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Dispersion equilibria in spatial Cournot competition

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Abstract

We consider the standard model of spatial Cournot competition and show that for dispersion equilibria to exist, (a) a necessary condition is that the distribution be not unimodal, and (b) a sufficient condition is that the distribution be convex with a unique antimode and that asymmetry is not too strong.

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Notes

  1. The limit case where consumers are concentrated at the end points of the support is arguably the barbell model (Hwang and Mai 1990), where a (desert) road connects two markets. In this framework, with symmetric linear demands Cournot competition may yield agglomeration or dispersion depending on the shape of the transportation cost: see Sun and Lai (2013), who also provide a general characterizations of location equilibria under Bertrand competition. The case of asymmetric demands, where market size is crucial to determine the firms’ locations in the Cournot case, is considered by Liang et al. (2006), while Guo and Lai (2013) introduce a third intermediate market.

  2. Notice however that switching to the circular road model may yield dispersion (Pal 1998), while Benassi et al. (2007) show that one other key variable is the level of transportation costs (relative to the consumers’ reservation price): Dispersion is the unique equilibrium in the linear city with a uniform distribution when such costs are high enough (\( A<1 \) in our notation).

  3. These authors’ proof relies on differentiating each firm’s profit function (3) with respect to its own location, to get that \(\lim _{x_{1}\rightarrow 0^{+}}\partial \Pi _{1}/\partial x_{1}>0\ \)and \(\lim _{x_{2}\rightarrow 1^{-}}\partial \Pi _{2}/\partial x_{2}>0\).

  4. This is Gupta et al.’s example 7 (see also their f.note 6, p. 280), where the density is \(f(x)=1/2+6(x-1/2)^{2}\), symmetric with mean \(\mu =1/2\), and \(A=2.681\); the second-order bounds on the density are satisfied at \( (x_{1}^{*},x_{2}^{*})\). Notice that in general, \(x^{b}(\delta )\) is not a one-to-one function, since clearly equation (5b) may have more than one solution. Also, symmetry implies that \(x^{b}(\cdot )\) be vertical at \( \delta ^{*}\).

  5. Since \(h(0,A)>0>h(1,A)\), \(h(\cdot ,A)=0\) has always a solution, and we know from Gupta et al. (1997) that this is an equilibrium whenever the density is unimodal—which follows from their result (p. 269), as unimodality implies the existence of a ‘modal interval’ \(I\subset (0,1)\) such that \(f(x)>1\) for all \(x\in I\).

  6. This also extends Gupta et al.’s sufficiency Proposition 3 (1997, p. 273) (to the effect that agglomeration is the unique equilibrium), to cover the case where \(f(x)<3/2A\) for some \(x\), provided that unimodality is preserved. I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point.

  7. The former is true of all (convex) symmetric densities, as \(f(0)=f(1)>1\) while \(3/2A<1\) for \(A>2\); the latter is explicitly made for the dispersion case by Gupta et al. (1997) in their Proposition 4, where symmetry implies \(x_{A}=x_{m}\). Indeed, they assume that the density is “symmetric and nonincreasing in \(\left[ 0,1/2\right] \)”, which amounts to quasi-convexity.

  8. As to symmetry, it should perhaps be noticed that the “mirror image” of \(f\), i.e., any density \(g\) such that \(g(x)=f(1-x)\), is bound to satisfy all assumptions of Proposition 3 if so does \(f\), and accordingly admit of a dispersion equilibrium (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

  9. We are using \(f(x)=\frac{300}{163}\big ( \big ( x-\frac{9}{10}\big ) ^{2}+ \frac{9}{10}x^{2}\big ) \), such that the mean \(\mu \approx 0.515\,<0.532\), the median value.

  10. The second-order conditions are satisfied, as \(\min \left\{ f\left( x^{*}\right) ,f\left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\right) \right\} =f(x^{*})\approx 0.71>1/\left( A+\delta ^{*}\right) \approx 0.482\).

  11. Formally, a lower bound on \(f(x_{m})\) is called for to solve system (5), as the implicit function theorem is used, which requires the relevant derivatives to be always well defined. If one looks for symmetric solutions with a symmetric density, the problem is much simplified by Eq. (5a) collapsing to \(\delta =h\big ( \frac{1-\delta }{2},A\big ) /\big ( 1+2F\big ( \frac{1-\delta }{2}\big ) \big ) \).

  12. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.

  13. It may be worth noting that in this example, an agglomeration equilibrium also exists, such that \(x^{*}=x_{A}=0.85028\).

