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Budget burden and benefit visibility of European central level governments

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Abstract

Central levels of government in European Union member countries are different regarding their basic institutions, powers, fiscal systems, accountability, public performance management, financial control bodies, and the like. In spite of this, the economic operation of such levels of government should be analyzed, evaluated, and compared from an efficiency viewpoint. This paper presents general indicators to systematically assess the burden and benefit visibility of public budgets of the International Monetary Fund member countries and specific estimates for the central subsystems of public revenue and expenditure now in force in such European countries. An important policy implication of these estimates seems straightforwardly perceived: significant allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms, aiming to raise their current visibility values.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Valencia, Spain

    Miguel Roig-Alonso

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  1. Miguel Roig-Alonso
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Additional information

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Ninth International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 14–21, 2000, Munich, Germany. The author is indebted to conference participants for helpful comments. The author is responsible for any errors or shortcomings.

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Roig-Alonso, M. Budget burden and benefit visibility of European central level governments. International Advances in Economic Research 7, 184–198 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02296008

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