in the contemporary Levant. Am Polit Sci Rev 94(4):803–817

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiassny A (1996) A spectral decomposition for structural VAR models. Empir Econom 21(4):535–555

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suárez-de Vivero JL, Mateos JCR (2017) Forecasting geopolitical risks: oceans as source of instability. Mar Policy 75:19–28

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thiem C (2018) Cross-category spillovers of economic policy uncertainty (no. 744). Ruhr Economic Papers

  • Vanderkamp J (1977) The gravity model and migration behaviour: an economic interpretation. J Econ Stud 4(2):89–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Virilio P (1986) Speed and politics: an essay on dromology, translated by Mark Polizzotti. Semiotext (e), New York

  • Waltz K (1979) Theory of international relations. Random House, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Ward MD, Siverson RM, Cao X (2007) Disputes, democracies, and dependencies: a reexamination of the Kantian peace. Am J Polit Sci 51(3):583–601

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ward MD, Greenhill BD, Bakke KM (2010) The perils of policy by p-value: predicting civil conflicts. J Peace Res 47(4):363–375

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weidmann NB (2015) Communication networks and the transnational spread of ethnic conflict. J Peace Res 52(3):285–296

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Werner S (1999) Choosing demands strategically: The distribution of power, the distribution of benefits, and the risk of conflict. J Confl Resolut 43(6):705–726

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xiang J, Xu X, Keteku G (2007) Power: the missing link in the trade conflict relationship. J Confl Resolut 51(4):646–663

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yin L, Han L (2014) Spillovers of macroeconomic uncertainty among major economies. Appl Econ Lett 21(13):938–944

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Faruk Balli.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors report no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix A. Details of data and sources

Appendix A. Details of data and sources

Variable name

Definition

Source

Exports ij

Share of the total exports of origin country i to country j relative to the total exports of country i. It is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database

Imports ij

Share of the total imports of origin country i from country j relative to the total imports of country i. It is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database

Contiguous ij

A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i and country j are sharing a border, and 0 otherwise

CEPII

Colony ij

A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i has been a colony of country j, and 0 otherwise

CEPII

Common Colony ij

A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i and country j have remained under the influence of same colonial power, and 0 otherwise

CEPII

Common Language ij

A binary variable that takes 1 if origin country i and country j share at least one common language, and 0 otherwise

CEPII

Distance ij

Physical distance (in kilometers) between origin country i and country j

CEPII

Budget Deficit i

Budget deficit (surplus) of country i as a percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Budget Deficit j

Budget deficit (surplus) of country j as a percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Debt i

Central government debt of country i as a percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Debt j

Central government debt of country j as a percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Area i

Geographical area (in squared kilometers) of country i. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Area j

Geographical area (in squared kilometers) of country j. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Market Capitalization i

Stock market capitalization of country i as a percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

Market Capitalization j

Stock market capitalization of country j as a percentage of its GDP. The figure is averaged for the period between 1985 and 2016

World Development Indicators (WDI)

DS ij

Directional mean spillover (in %) of GPR transmitted by origin country i to country j

These amounts are calculated by authors by applying the spillover model of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) on 19 GPR series of Caldara and Iacoviello (2018). These series are available on http://www.policyuncertainty.com/

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Balli, F., Balli, H.O., Hasan, M. et al. Geopolitical risk spillovers and its determinants. Ann Reg Sci 68, 463–500 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-021-01081-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-021-01081-y

JEL Classification

Navigation