References

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Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to two anonymous referees, whose comments led to many changes.

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Correspondence to Corrado Benassi.

Appendix

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1

The first-order conditions for profit maximization, given definition (2) and solving integrals, reduce to

$$\begin{aligned} A[1-2F(x_{1})]-\left[ 1+2F(x_{1})\right] \delta +x_{1}-\mu +2I(x_{1},x_{2})&= 0 \end{aligned}$$
(6a)
$$\begin{aligned} A[1-2F(x_{2})]+\left[ 1-2F(x_{2})\right] \delta +x_{2}-\mu +2I(x_{1},x_{2})&= 0 \end{aligned}$$
(6b)

where to ease notation, we let \(\delta =x_{2}-x_{1}\ge 0\) and \( I(x_{1},x_{2})=\int _{x_{1}}^{x_{2}}F(x)\mathrm{d}x\). Now, we may sum and subtract over (6) to get

$$\begin{aligned} A\Delta F-\frac{3}{2}\delta +\delta \Delta F=0 \end{aligned}$$
(7a)
$$\begin{aligned} A\left[ 1-\Sigma F\right] +\frac{x_{1}+x_{2}}{2}-\delta \Sigma F-\mu +2I(x_{1},x_{2})=0 \end{aligned}$$
(7b)

where \(\Sigma F=F(x_{1})+F(x_{2})\) and \(\Delta F=F(x_{2})-F(x_{1})\ge 0\). By summing over again, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \delta =\dfrac{1}{1+2F(x_{1})}\left( 2I(x_{1},x_{2})+x_{1}-\mu +\left[ 1-2F(x_{1})\right] A\right) \end{aligned}$$
(8)

which, letting equilibrium values \(x_{1}^{*}=x^{*}\) and \(x_{2}^{*}=x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\), amounts to Eq. (5a).

By subtracting (7b) from (7a), we now get

$$\begin{aligned} \left[ 1-2F(x_{2})\right] \delta =-\left\{ 2I(x_{1},x_{2})+x_{2}-\mu +\left[ 1-2F(x_{2})\right] A\right\} \end{aligned}$$

which, solving for \(\delta \) from (8) and letting \(x_{2}=x_{1}+\delta \), gives, after simplifications, the equilibrium value

$$\begin{aligned} \delta ^{*}=\frac{2A\Delta F}{3-2\Delta F} \end{aligned}$$
(9)

which can be solved for \(\Delta F=F(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})-F(x^{*})\) to give Eq. (5b). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 2

If \((x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\) is a pair of equilibrium dispersed locations, \(\delta ^{*}\in (0,1-x^{*})\) must satisfy the twin conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa (\delta ^{*})&= 0 \end{aligned}$$
(10a)
$$\begin{aligned} \lambda (\delta ^{*})&= 0 \end{aligned}$$
(10b)

where, using (5a, 5b), the following definitions apply:

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa (\delta )&= \delta [1+2F(x^{*})]-2\displaystyle \int \limits _{x^{*}}^{x^{*}+\delta }F(z)\mathrm{d}z-h(x^{*},A) \end{aligned}$$
(11a)
$$\begin{aligned} \lambda (\delta )&= \Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta )-\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta } \end{aligned}$$
(11b)

here \(h(x^{*},A)=x^{*}-\mu +\left[ 1-2F(x^{*})\right] A\) and, to ease notation, \(\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta )=F(x^{*}+\delta )-F(x^{*})\), an increasing function of \(\delta \). Given \(x^{*}\), both \(\kappa \) and \(\lambda \) are continuous functions. We now proceed in three steps:

  1. (i)

    The function \(\kappa (\delta )\) is strictly concave for any \( \delta \in [0,1-x^{*}]\), increasing at least up to some \( \widetilde{\delta }\in (\delta ^{*},1-x^{*}]\), and such that \(\kappa (0)=-h(x^{*},A)<0\) and \(\kappa ^{\prime }(\delta ^{*})<1\). Indeed, differentiation shows that \(\kappa ^{\prime }(\delta )=1-2\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta )\), clearly decreasing and positive for \(\delta \le \delta ^{*}\), as by Lemma 1 \(\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta ^{*})<1/2\) : hence, \(\kappa (0)=-h(x^{*},A)<0\) and that \(\kappa ^{\prime }(\delta ^{*})>0\). Since (10a) is a necessary condition for equilibrium, this ensures that for the given \(x^{*}\), there is only one \(\delta ^{*}\) such that \((x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\) is an equilibrium location pair.

