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Explanatory and Predictive Roles of Inner Causes: A Reply to Overskeid

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Abstract

Overskeid (1993) argues that the radical behaviorist account of inner events is inadequate. He recommends an alternative approach which explicitly acknowledges the causal role of inner events. This approach supposedly increases the predictive and controlling power of our treatment and also contributes to theoretical consistency. In this paper, it is argued that Overskeid’s alternative approach is based on a mistake. Although accepting the causal role of inner events indeed contributes to theoretical consistency, it does not increase the predictive and controlling power of the treatment.

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Stemmer, N. Explanatory and Predictive Roles of Inner Causes: A Reply to Overskeid. Psychol Rec 45, 349–354 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03395147

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03395147

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