Interbehavioral Psychology and the Logic of Science

Abstract

The celebration of the 200th anniversary of Kant’s Critik der reinen Vernunft offers an occasion to consider the value of naturalistic psychology for scjence and philosophy. The importance of the occasion is enhanced by the well-known fact that Kant was profoundly at home in the sciences of his day, and his work still influences the thinking of later scientists and philosophers, as well as psychologists. As Kantor (1969) has pointed out, Kant is one of the formulators of what is today the predominant model of cognitive psychology.

To assess the place of objective psychology in the philosophy or logic of science it is well to focus on the Kantian doctrine of categories. As history indicates, for Kant, in his time, categories consist of psychic forms which mold sense materials to create the contents of experience and existence.

Of necessity Kant operates with a metaphysical psychology. He regards the understanding, the source of categories and the basic factor in philosophical thinking, as a transcendental entity, and not the behavior of an actual person in a field along with other persons, objects, and events. Kantian psychology thus clashes with current scientific observation and practice.

Naturalistic psychology envisages categories as merely descriptive or classifying terms for carrying on reflective and investigative projects. They promote an understanding of the relation between Constructions and Events, as well as the general nature of intercommunicative Behavior and Symbols.