  2. (ii)

    The function \(\lambda (\delta )\) is such that:

    1. (a)

      \(\lambda (1-x^{*})>0\): from (i) it must be \( h(x^{*},A)>0\): this directly implies that

      $$\begin{aligned} 1-F(x^{*})>\frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\frac{x^{*}}{A}\right) \end{aligned}$$
      (12)

      Using (11b) and noting that \(\Delta _{F}(x^{*},1-x^{*})=1-F(x^{*})\), from (12) \(\lambda (1-x^{*})>\) \(\frac{1}{2}\left( 1- \frac{x^{*}}{A}\right) -\frac{3}{2}\frac{1-x^{*}}{A+1-x^{*}}\), so that \(\lambda (1-x^{*})>0\) if

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\frac{x^{*}}{A}\right) -\frac{3}{2}\frac{1-x^{*}}{A+1-x^{*}}>0 \end{aligned}$$
      (13)

      which amounts to \((A-x^{*})(A+1-x^{*})-3A(1-x^{*})>0\): this is surely true for any \(x^{*}\in \left[ 0,1\right] \) and \(A>2\).

    2. (b)

      there are at least two values of \(\delta \) in the interval \( (0,1-x^{*})\) such that the derivative of \(\lambda (\delta )\) vanishes. To see this, notice that \(\lambda \) cannot be monotone as \(\lambda (0)=\lambda (\delta ^{*})=0\). Also, \(\lambda (1-x^{*})>0\) implies the existence of some \(\widehat{\delta }\in (0,1-x^{*})\) such that \( \widehat{\delta }\ge \delta ^{*}\), with \(\lambda (\widehat{\delta } )=0<\lambda ^{\prime }(\widehat{\delta })\) and \(\lambda (\delta )>0\) for all \(\delta \in (\widehat{\delta },1-x^{*})\). Let now \(\Gamma (\delta )=\kappa ^{\prime }(\delta )\lambda (\delta )+\kappa (\delta )\), such that \( \Gamma (0)=\Gamma (\delta ^{*})=0\): there has to be some \(\overline{ \delta }\in (0,\delta ^{*})\) such that \(\Gamma ^{\prime }(\overline{ \delta })=\kappa ^{\prime \prime }(\overline{\delta })\lambda (\overline{ \delta })+\left[ \lambda ^{\prime }(\overline{\delta })+1\right] \kappa ^{\prime }(\overline{\delta })=0\) i.e., \(\kappa ^{\prime \prime }(\overline{ \delta })\lambda (\overline{\delta })=-\left[ \lambda ^{\prime }(\overline{ \delta })+1\right] \kappa ^{\prime }(\overline{\delta })<0\): since \(\lambda ^{\prime }(\delta )+1=f(x+\delta )+\frac{2(A+\delta )^{2}-3A}{2(A+\delta )^{2}}>0\) for all \(\delta \in [0,1-x^{*}]\) and \(\kappa \) is concave, it must be \(\lambda (\overline{\delta })>0\). All of which implies that \(\lambda ^{\prime }(\delta )\) changes sign at least twice over \([0, \widehat{\delta }]\): there is at least a pair \((\delta _{1},\delta _{2})\), \( \delta _{1}<\delta _{2}\), say, \(\delta _{i}\in (0,\widehat{\delta })\) for \( i=1,2\), such that \(\lambda ^{\prime }(\delta _{i})=0\).

  3. (iii)

    By (11b), it is now easily seen that \(f(x^{*}+\delta _{1})>f(x^{*}+\delta _{2})\), since \(\lambda ^{\prime }(\delta _{i})=0\) is equivalent to \(f(x^{*}+\delta _{i})=\frac{3}{2}\frac{A}{(A+\delta _{i})^{2}}\) and \(\delta _{1}<\delta _{2}\). Hence, unimodality is ruled out if one can find some \(\delta _{3}>\delta _{2}\) such that \(f(x^{*}+\delta _{3})>f(x^{*}+\delta _{2})\). To do so, consider the function \(\theta (\delta )=\frac{1-F(x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}\delta -\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta }\); this is positive for any \(\delta \in (0,1-x^{*}]\): indeed, \(\theta (1-x^{*})=\) \(\lambda (1-x^{*})>0=\theta (0)\), while \( \theta ^{\prime }(\delta )=\frac{1-F(x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}-\frac{3}{2} \frac{A}{(A+\delta )^{2}}>0\): as \(\theta \) is strictly convex, \(\theta ^{\prime }(\delta )>0\) if \(\theta ^{\prime }(0)\ge 0\), i.e., \(\frac{ 1-F(x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}\ge \frac{3}{2A}\), which is true for \(A>2\). To see this, notice that \(h(x^{*},A)>0\) implies \(\frac{1-F(x^{*})}{ 1-x^{*}}>\frac{A-x^{*}+\mu }{2A(1-x^{*})}\), so that \(\theta ^{\prime }(0)>0\) if \(A+2x^{*}+\mu -3\ge 0\). That the latter is verified in equilibrium can be seen as follows:

