Abstract
In this paper we review Myerson’s proper equilibrium concept and introduce a strict refinement of it; we also demonstrate the existence of at least one of our solutions in every finite non-cooperativen-person normal form game.
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Cuarto Premio de Investigación Fundación ≪Ramiro Melendreras≫ (XVII Reunión Nacional de la SEIO, Benidorm, abril 1988).
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García Jurado, I. Un refinamiento del concepto de equilibrio propio de Myerson. Trabajos de Investigacion Operativa 4, 11–19 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02888337
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02888337