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Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities

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Abstract

We give the condition for a welfare improving monopoly deregulation when the decision making process cannot be insulated from Tullock activities and players are risk neutral.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 1101, Quezon City, Philippines

    Raul V. Fabella

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  1. Raul V. Fabella
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Additional information

The author is grateful to the Faculty Recruitment Program (FRP) of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations for financial support.

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Fabella, R.V. Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities. Public Choice 62, 287–293 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02337746

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02337746

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