    (a\(^\prime \)):

    \(h(x+\delta ^{*},A+\delta ^{*})=x^{*}+\delta ^{*}-\mu +\left[ 1-2F(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\right] (A+\delta ^{*})<0\): this follows from (10) and the definitions (11), by noting that \(\delta ^{*}\left[ 1+2F(x^{*})\right] >h(x^{*},A)\) and substituting for \( F(x^{*})\) from (10); there follows \(\mu >x^{*}+\delta ^{*}+ \left[ 1-2F(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\right] (A+\delta ^{*})\) and \( A+2x^{*}+\mu -3>2A-3(1-x^{*})+2\delta ^{*}-2(A+\delta ^{*})F(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\);

    (b\(^\prime \)):

    by substituting back \(F(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})(A+\delta ^{*})\) from (10b) we get \(A+2x^{*}+\mu -3>2A-3(1-x^{*})-\delta ^{*}+2(A+\delta ^{*})F(x^{*})>0\): which holds as \(3(1-x^{*})+\delta ^{*}<4\), while \(2A>4\).

    Now, notice that by construction \(\widehat{\delta }>\delta _{2}>\delta _{1}\) and \(\theta (\widehat{\delta })=\frac{1-F(x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}\widehat{ \delta }-\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\widehat{\delta })>0\). Since \(\Delta _{F}(1-x^{*},x^{*})=1-F(x^{*})\), it is true at \(\widehat{\delta } \) that \(\frac{\Delta _{F}(x^{*},1-x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}>\frac{\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\widehat{\delta })}{\widehat{\delta }}\), so that there exists some \(\delta _{3}\in [\widehat{\delta },1-x^{*}]\) such that \( \frac{\Delta _{F}(x^{*},1-x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}<\frac{\partial }{ \partial \delta }\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta _{3})=f(x^{*}+\delta _{3})\) ; but \(0<\theta ^{\prime }(\delta _{2})=\frac{\Delta _{F}(x^{*},1-x^{*})}{1-x^{*}}-f(x^{*}+\delta _{2})\): hence \(f(x^{*}+\delta _{2})<\frac{\Delta _{F}(x^{*},1-x^{*})}{1-x^{*}} <f(x^{*}+\delta _{3})\). \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 3

Observe that any solution to system (5) amounts to the first-order conditions for the firms’ maximization problem holding. In order to prove that one such solution exists, we need the following Lemmata. \(\square \)

Lemma 2

Given the assumptions of Proposition 3, (a) there exists a unique pair of solutions \(\overline{x} _{i}\in (0,1),i=1,2\), to the equation \(f(\cdot )=3/2A\) ; (b) there is a unique solution \(x_{A}\in \left( 0,1\right) \) to the equation \(h(\cdot ,A)=0\) ; (c) at any pair \((x,\delta )\) such that \(\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) =\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{ A+\delta }\), \(\max \left\{ f(x),f(x+\delta )\right\} (A+\delta )\ge 1\).

Proof

(a) The results follows trivially, given convexity and assumption ( i). (b) Convexity and assumptions (ii) and ( iii) imply that there is only one \(x_{A}\) such that \(h(\cdot ,A)=0\), since \(h_{x}(x,A)=1-2Af(x)<0\) and \(f(x)\ge f(x_{m})>1/2A\). By assumption ( ii), both \(x_{A}\) and \(x_{m}\) lie in \((\overline{x}_{1},\overline{x} _{2})\). (c) Convexity implies that at any pair \((x,\delta )\) such that \(\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) =\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta }\),

$$\begin{aligned} \left[ f(x)+f(x+\delta )\right] \frac{\delta }{2}\ge \Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) \end{aligned}$$

while \(2\max \left\{ f(x),f(x+\delta )\right\} \ge \) \(f(x)+f(x+\delta )\ge 2\min \left\{ f(x),f(x+\delta )\right\} \), so that \(\max \left\{ f(x),f(x+\delta )\right\} \ge \) \(\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{A+\delta }>\frac{1}{ A+\delta }\). \(\square \)

Lemma 3

Let \((x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\) be a solution to system (5) with \(\delta ^{*}>0\) . Then, \(h(x^{*},A)>0=h(x_{A},A)>h(x^{*}+\delta ^{*},A)\) , so that \(x^{*}<x_{A}<x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\).

