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How efficient is joint decision-making in the EU?

Environmental policies and the Co-decision procedure

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  • European Governance
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Intereconomics

Abstract

This paper looks at how the joint decision-making mode of governance enhances policy effectiveness in the field of European environmental policy. This is mainly due to the as yet neglected phenomenon of the interaction between representative institutions at different levels in the European Union that characterises joint decision-making.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Catholic University, Lisbon

    Francisco Torres

  2. University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal

    Francisco Torres

  3. the Bank of Portugal, Portugal

    Francisco Torres

Authors
  1. Francisco Torres
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Torres, F. How efficient is joint decision-making in the EU?. Intereconomics 38, 312–322 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02914021

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02914021

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