Abstract
This article examines the optimal environmental regulation in a mixed duopolistic market wherein environmental damage is associated with production. Specifically, the effects of partial privatization on optimal policy choices, environmental damage, and social welfare are examined under three regimes: no regulation, direct regulation on emission, and the indirect regulation via Pigouvian tax. The common result under the different regimes of regulation is that the optimal level of environmental regulation critically depends on the degree of privatization, and its relationship is not monotonous. Furthermore, results show that while privatization results in different impacts on policy choices, environmental damage, and social welfare under the three different regimes, it is mostly compatible with an improvement in environmental quality.
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Naito, T., Ogawa, H. Direct versus indirect environmental regulation in a partially privatized mixed duopoly. Environ Econ Policy Stud 10, 87–100 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03353980
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03353980