Proof

From the proof of Proposition 2, we already know that \(\kappa (\delta )=\delta [1+2F(x^{*})]-2I(x^{*},\delta )-h(x^{*},A)\) is such that \(\kappa (0)=-h(x^{*},A)<0\) at any solution of (5). There remains to show that \(h(x^{*}+\delta ^{*},A)<0\). To do so, notice that by definition \(h(x^{*}+\delta ^{*},A)=h(x^{*},A)+\delta ^{*}-2A\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta ^{*})\); at \((x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\), we know that \(\kappa (\delta ^{*})=0\), i.e., \( h(x^{*},A)=\delta ^{*}[1+2F(x^{*})]-2I(x^{*},\delta ^{*}) \), so that \(h(x^{*}+\delta ^{*},A)=2\delta ^{*}[1+F(x^{*})]-2A\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta ^{*})-2I(x^{*},\delta ^{*})\), which—given (5a)—can be written as \(h(x^{*}+\delta ^{*},A)=2\delta ^{*}[1+F(x^{*})]-\frac{3A\delta ^{*}}{A+\delta ^{*}}-2I(x^{*},\delta ^{*})=H(x^{*},\delta ^{*})\). Consider now the function \(H(x^{*},\delta )\): surely \(H(x^{*},0)=0\), and \(H_{\delta }(x^{*},\delta )=2[1-\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta ^{*})]-\frac{3A^{2}}{\left( A+\delta \right) ^{2}}<0\) for all \(\delta \in [0,\delta ^{*}]\). To see this, notice that \(H_{\delta }(x^{*},0)<0\), so that \(H(x^{*},\delta ^{*})\ge 0\) would require some \( \delta ^{\prime }\in (0,\delta ^{*})\) such \(H(x^{*},\delta ^{\prime })<0=H_{\delta }(x^{*},\delta ^{\prime })\), so that \(\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta ^{\prime })=1-\frac{3A^{2}}{2\left( A+\delta ^{\prime }\right) ^{2}} <0\), which is impossible as \(\Delta _{F}(x^{*},\delta )\ge 0\) for any \( \delta \in [0,\delta ^{*}]\). \(\square \)

Lemma 4

      Let \(G(\cdot )\) be the distribution such that \(G(x)=1-F(1-x)\) for all \(x\in \left[ 0,1 \right] \) , and let \((x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\) be a solution to system (5) with \(\delta ^{*}>0\) . Then \( (z^{*}-\delta ^{*},z^{*})\) , with \(z^{*}=1-x^{*}\) , is a solution of the same system where \(F\left( \cdot \right) \) is replaced by \(G\left( \cdot \right) \) . Moreover, if \( (x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\) is a dispersion equilibrium under \(F\) , so is \((z^{*}-\delta ^{*},z^{*})\) under \(G\).

Proof

Notice that \(G\) is the “mirror image” of \(F\), such that (with obvious notation and \(z=1-x\)), \(\mu _{G}=1-\mu \), \(-h_{G}(z,A)=h(x,A)\), and \( G(z)-G(z-\delta )=F(x+\delta )-F(x)\). The result follows after some simplification by substituting accordingly within (5). Moreover, if the second-order conditions under \(F\) hold, \(\left( A+\delta ^{*}\right) \min \left\{ f(x^{*}),f(x^{*}\!+\!\delta ^{*})\right\} \ge 1\), it must be \(\left( A+\delta ^{*}\right) \min \left\{ g(z^{*}-\delta ^{*}),g(z^{*})\right\} \ge 1\), as \(f(x)=g(1-x)\) for all \(x\). \(\square \)

The proof now proceed in four steps.

