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Security analysis of efficient (Un-) fair non-repudiation protocols

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Formal Aspects of Computing

Abstract

An approach to protocol analysis using asynchronous product automata (APA) and the simple homomorphism verification tool (SHVT) is demonstrated on several variants of the well known Zhou–Gollmann fair non-repudiation protocol and on two more recent optimistic fair non-repudiation protocols. Attacks on all these protocols are presented and an improved version of the Zhou–Gollmann protocol is proposed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fraunhofer – Institute for Secure Telecooperation SIT, Rheinstrasse 75, D-64295, Darmstadt, Germany

    S. Gürgens & C. Rudolph

Authors
  1. S. Gürgens
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  2. C. Rudolph
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to S. Gürgens.

Additional information

This paper describes results of work within the project CASENET partly funded by the European Commission under IST-2001-32446.

Received December 2003

Revised September 2004

Accepted November 2004 by A. E. Abdallah, P. Y. A. Ryan, S. A. Schneider and D. J. Cooke

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Gürgens, S., Rudolph, C. Security analysis of efficient (Un-) fair non-repudiation protocols. Form Asp Comp 17, 260–276 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-004-0055-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-004-0055-4

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