Abstract
This paper studies compromise and inflexibility in political negotiations. It provides the first analysis of gridlock, a result in which politicians fail to agree on an ideal compromise but which most voters find preferable to the status quo. A multistage game is developed in which contending political blocs choose from hardline or compromise strategies. The outcomes—compromise, gridlock, or one party's ideal legislation—are a function of the incentives of political actors to cooperate or fight. The model illustrates problems in political markets that may occur when consumers are poorly informed.
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Osborne, E. A theory of gridlock: Strategic behavior in legislative deliberations. Atlantic Economic Journal 26, 238–251 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02299342
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02299342