First step      Consider the equation

$$\begin{aligned} f(x+\delta )=f(x) \end{aligned}$$
(14)

Given convexity, this has only one solution \(\widehat{x}\) for \(\delta \in (0,\delta _{M})\), where \(\delta _{M}\le 1\) solves either \(f(\delta _{M})=f(0)\) when \(f(0)<f(1)\), or \(f(x+\delta _{M})=f(1)\) when \(f(0)>f(1)\); \( \delta _{M}=1\) and \(f(0)=f(\delta _{M})=f(1)\) when \(f(0)=f(1)\): so \(f\left( \delta _{M}\right) =\min \left\{ f(0),f(1)\right\} \). (14) thus defines an implicit function \(\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) \) such that:

  1. (a)

    \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =x_{m}\);

  2. (b)

    \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \delta _{M}}\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =x_{M}<x_{m}\,\), where \(x_{M}=0\) when \(f(0)\le f(1)\) or \(\,x_{M}=1-\delta _{M}\) for \(f(0)\ge f(1)\);

  3. (c)

    \(\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =\frac{f^{\prime }(x+\delta )}{f^{\prime }(x)-f^{\prime }(x+\delta )}<0\), since at \( f(x+\delta )-f(x)=0\) it must be \(f^{\prime }(x+\delta )>0>f^{\prime }(x)\). Notice that \(\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =-\frac{1}{2} \) if \(f^{\prime }(x+\delta )=-f^{\prime }(x)\), such that under symmetry, \( \widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =\frac{1-\delta }{2}\); if there is symmetry around \(x_{m}\), \(\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =x_{m}-\frac{1}{2}\delta \);

  4. (d)

    \(f(x+\delta )-f(x)=\Delta _{f}\left( x,\delta \right) >0\,\) for any \(x> \widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) \), and \(\Delta _{f}\left( x,\delta \right) <0\) for any \(x<\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) \).

Second step      Consider the equation

$$\begin{aligned} \dfrac{1}{1+2F(x)}\left( 2\displaystyle \int \limits _{x}^{x+\delta }F(z)\mathrm{d}z+x-\mu +\left[ 1-2F(x) \right] A\right) =\delta \end{aligned}$$
(5a)

which, solving the integral by parts, amounts to

$$\begin{aligned} 2\left( x+\delta \right) \Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) -2\widetilde{\mu }\left( x,\delta \right) +h(x,A)=\delta \end{aligned}$$
(15)

where \(\widetilde{\mu }\left( x,\delta \right) =\int _{x}^{x+\delta }zf(z)\mathrm{d}z>0 \). For any given \(\delta >0\), (15) solves for some \( x=x^{a}\left( \delta \right) \). This will be well defined so long as the derivative wrt \(x\) of

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa (x,\delta )=2\left( x+\delta \right) \Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) -2\widetilde{\mu }\left( x,\delta \right) +h(x,A)-\delta \end{aligned}$$

does not vanishes at \(\kappa =0\). At any such point, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa _{x}(x,\delta )=1-2\left( A+\delta \right) f(x)<0 \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x\in \left[ 0,1\right] \) as \(f(x)\ge f(x_{m})>1/2A\). Then, \( x^{a}\left( \delta \right) \) is such that:

  1. (a)

    \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}x^{a}\left( \delta \right) =x_{A}\);

  2. (b)

    \(\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }x^{a}\left( \delta \right) =\frac{1-2\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) }{1-2\left( A+\delta \right) f(x)}<0\) for \(\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) <1/2\,\);

  3. (c)

    \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }x^{a}\left( \delta \right) =\frac{1}{1-2Af(x(A))}<0\).

Third step      Consider the equation

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) -\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta }=0 \end{aligned}$$
(5b)

Under the stated assumptions, this has two solutions, \(x_{1}^{b}\left( \delta \right) \) and \(x_{2}^{b}\left( \delta \right) \). Indeed:

  1. (a)

    \(\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) -\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta } =0\) can be written as

    $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) }{\delta }-\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{ A+\delta }=0 \end{aligned}$$

    so that \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}\left( \frac{\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) }{\delta }-\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{A+\delta }\right) =f(x)-\frac{3}{2A}\) : since our condition must hold also in the limit, it must be \(f(x)=\frac{3}{ 2A}\) which by Lemma 2 gives two solutions in \(\left( 0,1\right) \), \( \overline{x}_{1}<\overline{x}_{2}\), say. Hence: \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}x_{1}^{b}\left( \delta \right) =\overline{x}_{1}<\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}x_{2}^{b}\left( \delta \right) =\overline{x}_{2}\).

  2. (b)

    More generally, for \(\delta >0\), there exists some \(z\in \left( x,x+\delta \right) \) such that \(\frac{\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) }{ \delta }=f(z)\), and \(f(z)-\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{A+\delta }=0\) gives a pair \( \left( x_{1}^{b}\left( \delta \right) ,x_{2}^{b}\left( \delta \right) \right) \) such that \(\Delta _{F}\left( x,\delta \right) -\frac{3}{2}\frac{ \delta }{A+\delta }=0\).

