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The public administrator: Regulating for maritime transport efficiency

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Abstract

One role often fulfilled by public administrators is to regulate private enterprise in the public interest. The academic literature has not developed this area fully because public administration is not always tasked with this function. Nevertheless, when regulation forms a part of the responsibilities of the public administrator, it is among the most important. An essential foundation for effective regulation is a complete understanding of the implications and impact of regulatory action. In the absence of regulation, entrepreneurial awareness is applied in the private sector exclusively to satisfying consumer wants. In a regulated market, the entrepreneur’s focus is shifted toward regulatory imperatives. Regulation offers non-market opportunities for entrepreneurial innovation, as well as imposing new market constraints. This paper examines regulation of the maritime industry by the US federal government as an example.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Maritime Studies, United States Merchant Marine Academy, 300 Steamboat Road, 11024, Kings Point, New York, USA

    Gary A. Lombardo

  2. Department of Accountancy, Finance, Information Systems and Economics, Western Carolina University, 28723, Cullowhee, North Carolina

    Robert F. Mulligan

Authors
  1. Gary A. Lombardo
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  2. Robert F. Mulligan
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Correspondence to Gary A. Lombardo.

Additional information

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Merchant Marine Academy, the Maritime Administration, the Department of Transportation, or any other US Government agency. Thanks are due to William L. Anderson and two anonymous referees of this Journal for helpful comments.

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Lombardo, G.A., Mulligan, R.F. The public administrator: Regulating for maritime transport efficiency. WMU J Marit Affairs 9, 29–44 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03195164

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