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Empirical analysis of up-or-out rules for promotion policies

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Abstract

Previous research in the areas of tournaments, human capital, and learning theory have shown that promotion is a function of human capital, experience, ability, and wage growth. These variables were used to estimate a Cox regression using data from a single firm. The survival rates for a Cox regression and an up-or-out regression model are computed. The results suggest that certain up-or-out models are valid even when the firm does not have such a policy and show that an up-or-out procedure predicts the promotion and exit survival rates as well as a Cox regression.

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Correspondence to Rosemary L. Walker.

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Walker, R.L. Empirical analysis of up-or-out rules for promotion policies. J Econ Finan 29, 172–186 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02761552

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