  3. (c)

    \(x_{i}^{b}\left( \delta \right) \), \(i=1,2\) are well-defined functions for all \(\delta \), such that

    $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }x_{i}^{b}\left( \delta \right) =-\frac{f(x+\delta )-\frac{3 }{2}\frac{A}{\left( A+\delta \right) ^{2}}}{\Delta _{f}\left( x,\delta \right) } \end{aligned}$$

    Indeed, since \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) =x_{m}\in \left( x_{1},x_{2}\right) \), and using (d) of the first step, we have that so long as \(x_{1}^{b}\left( \delta \right) <\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) \), \(\Delta _{f}\left( x,\delta \right) <0\), while so long as \( x_{2}^{b}\left( \delta \right) >\widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) \), \(\Delta _{f}\left( x,\delta \right) >0\).

  4. (d)

    there is a unique \(\overline{\delta }\in \left( 0,\delta _{M}\right) \) such that \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }}x_{1}^{b}(\delta )=\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }}x_{2}^{b}(\delta )=\widehat{x}( \overline{\delta })\) and \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }}\frac{\mathrm{d} }{\mathrm{d}\delta }x_{1}^{b}(\delta )=\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }x_{2}^{b}(\delta )=\infty \). To see this, we use the first step to define

    $$\begin{aligned} \Phi \left( \delta \right) =\Delta _{F}\left( \widehat{x}\left( \delta \right) ,\delta \right) -\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta } \end{aligned}$$
    (16)

    such that \(\Phi \left( 0\right) =0\) and \(\Phi \left( \delta _{M}\right) >0\). The former is obvious, while the latter can be shown as follows. Either \( \Phi \left( \delta _{M}\right) =F(\delta _{M})-\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta _{M}}{ A+\delta _{M}}\), or \(\Phi \left( \delta _{M}\right) =1-F(1-\delta _{M})- \frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta _{M}}{A+\delta _{M}}\); since by Lemma 4, one can always define \(F(\delta _{M})=1-G(1-\delta _{M})\), and one can concentrate simply on \(1-F(1-\delta _{M})-\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta _{M}}{A+\delta _{M}}\), which is positive for all \(\delta _{M}>0\). Indeed, letting \(\rho (\delta )=1-F(1-\delta )-\frac{3}{2}\frac{\delta }{A+\delta }\), we have \(\rho (0)=0\), \(\rho (1)=1-\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{A+1}>0\), and \(\rho ^{\prime }\left( \delta \right) =f(1-\delta )-\frac{3}{2}\frac{A}{\left( A+\delta \right) ^{2}}\), so that \(\rho ^{\prime }\left( 0\right) =f(1)-\frac{3}{2A}>0\) and \(\rho ^{\prime }\left( 1\right) =f(0)-\frac{3}{2}\frac{A}{\left( A+1\right) ^{2}} >0 \); hence, a negative \(\rho \) would require at least two values of \(\delta \), \(\delta _{1}<\delta _{2}\), such that \(\rho ^{\prime }\left( \delta _{1}\right) =0<\rho ^{\prime \prime }\left( \delta _{1}\right) \) and \(\rho ^{\prime }\left( \delta _{2}\right) =0>\rho ^{\prime \prime }\left( \delta _{2}\right) \), which is ruled out by convexity, as \(-f^{\prime }(1-\delta )~\) is increasing in \(\delta \) while \(-\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }\frac{3}{2}\frac{A}{ \left( A+\delta \right) ^{2}}=\frac{3A}{\left( A+\delta \right) ^{3}}\) is decreasing. Observe now that \(\Phi ^{\prime }\left( 0\right) =f(x_{m})-\frac{3}{2A}<0\): \(\Phi \left( \delta _{M}\right) >0\) then implies the existence of some \(\overline{\delta }\in \left( 0,\delta _{M}\right) \) such that \(\Phi \left( \overline{\delta }\right) =0<\Phi ^{\prime }\left( \overline{\delta }\right) =f(x+\overline{\delta })-\) \(\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{A+ \overline{\delta }}\), and the latter is unique, as convexity implies that \( \max \left\{ f(x),f(x+\overline{\delta })\right\} =f(x+\overline{\delta } )\ge \) \(\frac{3}{2}\frac{1}{A+\delta }\) for all pairs \(\left( x,\delta \right) \) such that \(\Phi =0\) (Lemma 2(c)). By construction, \( \lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }}x_{1}(\delta )=\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }}x_{2}(\delta )=\widehat{x}(\overline{\delta } ) \) since \(\Delta _{F}\left( \widehat{x}\left( \overline{\delta }\right) , \overline{\delta }\right) =\frac{3}{2}\frac{\overline{\delta }}{A+\overline{ \delta }}\), while \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta }}\frac{\mathrm{d}}{ \mathrm{d}\delta }x_{1}(\delta )=\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}\delta }\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{ \delta }}x_{2}(\delta )=\infty \) as \(f\left( \widehat{x}(\overline{\delta })+ \overline{\delta }\right) =f\left( \widehat{x}\left( \overline{\delta } \right) \right) \).

