Abstract
In its traditional form, Paretian welfare economics has little to say about policies of redistribution. I argue that by adopting a constitutional perspective, elements of a theory of redistribution can be developed without recourse to interpersonal utility comparisons. Individuals who find themselves under an imperfect veil of uncertainty at a constitutional stage face a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of redistribution. The benefits consist of a reduction in the variance of a risk-averse agent's income distribution. The costs are represented by deadweight losses caused either by bureaucracy or by disincentive effects associated with the transfer scheme. My simple formal analysis shows that individuals may, even under an imperfect veil of uncertainty, be able to agree unanimously on a certain transfer policy if their personal characteristics are not too different from each other.
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This paper is a modified version of a chapter from my Master's thesis, submitted at the University of Bonn in 1992. Revisions were done during a stay at DELTA/Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. A scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Urs Schweizer, Hartmut Kliemt, Niclas Berggren, and an anonymous referee of this journal for valuable comments and suggestions, which have greatly improved the paper.
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Wessels, J.H. Redistribution from a constitutional perspective. Constit Polit Econ 4, 425–448 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393270
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393270