Fourth step       We are now ready to prove existence. To do so, notice that by the second step, \(x^{a}\left( \delta \right) \) is defined for all \(\delta \in \left[ 0,1\right] \), and obeys \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow 0}x^{a}\left( \delta \right) =x_{A}\in (\overline{x}_{1}, \overline{x}_{2})\); since \(\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta } }x_{1}^{b}\left( \delta \right) =\lim _{\delta \rightarrow \overline{\delta } }x_{2}^{b}\left( \delta \right) \), there exists some \(\delta ^{*}\in \left( 0,\overline{\delta }\right] \), at which either \(x^{a}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) =x_{1}^{b}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) \), or \(x^{a}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) =x_{2}^{b}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) \), or both (in which case \(\delta ^{*}=\overline{\delta }\)). The pair \(\left( x_{1}^{*},x_{2}^{*}\right) = \left( x^{*},x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\right) \) such that \(x^{*}=x^{a}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) \) is a dispersion equilibrium. Indeed, by construction (Proposition 1), it gives both firms’ first-order conditions for maximum profits. Also, the second-order conditions \(\left( A+\delta ^{*}\right) \min \left\{ f(x^{*}),f(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\right\} \ge 1\) are satisfied. First, by convexity, \(\max \left\{ f(x),f(x+\delta )\right\} \ge \) \(\frac{3}{ 2}\frac{1}{A+\delta }>\frac{1}{A+\delta }\) for all \(\left( x,x+\delta \right) \, \)(Lemma 2(c)), which gives those conditions when \(\delta ^{*}=\overline{\delta }\), i.e., whenever \(\Delta _{f}\left( x^{*},\delta ^{*}\right) =0\) (which includes the case of symmetry) and ensures that if \(\Delta _{f}\left( x^{*},\delta ^{*}\right) \ne 0\), \(\max \left\{ f(x^{*}),f(x^{*}+\delta ^{*})\right\} >\frac{1}{ A+\delta ^{*}}\). Secondly, in the latter case, we have \(\delta ^{*}< \overline{\delta }\) and equilibrium is given by \(x^{a}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) =x_{i}^{b}\left( \delta ^{*}\right) \), \(i=1\) for \(x_{A}<x_{m}\), with \(\Delta _{f}\left( x^{*},\delta ^{*}\right) <0\); and \(i=2\) for \( x_{A}>x_{m}\) with \(\Delta _{f}\left( x^{*},\delta ^{*}\right) >0\). Take the case \(x_{A}<x_{m}\): then \(\Delta _{f}\left( x^{*},\delta ^{*}\right) <0\) and \(\min \left\{ f(x^{*}),f\left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\right) \right\} =f\left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\right) \); by Lemma 3, \( x^{*}+\delta ^{*}>x_{A}\), and by convexity \(f\left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\right) +f\left( x_{A}\right) \ge 2\frac{\Delta _{F}\left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*},x_{A}\right) }{x^{*}+\delta ^{*}-x_{A}}=2f(z_{1})\), say; surely \(z_{1}\in \left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*},x_{A}\right) \) and \( f(z_{1})\ge f(x_{m})\): hence, \(f\left( x^{*}+\delta ^{*}\right) \ge 2f(x_{m})-f(x_{A})\ge \frac{1}{A}>\frac{1}{A+\delta ^{*}}\) by assumption (iii). The same goes for \(x_{A}>x_{m}\), in which case by the same Lemma 3 \(x^{*}<x_{A}\) and \(f\left( x^{*}\right) +f\left( x_{A}\right) \ge 2\frac{\Delta _{F}\left( x_{A},x^{*}\right) }{ x_{A}-x^{*}}=2f(z_{2})\), say, so that \(f\left( x^{*}\right) \ge 2f(x_{m})-f(x_{A})>\frac{1}{A+\delta ^{*}}\).

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Benassi, C. Dispersion equilibria in spatial Cournot competition. Ann Reg Sci 52, 611–625 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-014-0603-7

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